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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores ideas of the state, the military, and identity. It demonstrates the complex 
relationship between these concepts by charting the evolution of three armies which were 
established to fight the Bosnian War from their inception in 1991 until their formal unification in 
2006. This process is illustrated through the analysis of a wide range of sources, including interviews, 
speeches, military journals, government documents and legislation, memoirs, newspaper articles, 
and trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The author’s perspective is 
informed by his experience living, researching, and working in Sarajevo for over two years, in which 
time he also travelled throughout every former Yugoslav republic and learned the local language. 
Nestled in the heart of the Dinaric Alps, Bosnia and Herzegovina is home to three constituent 
peoples (Bosnian Croats, Muslims, and Serbs) which, until the period of study, lived in mixed 
communities scattered across its mountains and valleys. Heritage from a particular constituent 
people did not necessarily inform political outlooks, and for much of the population regional or 
ideological loyalties took precedent. This dissertation first examines how the Yugoslavs attempted to 
build a cohesive military from this range of identities during the socialist period. It then explores how 
rival nationalist leaders raised armies and attempted to build states on Bosnian territory following 
the collapse of Yugoslavia, offering new perspectives and fresh analysis of the Bosnian War. The 
focus of this research, however, is on the process of defence reform and military integration which 
followed the conflict. Just ten years after the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war, the three 
armies which had fought it were unified by the Bosnian parliament. Such a development represents 
a rare moment of political consensus in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is considered to 
be the greatest step in establishing peace since the end of the war. This dissertation illustrates how 
this step was taken.   
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina offers us many insights. It reminds us that the boundaries and 
salience of identity are fluid, and that states are fragile constructs that are difficult to build and 
maintain. It illustrates the difficulties of building a cohesive military from a diverse population, and 
offers a lens to analyse various attempts to overcome them. Furthermore, it demonstrates that 
military integration can serve as the vanguard of institutional reconciliation in post-conflict states 
and a unified army can serve as a symbol of cooperation in a divided society. 
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Introduction 
 
On 1 January 2006, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Oružane snage Bosne i 
Hercegovine, OSBiH) officially entered service. The emergence of this new, multiethnic military came 
just over a decade after a long and bloody war divided the majority of the Bosnian population along 
ethnic lines, both politically and geographically. Upon its formation, the OSBiH became the largest 
multiethnic institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina, BiH), and ever since, its 
architects have held the military integration process as a model for the rest of Bosnian society to 
follow.1 Much of BiH has remained divided since the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) ended the war. 
State-level governance remains largely deadlocked, while economic stagnation and falling standards 
of living continue to drive population decline. It is in this challenging political climate that the 
Bosnian military has quietly been strengthening itself as an institution, and BiH as a state.  
Since 2005, Bosnian troops have served alongside soldiers from a host of other militaries during 
multilateral operations around the world. The units sent on such missions are always equally 
representative of BiH’s three constituent peoples: Bosnian Croats, Muslims, and Serbs. The first 
OSBiH unit to deploy abroad, for example, was an unexploded ordnance disposal team composed of 
12 personnel from each constituent people. The team was sent to Iraq to join the international 
peace support operation there.2 Operating alongside more experienced and more advanced armed 
forces in enivironments such as this presents an excellent opportunity for Bosnian troops to 
exchange knowledge and develop experience, while also contributing to the institutional identity 
and cohesion of the OSBiH. In total, 1,222 personnel from the Bosnian Ministry of Defence and the 
OSBiH have participated in EU, NATO, and UN missions outside of BiH.3 Furthermore, through its 
participation in such operations, the OSBiH has earned itself a good reputation, as this 2018 report 
makes clear: 
The participation of members from BiH in peace support operations has been rated 
positively and they can be seen as ambassadors of their country. Their outstanding 
achievements attracted the attention of world media through various events on missions 
where they participated, and were rewarded with recognition by the UN, NATO, and local 
governments.4 
                                                          
1 Paddy Ashdown, interview with the author. (22/03/2016) 
2 Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Brochure. (Sarajevo, 2011) p.5 
3 Centre for Security Studies – Sarajevo. Bosnia and Herzegovina in Peace Missions: Contribution to Maintaining 
Peace in the World. (Sarajevo, 2018) p.10 
4 Ibid. p.12 
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Furthermore, since its formation, the OSBiH has been a partner of the Maryland National Guard 
through the US Department of Defense’s State Partnership Program. In this time, thousands of 
soldiers from across BiH have deployed on training exercises together and participated in events 
with their counterparts from Maryland, enhancing their professionalism further.5 Additional 
assistance has been offered to the OSBiH from the British Embassy in Sarajevo, which has sponsored 
an initiative since 2013 that aims to rejuvenate the ‘ageing’ OSBiH officer corps by ‘identifying the 
best young leaders from the civilian post-graduate sector’ and establishing the ‘best possible model 
for selecting and training’ the next generation of Bosnian military leaders.6 The result of all of these 
activities is an increasingly capable and professional military which is viewed as a peer by the officers 
and soldiers of other armed forces. The successful development of the OSBiH was recently 
recognised by the leadership of NATO, who, in December 2018, invited BiH to submit its first Annual 
National Plan detailing how it will meet the terms of its Membership Action Plan (MAP). Once the 
MAP is complete, BiH will be ready to join NATO as a full member state if the political consensus to 
do so can be found.7  
The path to this moment, however, has not been smooth. Prior to the events of 2018, Bosnian 
progress towards NATO accession stalled for almost a decade. A particular point of contention for 
many Bosnian Serb leaders was the signing over of defence property seized during the war to the 
state. Despite numerous court rulings, it took over nine years for any progress to be made on this 
issue, and it remains largely unresolved at the time of writing. Furthermore, many other security and 
defence matters continue to threaten the stability of BiH. In 2017, for example, Bosnian Serb soldiers 
participated in a parade celebrating the formation of the Bosnian Serb entity in BiH, Republika 
Srpska (RS), in defiance of a Bosnian government declaration that such action was unconstitutional.8 
More recently, RS President Milorad Dodik called for Bosnian Serb troops to wear their old wartime 
uniforms during ceremonies, rather than the current uniforms inspired by those worn in the US 
military.9 Furthermore, recent estimates suggest that the RS administration has built up an arsenal 
of weaponry, largely imported from Russia, including enough automatic rifles to arm ‘roughly 75 
percent of its [5,238-strong] police with Kalashnikov-type firearms,’ and is even rumoured to have 
                                                          
5 Maj. Kurt Rauschenberg. “Bosnia and Herzegovina armed forces celebrate Armed Forces Day, marking 13 
years of unified military.” U.S. Army News. (01/12/2018)  
6 British Embassy Sarajevo. “Best and Brightest Required to Lead the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
UK Government Announcements. (02/10/2013) Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/best-and-
brightest-required-to-lead-the-armed-forces-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina 
7 Gregorian, interview with the author. 
8 Andrew Byrne. “Bosnian Serb forces take part in illegal ‘statehood day’ parade.” Financial Times. 
(09/01/2017) 
9 Alan Crosby. “Bosnian Serb Leader’s Call for Wartime Uniforms Tugs at Bosnia’s Nationalist Threads.” Radio 
Free Europe. (13/05/2019)  
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procured Igla 1-V anti-aircraft missiles.10 Events and developments such as this indicate the extent to 
which the military remains a contentious topic in Bosnian politics, but also highlight the significance 
and symbolic importance of the unified OSBiH.  
In order to properly illustrate how a multiethnic army was built in this evironment, this dissertation 
explores the military history of BiH from when it was a constituent republic of Yugoslavia to the 
formation of the OSBiH. Although volumes of literature (much of which is discussed in detail) has 
been published on the collapse of Yugoslavia, the war in BiH, and the post-Dayton reform process, 
the research presented in the following chapters constitutes the first work from a military 
perspective to assess these events as an integral whole. However, rather than focussing on battles 
and wars, this dissertation analyses the ways in which the five armies that developed in BiH between 
1991 - 2006 approached the subject of identity.11 In each case, the ethnic composition, structure, 
ideology, and educational initiatives of the military are assessed, along with the ceremonial and 
symbolic functions that its soldiers are expected to perform.  With the history and organisational 
methods of the armies which preceded the OSBiH well established, the dissertation culminates with 
a detailed account of how they were pieced together to form a single, unified army. This final section 
includes not just an overview of the practical aspects of the defence reform and military integration 
process, but also builds on themes discussed throughout the dissertation to illustrate why the OSBiH 
was organised in the way it was and explain why this model was chosen.  
This dissertation demonstrates that building a multiethnic military is a vital step of state-building in 
diverse societies, particularly after conflict. The case of BiH illustrates this process over the longue 
durée, and highlights the impact of conflict and international crisis management initiatives on such 
processes. In addition, this dissertation reveals the many ways in which the military has been 
employed, with varying degrees of success, to forge and consolidate national identities.   
The first chapters of this dissertation provide the conceptual and historical context in which the 
findings of later chapters should be understood. Chapter One explores the themes that underpin the 
dissertation, including: state formation; civil-military relations; nation-building; nations and 
nationalism; military organisation; and multiethnic armed forces. It combines historical examples 
with theories drawn from a range of academic disciplines to illustrate the relationship between the 
state, the military, and identity. By doing so, the chapter not only provides definitions of such 
concepts, but also creates a lens through which the complex processes that represent the core of 
                                                          
10 Rauf Bajrović, Richard Kraemer, & Emir Suljagić. Bosnia on the Chopping Block: The Potential for Violence and 
Steps to Prevent it. (Philadelphia, 2018) p.6 
11 This figure excludes paramilitary formations, as well as the peacekeeping forces deployed by the UN, NATO, 
and EU.  
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this dissertation can be better understood. Furthermore, it outlines many of the challenges that 
those who hoped to build a multiethnic army in post-war BiH faced and establishes the historical 
context in which their efforts took place.  
The framework established in Chapter One is then applied to two case studies. By examining the 
history of the Lebanese Army, Chapter Two provides an overview of how a multiethnic military was 
successfully created following a civil war. This serves to provide an example of how such armed 
forces have been organised, while also illustrating the challenges that a complex post-conflict 
environment creates for policymakers and military leaders. The second case study assesses the ways 
in which the British Army has overcome the challenge of forging a cohesive military from the diverse 
population that it serves. The study focusses on the origins and development of the regimental 
system, a method of military organisation that was adopted by the OSBiH upon its formation. 
Together, these two case studies establish templates of successful multiethnic militaries which are 
used to comparatively analyse the other armed forces discussed in the dissertation. Furthermore, 
they also establish two models which provide another lens through which the defence reform and 
military integration process in BiH can be better understood.  
Chapter Three offers an analysis of the origins and development of the Yugoslav People’s Army 
(Jugoslovenska narodna armija, JNA) and the territorial defence formations that supported it. This 
serves a number of key functions. Primarily, it provides vital context for understanding the war in 
BiH and the armies which fought in it. Indeed, all of the armies that fought in the war and later 
became components of the OSBiH drew many of their structures, units, and personnel from the 
Yugoslav defence establishment. Additionally, understanding how the multiethnic JNA was 
organised provides necessary context for understanding the decisions, outlooks, and political 
platforms that informed the creation of the OSBiH. Together, these three chapters serve to review 
existing literature, offer crucial context for understanding the Bosnian War, and provide the 
theoretical underpinning of the dissertation.  
Chapters Four and Five focus on the conflict in BiH and the emergence of rival states and armies on 
Bosnian territory between 1991 and 1995. Chapter Four assesses the formation of RS and its 
military, the Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike Srpske, VRS). As the army which inherited 
most equipment and personnel, as well as the structures of the JNA, particular consideration is given 
to the changes and continuity between the two. Furthermore, the chapter provides an account of 
how the VRS transitioned from an inclusive, multiethnic, and socialist military into a nominally 
monoethnic, nationalist army. Examining the VRS from this perspective not only offers many insights 
into its history, but also creates a new perspective from which to view the war. Chapter Five 
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analyses the armies which, in 1992, fought for the Bosnian government: The Army of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, ARBiH) and the Croat Defence 
Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, HVO). As well as charting the origins and development of these two 
armed forces and offering insights into the relationship between the two, this chapter focuses on 
the gradual evolution of the ARBiH from an inclusive and multiethnic force into a predominantly 
Bosnian Muslim army. As with Chapter Four, assessing the ARBiH and HVO in this way provides a 
fresh perception of the conflict. The three armies are assessed through the analysis of documents, 
testimonies, and recollections of key participants. The official journals of the ARBiH and the VRS, 
Prva linija (Front Line) and Srpska vojska (Serb Army) respectively, provide the core source base for 
these chapters. Both were established in the earliest days of the war, and report on developments 
within each army, offer interviews with leading political and military figures, and provide a 
fascinating insight into the conflict. Almost every senior commander (from all three armies) to 
survive the war published a memoir of some kind. The works of Rasim Delić, Jovan Divjak, Hasan 
Efendić, and Sefer Halilović from the ARBiH, Vinko Pandurević and Manojlo Milovanović from the 
VRS, and Slobodan Praljak of the HVO are considered, alongside publications by political figures from 
neighbouring countries and the international community.  
Chapters Four and Five provide a detailed account of the history of the three component parts which 
would later form the OSBiH: the ARBiH, HVO, and VRS. With this context established, Chapter Six 
details political and military developments in BiH in the years following Dayton. It provides an 
account of how each army adapted to peace and offers detail on the major developments and 
events which informed the Bosnian security sector in this period, including the creation of the Army 
of the Federation (Vojska federacije, VF) of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the ARBiH and HVO. 
Furthermore, the chapter explores the relationships between the armies and the various 
administrations that governed them, detailing how each military responded to its political leaders 
and the ways in which such leaders utilised the armies to consolidate their bases of power. In 
addition, this chapter serves to set the scene for the events of 2002 – 2006 which culminated in the 
creation of the OSBiH.  
The final chapter focusses on the political events, practical steps, and individual efforts which led to 
a multiethnic military being constructed in BiH. A central feature of the chapter is the Orao Affair, a 
political scandal which directly led to seismic changes in the governance and organisation of the 
security sector in BiH and proved to be a catalyst for defence reform and ultimately military 
unification. Indeed, such was the impact of the scandal that a dedicated article, based on preliminary 
research for this dissertation, was published in February 2018 in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies 
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on the topic.12 The chapter also considers the organisation and structure of the OSBiH by drawing on 
many of the concepts and models discusses throughout the dissertation. This significant period of 
Bosnian history is severely under-reasearched, making the contribution that this chapter in 
particular offers the field to be particularly significant.  
Sources  
A meaningful investigation into the complex topics described in the chapter outlines required 
idenifying and analysing a broad base of source material, as well as developing a nuanced and 
sophisticated understanding of the society and history of BiH and the former Yugoslavia. 
Furthermore, while many sources (particularly those produced after the war) have been published in 
English, much of the material upon which this study is based only exists in its original language and 
can only be found in the region. As a result, to best conduct the research for this dissertation, I lived 
in Sarajevo for over two years and travelled extensively throughout former Yugoslavia. By doing so, I 
became acquainted with the people, culture, and history of the area, learned the local language, and 
conducted extensive archival research in BiH and Serbia. At the National and University Library of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, I uncovered the official journals of the various the armed forces and the 
memoirs of a broad range of Bosnian military and political figures, as well as extensive newspaper 
and media records from some of the key events discussed in this dissertation. The National Library in 
Belgrade offered access to a considerable collection of specialist books and documents. Many are 
first hand accounts and memoirs written by former military personnel and politicians, while others 
represent the research of leading scholars from the region.  
The source material acquired in Belgrade and Sarajevo provides the foundation of this dissertation. 
This base has been built on using material gathered from numerous other sources. The interview 
transcripts of the 1995 BBC documentary, The Death of Yugoslavia, held at the Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives at King’s College London, proved to be an invaluable resource. The collection 
includes extensive interviews with almost every major diplomatic, military, and political figure 
involved in the conflict, to the extent that many were used as evidence by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). These transcripts provided many significant insights for my 
work. Furthermore, I gathered additional useful material from the US Army Center for Military 
History in Washington, DC. The After-Action Reports and transcribed oral history testimonies 
produced by US personnel serving in IFOR and SFOR, the NATO peacekeeping forces deployed to BiH 
after the war, provide a fascinating perspective of the armed forces in BiH. This selection of archival 
                                                          
12 Elliot Short. “The Orao Affair: The Key to Military Integration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1. (2018) 
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material was also strengthened further with numerous books I was able to acquire from shops, 
collectors, and friends across the region. 
After the war, an extensive range of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations began 
working in BiH. The EU, NATO, OSCE, and UN, for example, all maintained missions which focussed 
on upholding peace and driving the recovery from conflict, while countless NGOs led projects and 
researched various aspects of BiH’s transition from war. The reports, publications, and other records 
produced by such organisations, particularly those that operated in the security sector, provide this 
dissertation with an additional selection of excellent source material. Of note are the assessments 
and analysis offered by peacekeepers who were deployed to BiH, as their expertise and unique 
perspectives on the conflict and its aftermath are particularly insightful to this dissertation. 
Documents such as this are supplemented by similar reports and publications produced by various 
institutions of the Bosnian government, the OSBiH itself, as well as government departments of 
numerous other states.   
An additional source of material comes from the trials of the ICTY. The witness testimonies, legal 
assessments, and verdicts of the Tribunal provide a wealth of information and insights into the war 
in BiH and the armies which fought it. The efforts of prosecutors to prove the link between the VRS 
and Belgrade in particular are useful, as the details of such secretive initiatives may otherwise have 
been lost. Instead, the work of the ICTY offers detailed first-hand accounts from individuals who 
participated in the conflict at every level, as well as expert assessments of the key events of conflict. 
The greatest strength of this dissertation, however, is the material gathered from “elite interviews” 
with individuals involved in the events and developments relevant to this thesis, including the 
construction of the OSBiH.13 These include Paddy Ashdown, who served as High Representative in 
BiH from May 2002 until January 2006. In this time, he was responsible for overseeing the 
governance of BiH and ensuring the terms of the DPA were adhered to, making him the most 
politically powerful individual in the country. Furthermore, the construction of the OSBiH was, for 
the most part, the result of his ambition and vision. However, Ashdown had little involvement in the 
practical and technical aspects of the reform process. Much of this was done by NATO officials 
working alongside Bosnian politicians and military personnel. One of the most significant NATO 
figures involved in this process was Raffi Gregorian, who Co-Chaired the Defence Reform 
Commission which designed the OSBiH and created a plan for its construction. Gregorian was 
assisted in his work by Rohan Maxwell, who now serves as NATO’s Senior Politico-Military Advisor in 
                                                          
13 Elite interviews target people directly involved in the political process. Glen Beamer. “Elite Interviews and 
State Politics Research.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1. (2002) p.87 
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BiH. Maxwell was responsible for developing a model of military organisation that was affordable, 
practical, and most importantly, acceptable to Bosnian politicians of all parties. The perspectives and 
insights I gained by interviewing such figures were complimented further by lengthy conversations I 
held with a range of Bosnian politicians and international military personnel and officials. 
My sense of the history and political context in which the reform process took place was further 
informed by the time I spent working for a Bosnian non-governmental organisation that works 
alongside a host of international bodies, the Centre for Security Studies (CSS). While working there, I 
was able to discuss the recent military history of BiH with the staff of the country’s leading civil-
society organisation dedicated to researching and scrutinising security policy. Furthermore, by 
assisting in a number of projects that CSS were developing, as well as writing reports of my own, I 
became familiar with the practical implications of the military integration process. I also participated 
in, and later contributed to, the International Peace and Security Institute’s Symposium on Post-
Conflict Transitions that was held in Ilidža in 2017 and 2018. This proved to be an excellent 
opportunity to meet a broad range of scholars, students, peacebuilding practitioners, and military 
personnel from around the world (including BiH) with experience in researching or delivering 
processes such as defence reform in post-war BiH.  
The initial findings of this study have been presented for scrutiny and discussion in a range of 
academic articles, media publications, and conference papers.14 These have served as barometers to 
measure the progress of my research and have allowed me to refine the analysis and observations 
contained in this dissertation. As a result, it represents a considered and balanced exploration of the 
process of building a multiethnic military in post-Yugoslav BiH, and offers fresh insights into the 
complex dynamic between the state, the military, and identity in the former Yugoslavia. 
Literature and Definitions 
A wealth of literature has been produced which explores various aspects of the Bosnian War, the 
DPA, and post-Dayton BiH. The US Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Russian and European 
Analysis published Balkan Battlegrounds, an unclassified treatise based on the Agency’s tracking of 
the conflict, in 2002.15 It remains the most comprehensive strategic analysis of the conflicts in BiH 
and the wider region during the 1990s, and also provides insights into key political developments 
                                                          
14 These include regular attendance at the British Association of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies’ annual 
conference at Cambridge University, a trip to the Association of East European and Eurasian Studies conference 
in Chicago, as well as presentations given at Uppsala University, the Royal Danish Defence College, and the 
Sarajevo School of Science and Technology.  
15 Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military 
History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995. (Washington, DC, 2002)   
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that affected military aspects of the conflict. A more refined evaluation of these developments, 
however, is presented in James Gow’s The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. Based on research 
conducted for trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Gow’s 
work provides an authoritative account of the complex machinations and key events that brought 
about the collapse of Yugoslavia and illustrates the complex dynamics of power and influence which 
guided the conflicts.16 Marko Attila Hoare’s How Bosnia Armed offers a detailed study of how the 
Bosnian government, facing an international arms embargo and a much more powerful foe, 
managed to raise and equip an army during the war.17 In addition, considerable volumes have been 
published by participants and witnesses of the Bosnian War. Indeed, most major political and 
military leaders from BiH and beyond involved in the conflict have published diaries, memoirs, or 
studies of aspects of the conflict. Some of the most insightful contemporary accounts, however, 
come from observers rather than participants. War correspondent Anthony Loyd, for example, was 
in BiH for most of the conflict, and the reflections he offers in My War Gone By, I Miss It So portray 
many complexities of the war that are often overlooked in such accounts, particularly the trials and 
tribulations of ordinary people.18 The head of the European Community Monitoring Mission 
deployed to wartime BiH, Colm Doyle, provides a similarly insightful commentary on political 
developments in the first years of the conflict based on his observations from meetings and 
investigations as a peacekeeper.19  
Considerable scholarship has focussed on the DPA and its implementation. Many of the facilitators 
and signatories of the Agreement produced publications which illustrate their perspective on events, 
while the implementation of the agreement has been analysed by countless political scientists and 
NGOs.20 Christopher Bennett’s Bosnia’s Paralysed Peace offers the most comprehensive analysis of 
the efforts to stabilise BiH in this period.21 Post-war defence reform has been the subject of more 
                                                          
16 James Gow. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes. (London, 2003); Gow has also 
produced numerous other relevant works, including: James Gow. The Triumph of the Lack of Will: International 
Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. (London, 1997) and James Gow. Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav 
Crisis. (London, 1992)   
17 Marko Attila Hoare. How Bosnia Armed. (London, 2004); Hoare has also written on the development of civil-
military relations in the ARBiH: Marko Attila Hoare. “Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995.” 
In Branka Magaš & Ivo Zanić, eds. The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995. (London, 2013) 
18 Anthony Loyd. My War Gone By, I Miss It So. (London, 2000) 
19 Colm Doyle. Witness to War Crimes: The Memoirs of a Peacekeeper in Bosnia. (Barnsley, 2018)   
20 The Peace Implementation Council and the Office of the High Representative were both established to 
monitor and assist with the implementation of the DPA, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation were mandated to oversee certain provisions of the 
Agreement. The United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, and the International Crisis Group also 
established missions designed to monitor or assist BiH in its transition from conflict. All published reports and 
analysis on the situation in BiH. Florian Bieber and Sumantra Bose are the most prolific political analysts of the 
implementation of Dayton, and their relevant publications are listed in the bibliography.  
21 Christopher Bennett. Bosnia's Paralysed Peace. (London, 2016) 
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focused studies, with Destination NATO: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, written by 
Rohan Maxwell and John Andreas Olsen, providing the most detailed account of this process.22 An 
excellent overview is also offered in Military Integration After Civil Wars, in which Florence Gaub 
examines the case of BiH alongside other examples of post-conflict defence reform.23 
This dissertation navigates these established works, drawing on many key ideas and observations. 
However, none of the existing literature considers the military history of BiH in the timeframe 
presented in these chapters, nor do they investigate the impact that armed forces had on the 
creation and development of states and identity as Yugoslavia collapsed. In addition, the research 
presented in the final chapters of this dissertation represents previously unexplored territory for 
historians and provides vital insights for anyone wishing to understand the contemporary military 
situation in BiH. It is in these areas that this dissertation makes a unique and valuable contribution to 
the field.   
 
 
  
                                                          
22 Rohan Maxwell & John Andreas Olsen. Destination NATO: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003-
2013. (London, 2013); Maxwell has also published an insightful chapter on the subject in Rohan Maxwell. 
“Bosnia-Herzegovina: From Three Armies to One.” in Roy Licklider, ed. New Armies From Old: Merging 
Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars.Washington, DC, 2014) 
23 Florence Gaub. Military Integration After Civil Wars: Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction. (London, 2011) 
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Chapter One: The State, Identity, and the Military 
 
The dynamic between the state, identity, and the military is complex and subject to influence from 
an immeasurable array of factors. The military occupies an intermediary position between the state 
and society, serving as an instrument of power for the former whilst being drawn from the latter, 
and as a result it represents a significant connection between the two. Furthermore, the military is 
embedded with the heritage of the society it serves, the national narratives of which are often 
mythologised histories of the military’s exploits. Tasked with the solemn duty of defending the 
territory, integrity, and population of a state, the military is an institution dependent on cohesion 
and unity to serve its purpose. In almost every case, however, a society is composed of numerous 
groups which may not be inclined to form united and cohesive institutions, nor to stand shoulder-to-
shoulder for a common cause. This chapter provides an overview of the key developments of the 
relationship between the state and the military, explores the interaction between identity and the 
military, and culminates with an analysis of the dynamic between these three concepts.  
Civil-Military Relations 
Sociologist Charles Tilly famously stated that ‘war made states, and vice versa.’ He argues that as 
Europe emerged from the middle ages, rulers gradually consolidated the ‘coercive means’ at their 
disposal at the expense of the populations under their control (which they disarmed) and any rival 
powerholders (whose armies they abolished). Once coercive means have been established within a 
given territory, a ruler gains a multiplicity of advantages (money, goods, etc), which they then 
attempt to protect and extend. In order to protect and extend their territories, standing armies 
developed, which, Tilly argues, generated the structures of a state.  
It did so both because an army became a significant organisation within the state and 
because its construction and maintenance brought complementary organisations – 
treasuries, supply services, mechanisms for conscription, tax bureaux, and much more – into 
life.’1  
Over time, such a model had to be adopted by more rulers, as failing to do so would result in defeat, 
and so ‘war wove the European network of national states, and preparations for war created the 
international structures within it.’2 According to Tilly’s theory, the origins of the modern state and 
                                                          
1 Charles Tilly. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 – 1990. (Blackwell, 1992) pp.70-71 
2 Ibid. p.76 
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the modern military are wholly intertwined, with one existing in order to facilitate the other. By such 
logic, it should be argued that the state made the military, and vice versa.   
Max Weber, who ruminated on the nature of the state long before Tilly, defined the state as a 
‘compulsory political association with continuous organisation’ whose ‘administrative staff 
successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.’3 In other 
words, as Francis Fukuyama would later postulate, ‘the essence of stateness is enforcement: the 
ability, ultimately, to send someone with a uniform and a gun to force people to comply with the 
state’s laws.’4 Whilst a state represents the source of authority within a given territory, it requires 
power to implement its will and enforce its laws. Armies typify the ultimate expression of power, 
coercion, and as a result their relationship with whom they serve and to what they owe their loyalty 
represents a challenging dilemma. A state requires an army for protection and, in the case that the 
civilian police are unable to fulfil its duties, the enforcement of laws. An army, however, because of 
its monopoly on the tools of violence, also presents a threat to the state.  
The involvement of the military in matters of state has historically been labelled as ‘Praetorianism’ 
after the Praetorian Guard of the Roman Empire. Initially established as a personal bodyguard of 
Emperor Augustus, the Praetorians possessed a monopoly on the use of force within the city of 
Rome, which offered them significant power and influence. They became infamous for assassinating 
Emperor Caligula and replacing him with Claudius, but would continue to “participate” in politics in 
this manner for centuries. Samuel Huntington, when considering contemporary ‘praetorian 
societies,’ proposed that three models of military involvement in society can be identified: 
Oligarchic, in which political participation is limited to dominant social forces such as landowners, 
the clergy, and the military, which is incorporated into governing structures; Middle-class radical, in 
which the oligarchic regime has been overthrown and the military offers stability, the inclusion of 
the middle-class in political participation, and the enforced demobilisation of other political 
elements; and Mass, in which there is mass participation in politics and the military acts as a 
‘guardian’ of the middle-class, serving to ‘block the lower classes from scaling the heights of political 
power.’5 Whilst his analysis is largely limited to Latin America, and defines the political actions of 
other institutions (the clergy and civil service, etc) as praetorian, it does provide a framework for 
understanding military involvement in state governance. Eric Nordlinger offers a more precise 
definition of praetorianism in contemporary societies, which is limited to military participation: 
                                                          
3 Max Weber. The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. (A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, trans) 
(Oxford, 1947) p.154 
4 Francis Fukuyama. “The Imperative of State-Building.” in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 2. (2004) p.21 
5 Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies. (Yale, 1968) pp.201-2 
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‘Praetorianism refers to a situation in which military officers are major or predominant political 
actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force.’6 
The quandary of how to ensure the military is effective enough to enforce the state’s will without it 
becoming prone to praetorianism has historically been illustrated by the question “Who will guard 
the guardians?” (Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?), first posited by the Roman satirist Juvenal.7 Indeed, 
that people with guns freely subordinate themselves to people without guns is counter-intuitive, as 
Samuel Finer suggests: 
Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever 
do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-a-vis other civilian 
groupings are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organisation. And they 
possess arms.8 
Various traditions, circumstances, and conventions can explain why a military may not become 
involved in politics. However ultimately the disinclination of an armed group to seize power can only 
be explained by loyalty, either to an individual, a state or an idea. To be efficient and effective 
fighting forces armies must share a common loyalty to one of these focus points. However, as 
individuals die, states fail, and ideas are shunned, an army can be left in a position in which it owes 
loyalty to nothing. In such a situation, an army may seize power from those it was protecting and 
create a new focus for loyalty, or it can splinter as its composite elements replace their shared 
loyalty with divergent loyalties to other individuals, states or ideas. As a result, the question of how 
to build a cohesive army to serve the state effectively, yet not threaten the state itself, has been the 
subject of debate among leaders, generals and thinkers for the course of recorded history.  
Many of the city-states of ancient Greece were fully aware of the threat the military posed to their 
fledgling republics. In order to ensure their armies reflected their civic values, and to prevent them 
from attaining too much power, the ideal of the citizen-soldier was advocated. The citizen-soldier 
represents two key pillars upon which the legacy of the Hellenic World was built: military service and 
civic participation. Claire Snyder argues that ‘citizen-soldiers serve in the military in order to protect 
their ability to govern themselves for the common good, and they participate in the process of 
deciding when to engage in war. Both halves of the ideal are equally important.’9 Central to this 
                                                          
6 Eric Nordlinger. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. (Upper Saddle River, 1977) p.3 
7 In the original context “Who will guard the guardians?” was used to show the impossibility of imposing a 
moral code on women. Juvenal. Thirteen Satires of Juvenal, Volume 1. (John Mayor, trans) (Cambridge, 2010) 
Satire 6. 
8 Samuel Finer. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. (London, 1962) p.5 
9 Claire Snyder. Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican 
Tradition. (London, 1999) p.1 
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model of preventing praetorianism is the investment the soldiers have, as individual citizens, in the 
state they serve. Indeed, the citizen-soldier’s commitment to civic participation precludes the need 
for the military to become involved in the state, because the boundary between the state and the 
military does not exist. Every (male) citizen is responsible for both the state and the military, and is 
guided through decisions via a set of principles, including ‘liberty, equality, camaraderie, the rule of 
law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship.’10 
The armies of the Roman Republic were modelled on the concept of the citizen-soldier, and with 
them Rome conquered much of the Mediterranean coast and established a sizeable empire. 
However, restricting military service to citizens with a certain amount of wealth led to frequent 
manpower shortages, which were addressed in 107 BC by sweeping reforms. Rather than military 
service being the civic right and duty of a few enfranchised wealthy classes, the new armies of Rome 
would be formed from the whole spectrum of society, who would serve in exchange for a plot of 
land at the end of their service.11 This contract between land-ownership and military service would 
come to dominate the relationship between the military and the state across most of the former 
Roman Empire for centuries. In medieval Europe, armies were formed from companies of 
mercenaries and troops supplied by vassals, who were obligated to supply a certain number to their 
monarch or tenant-in-chief in exchange for the fiefdom they controlled.12 Thus, militarily, feudalism 
can be explained by the following model: ‘a free man, the feudal lord, gave another free man, the 
vassal, a fief, which could be a piece of land, a post, or any other asset. The vassal in return 
committed himself to be obedient and loyal.’13 Under feudalism, the state – to be understood as the 
ruling aristocracy – also represented the most significant elements of the military, and is protected 
from the rest by the highly stratified, hierarchical society in which it operates. Whilst many peasants 
were mobilised from time to time, any armies they formed to challenge the state ‘were subjugated 
by an aristocracy of mounted warriors that became more powerful than any central institution and 
increasingly appropriated the jurisdiction over the peasants.’14 In this manner, a select group of 
individuals were again entrusted with both the state and the military, although this model of military 
service partnered with land ownership rather than civic participation.  
                                                          
10 Ibid. pp.1-2 
11 Christopher Anthony Matthew. On the Wings of Eagles: The Reforms of Gaius Marius and the Creation of 
Rome’s First Professional Soldiers. (Newcastle, 2010) p.26 
12 Ian Heath. Armies of Feudal Europe 1066 – 1300. (Cambridge, 2006) p.12 
13 Stefan Burkhardt. “Feudalism in Europe.” In Clifford Rogers, ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval 
Warfare and Military Technology, Vol. 1. (Oxford, 2010) p.44  
14 Rene Barendse. “The Feudal Mutation: Military and Economic Transformations of the Ethnosphere in the 
Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries.” Journal of World History, Vol. 14, No. 4. (2003) p.511 
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Over time, however, levy troops raised from fiefs of land lacked the training and equipment to be of 
much military worth. Furthermore, the value of land as a source of wealth diminished in comparison 
to material goods, trade, and currency, and as a result, armies came to be increasingly composed of 
mercenaries, particularly in areas in which feudalism did not fully develop, such as Italy. The rise of 
mercenary armies was considered by Niccolo Machiavelli in the sixteenth century, who wrote that 
‘these foreign soldiers are more likely to harm the public good than are one's own men.’15 He 
observed that ‘there exists no more dangerous sort of infantry than one composed of men who 
make war their profession, since you are forced either to make war constantly and repeatedly pay 
these men, or run the risk that they will take your kingdom from you.’16 Inspired by the legions of 
Rome and their ‘true and perfect antiquity,’ Machiavelli concludes that ‘one cannot build one’s 
foundation on forces other than one’s own’ and advocates a return to a military composed solely of 
the citizens of the state.17 
The New Model Army of the English Civil War (1642-51) represented a revolutionary step forward in 
terms of the relationship between state and military. The Army was composed of full-time soldiers 
rather than militiamen or levies, and was free to be deployed anywhere as it had no ties to garrisons. 
It was financed by a combination of taxes and loans offered by the merchants of the City of London, 
boasted high levels of discipline and, as it was essentially meritocratic after 1644, officers were 
professional soldiers who did not have seats in Parliament.18 In terms of its structure, organisation, 
financing, and, most importantly, its separation from political authority, the New Model Army was 
an unprecedented development. Parliament would utilise the power of its new army to consolidate 
its control of the entire British Isles, acquire additional colonies abroad, and establish a bridgehead 
on the European continent.19 A leading General, Oliver Cromwell, would ultimately use his influence 
to seize power, however the principle of the state possessing a standing army financed by the 
population (rather than an array of small armies financed and commanded by aristocrats), ‘wholly 
under the control of Parliament rather than the many competing local interests,’ established the 
prevailing model of the modern military – and the modern state as understood by Tilly and Weber.   
The following century witnessed another revolutionary development in the relationship between the 
state and the military. Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian general and military theorist of the Napoleonic 
era, examined war as a science. In his posthumously published treatise On War he famously stated 
                                                          
15 Niccolo Machiavelli. The Art of War. (P. Bondanella and M. Musa, trans) (London, 1995) p.8 
16 Ibid. p.19 
17 Ibid. p.34 
18 Ian Roy. “Towards the Standing Army 1485-1660.” in David G. Chandler & Ian Beckett, eds. The Oxford History 
of the British Army. (Oxford, 1994) pp.43-5 
19 Ibid.  
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that ‘war is nothing more than a continuation of political intercourse,’ describing it simply as ‘an act 
of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.’20 In addition, Clausewitz viewed the 
soldier in simple terms, claiming that ‘the soldier is levied, clothed, armed, exercised, he sleeps, eats, 
drinks, and marches, all merely to fight at the right time and place.’21 His thinking epitomised the 
new principles that would come to govern political and military thinking during the Enlightenment. 
Viewed in an abstract manner, war was explained as nothing more than an instrument of policy, and 
therefore, in order to achieve that policy, war without limit can be utilised. Applying such abstract 
ideas practically heralded the emergence of the principle of “Total War” and the mobilisation of the 
entire country in pursuit of victory. As Clausewitz himself observed, ‘instead of governments and 
armies as heretofore, the full nation was thrown into the balance.’22 
The modern study of the relationship between the military and the state began with Huntington’s 
The Soldier and the State, published in 1957. He not only laid the foundation of modern civil-military 
relations discourse (the discussion regarding the relationship between civil society and the military 
established to protect it), but also raised questions regarding what it meant to be a military 
professional, how a military should be organised, and what its relationship with the state should be. 
Huntington posits that ‘the cleavage between the military and civilian spheres and the resulting 
tension between the two are phenomena of distinctly recent origin,’ suggesting the Napoleonic 
Wars as the genesis of such issues.23 He proposes that the key to preventing military involvement in 
politics is to create a professional military class, over which objective military control is achieved by 
‘militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state.’24 He views a professional officer as 
someone ‘who pursues a “higher calling” in the service of society,’ defining their professionalism as 
being earned through expertise, responsibility and corporateness.25 The key task of an officer, 
therefore, is limited to the ‘management of violence,’ a phrase first used by the political scientist 
Harold Lasswell.26 Furthermore, the function of a professional military force is deemed to be nothing 
more than achieving ‘successful armed combat.’27 This definition is expanded by Anthony Forster, 
Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, who state that professional armed forces are those which: 
                                                          
20 Carl von Clausewitz. On War. (J.J. Graham and F.N Maude, trans) (Ware, 1997) p.357, p.5 
21 Ibid. p.33 
22 Ibid. p.592 
23 Samuel Huntington. The Soldier and the Changing State. (Oxford, 1970) p.20 
24 Ibid. p.83 
25 Ibid. pp.8-10 
26 Huntington. The Soldier and the Changing State. p.5; Harold Lasswell. “The Garrison State.” American Journal 
of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1941)  
27 Huntington. The Soldier and the Changing State. p.11 
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Accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the civilian government of the state and are 
capable of undertaking military activities in an effective and efficient way, and whose 
organisation and internal structures reflect these assumptions.28 
Huntington suggests that ‘the inherent quality of a military body can only be evaluated in terms of 
independent military standards. The ends for which the military is employed, however, are outside 
its competence to judge.’29 Such thinking clearly disabuses the military of any role or accountability 
in the social and political aspects of the society which it serves. This detachment of the military from 
responsibility is the result of one key assumption, summarised by Thomas-Durrell Young: 
There are key requisites, however, that legitimate the use of force and violence by a soldier 
in a democracy: force and violence are employed only in a rational way, for a public purpose 
and with public consent.30  
Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt posit a division between ‘political’ and ‘non-political’ armies. They 
define ‘political’ armies as ‘those institutions that consider involvement in – or control over – 
domestic politics and the business of government to be a central part of their legitimate function.’31 
By such a description, those militaries which conform to Huntington’s definition of a professional 
military are, or strive to be, non-political. Koonings and Krujt do note, however, that the ‘non-
political’ military should be seen as the exception,  
although a powerful one because it has turned into the dominant paradigm in North 
America, Western Europe, Japan, and to a certain degree also in the former Soviet Union, 
China, and most of the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe.32  
The conceptual framework offered thus far laid the foundations for understanding of the 
relationship between the state and the military in Western Europe, North America, and a number of 
other states. Following the Second World War, this consensus was manifested by the creation of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Although NATO was, and remains, primarily a defensive 
alliance between like-minded states, membership requires a particular model of civil-military 
                                                          
28 Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, & Andrew Cottey. “The Professionalisation of Armed Forces in 
Postcommunist Europe.” in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, & Andrew Cottey, eds. The Challenge of 
Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces. (Basingstoke, 2002) p.6 
29 Ibid. p.57 
30 Thomas-Durrell Young. “Military Professionalism in a Democracy.” in Thomas Bruneau & Scott Tollefson, eds. 
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relations to be established. Willem Van Eekelen defines the democratic institutions demanded by 
NATO thus: 
First of all, the existence of a constitution or basic law clearly defining: The relationship 
between president, government, parliament and the military; the checks and balances 
applying to this relationship, including the role of the judiciary; who commands the military; 
who promotes military personnel; who holds emergency powers in a crisis; and where the 
authority lies for the transition from peace to war. Second, there should be political 
oversight of the military. This should be done in two ways: by means of democratic political 
control over the General Staff through the defence ministry – which includes a civilian 
component – and which itself is subject to parliamentary control, especially concerning the 
budget. Third, the military should maintain adequate levels of training and equipment in 
order to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the state, but also to 
prevent demoralisation and Bonapartism within the army.33 
A model such as this is clearly predicated on the existence of a democratic state, a powerful 
parliament and judiciary, and an accountable government. While these methods of organisation 
were prevalent on either side of the Atlantic, they were either unattainable or undesired in much of 
the rest of the world.  
In the many communist states that emerged throughout the twentieth century, for example, the 
military was rarely subject to such constitutional restrictions and democratic oversight. Indeed, as 
the Party and the military usually enjoyed a considerable overlap with regard to personnel, the 
senior military leadership was integrated into the mechanisms and structures of political power in 
many cases. In 1978, Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes published a collaborative volume 
representing the first attempt to conceptualise the civil-military relations of communist states.34 
Roman Kolkowicz offers an analysis in the same vein as Huntington, noting that officers in the Soviet 
military were ‘essentially a conservative community of guildlike professionals.’35 He argues that the 
military in the Soviet Union was ‘both the mainstay of the regime and its principal rival for power,’ 
observing that ‘since the state makes no formal provision for the transfer of power, Party leaders 
have come to view organised groups and institutions as potential rivals and challengers.’36 The 
                                                          
33 Willem Van Eekelen. “The Security Dimensions of European Integration and the Central-East European 
States.” in Anton Bebler, ed. Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in 
Transition. (Santa Barbara, 1997) p.9 
34 Dale Herspring & Ivan Volgyes, eds. Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. (Boulder, 1978) 
35 Roman Kolkowicz. “Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Military.” in Dale Herspring & Ivan Volgyes, eds. 
Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. (Boulder, 1978) p. 11 
36 Ibid. p.13 
19 
 
military, with the great power at its disposal, evidently represented the greatest threat. As a result, 
Kolkowicz claims, Party leaders were ‘faced with the problem of how to control and, when 
necessary, to coerce the military without reducing its vigour, efficiency, and morale.’37 Such an 
analysis is almost identical to Huntington's, something which Kolkowicz himself concedes, stating 
that the institutional characteristics of the Soviet military were ‘those of all large professional 
establishments, regardless of their political-social environment.’38 William Odom, who would 
become Director of the US National Security Agency, takes issue with Kolkowicz’s argument, noting 
how the Party and the military shared a common outlook on issues such as economic 
decentralisation, intellectual dissent, the nationality question, political and economic liberalisation in 
Eastern Europe, and de-Stalinisation.39 He also observes that the military was in fact an 
administrative arm of the Party, that most of the military elite were also Party members, and that 
many civil and military activities were interlinked in fields such as industry, education, and regional 
administrations.40 Furthermore, Odom questions Huntington's definition of professionalism, arguing 
that the much of the expertise needed for a modern military has civilian counterparts, such as 
technical and medical professionals, and that ‘one seldom finds a military establishment that is 
effectively bound by a comprehensive professional ethic.’41 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War ushered in a period of instability and 
change to the world, which was felt most keenly in Europe. States freshly unburdened by the bloc 
politics and ideological division that had defined Europe for almost half a century clamoured to 
adapt to new realities. The social, economic and political structures of many Central and Eastern 
European states were dismantled and replaced with the foundations of free-market democracies. 
However, amidst the turmoil, many old threats to stability that had been contained by the pressures 
of the Cold War were beginning to re-emerge. Separatism and religious radicalism, regional 
interstate rivalries, humanitarian crises, organised crime, and environmental concerns, compounded 
by political-economic instability, presented a challenge that not all states would be able to 
overcome. As new states emerged, and others began to crumble, the borders of Europe and the 
viability of many of its states came into question. With Communism cast out of Europe, their former 
leaders deposed, and their states in flux, the armies of Central and Eastern Europe, many of which 
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had until recently been organised under the umbrella of the Warsaw Pact, were left in a precarious 
position. 
Koonings and Kruijt hypothesise three scenarios for ‘political armies’ in the aftermath of the Cold 
War. First, the ‘withering away scenario’ in which the forces of liberalisation are strong enough to 
gradually but effectively push the military out of politics. Second, the ‘institutionalised modification 
scenario,’ in which, either through overt or covert means the military remains politically involved at 
some level, perhaps by identifying new threats or ‘guiding democracy.’ Thirdly, the ‘perversion and 
corruption scenario,’ in which the military is reluctant to yield power, and can develop into a rogue 
regime, or retain its respectability whilst sponsoring paramilitary actions in its political interests.42  
Anton Bebler, discussing the actions of some of the newly independent states after the Cold War, 
notes how: 
The emancipation expressed itself in establishing in some states new national armies, 
introducing new uniforms, insignia and other symbols; in most states in reforming the 
previously existing military formations, revising the former postulates in conformity with 
new national security assessments and priorities, developing for the first time in history or 
after long decades of bloc politics true national defence doctrines, and so on.43   
Defence reform measures such as these, which focussed on protecting state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity rather than strengthening the Warsaw Pact, were, however, limited to a select 
group of former communist states. A correlation can be identified between states which faced the 
least complex challenges following the collapse of the Eastern bloc, those with minimal religious or 
ethnic radicalism for example, and militaries which were able to implement reform and ‘wither 
away’ from politics. Jerzy Wiatr observes that in Poland, a country with a largely homogeneous 
population, the ‘nascent democracy has not been endangered by the armed forces.’ He continues, 
‘Polish officers are as loyal to the new democratic institutions as they were to the party-controlled 
Peoples Republic.'44 Inversely, those states which proved unable to overcome the challenges 
presented by the end of the Cold War would see their legitimacy undermined, territorial integrity 
threatened, and their militaries entangled in politics. In Yugoslavia, the upheaval across Europe was 
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met with demands for independence from three of its six constituent republics, dividing the loyalties 
of many soldiers who now found themselves torn between nation and state. The threats to the 
integrity of the state it was pledged to defend threatened the existence of the Yugoslav People’s 
Army (Jugoslovenska narodna armija, JNA) itself. Under such circumstances, the JNA was easily 
coerced into acting on behalf of the strongest advocates of Yugoslav territorial integrity: the Serb 
leadership. During the crisis, the Serbs retained the option to form their own sovereign state. The 
JNA, however, had to either ensure the continuation of the state, or find a new one to serve. As a 
result, Miroslav Hadžić, a former JNA officer, records: 
The military commanders became dependent on the political will of the Serbian leaders. 
Thus, [Serbian President Slobodan] Milošević had an easy time putting the JNA in the front 
line of the battle for the Serbs’ ethnic and state interests and goals, although they were 
quite changeable and elastic.45 
With the unifying socialist ideology discredited and the state seemingly collapsing, the loyalty of the 
soldiers of the Yugoslav army splintered, with some finding new foci for their loyalty in their home 
republics and others with the rump Yugoslav regime in Belgrade. The JNA would ultimately collapse 
along with the Yugoslav state, with many of its soldiers becoming pawns of Milošević’s project for a 
greater Serbia and others fighting their former comrades for independence within socialist era 
boundaries. 
The end of the Cold War, the fall of communism in Europe, and the violent collapse of Yugoslavia 
heralded a new era of civil military relations. The mammoth bloc armies that had come to embody 
the Cold War, designed and organised to fight on an unprecedented scale across the plains of 
Europe, became immediately obsolete. Diane E. Davis observes: 
Even as a tentative peace settles in among previously contending geopolitical superpowers 
struggling over spheres of influence, those countries and regions that lay in the interstices of 
this larger power structure - and whose fates not that long ago seemed overdetermined by 
the economic or political competition between Cold War antagonists – are beginning to 
implode with greater frequency.46 
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This led to a ‘revolution in military affairs,’ and organisations such as NATO underwent a 
transformation both in purpose and application.47 Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO (1999 
– 2004), observed that after the Cold War ‘we face different challenges and different missions – 
regional or civil wars, humanitarian emergencies, peacekeeping operations, and responding to 
terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction.’48 In such operations, he notes, ‘troops from 
Europe, North America, Africa, Latin America, and even Asia are operating under the same 
command’ and ‘interoperability is key.’49  
His words illustrate a new direction for the relationship between a state and the military. Whilst 
multinational forces were nothing new, the institutionalisation and seeming permanence of them 
was. States within the Alliance pooled sovereignty, resources, and troops under non-state banners in 
order to achieve foreign policy goals outside of the territory of member-states. NATO, ostensibly 
founded as a military alliance, was no different, and became increasingly used as a tool of soft power 
to influence states and events outside of its territory, most significantly in the former Warsaw Pact 
states.50 Thomas Bruneau contends that ‘one of the biggest challenges to democratic consolidation 
and deepening has been to find the proper balance between the civilian and military sectors,’ an 
equilibrium which ‘is fundamental to the success of authentic democratic governance.’ 51 Faced with 
such challenges during their respective transitions from socialist governance, most former-Warsaw 
Pact states were receptive to the advice, training, and guidance that was increasingly offered by 
NATO. Zoltan Barany argues that in this period, ‘promoting stability in non-NATO Europe – an effort 
that became linked with the Alliance’s expansion – now became one of the key objectives of 
NATO.’52 To catalyse the desired transition to democratic governance, the prospect of NATO 
membership was used to encourage the states of Eastern Europe to strengthen their democratic 
institutions and ultimately subscribe to the school of civil-military relations which had prevailed in 
Western Europe following the Second World War. 
However, even as the model of an ‘apolitical’ military designed purely for ‘successful armed combat’ 
began to spread, many of its underlying assumptions were challenged. A series of civil wars broke 
out throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Many of them, such as those in Algeria, Burundi, and Nepal (to 
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name but a few), were predicated on the rejection of the legitimacy of the state by a group within 
society. While an apolitical military might meet some success in combatting the unconventional 
tactics employed by such groups, there was little it could do to reinforce the state’s legitimacy. 
Barany illustrates this point with an example of what can happen when a ‘political’ military 
employed, in part, to secure the legitimacy of state, is removed. On May 23, 2003, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, the US-dominated transitional government, issued Authority Order No. 2, 
which disbanded the Iraqi Armed Forces in their entirety.53 He notes: 
While the Ba’ath regime was uniformly hated in Kurdistan and amongst the population in 
southern Iraq, the military – a conscript army with a large proportion of Shia Muslim 
draftees and Sunni officers – had enjoyed considerable sympathy and respect in the rest of 
the country.54 
The disbandment of the army left a ‘security and public safety vacuum; produced a large pool of 
trained, armed humiliated, and desperate men for whom joining the anti-American insurgency 
became a logical choice; and destroyed the only national institution in a deeply divided society.’55 
The ensuing chaos has been well documented, but it can be stated that after over a decade of 
international efforts to rebuild a functioning state, the security situation has deteriorated to the 
point where the viability of the Iraqi has been brought into question. Davis notes that in many 
locations beset with socio-economic problems akin to Iraq: 
Specialized paramilitary forces and police now replace the national military on the front lines 
of violent conflict, while citizens arm themselves both offensively and defensively as 
vigilante groups, militias, terrorists, and even mafia organisations seeking to counteract or 
bypass the state's claim on a monopoly of legitimate force.56 
The literature on civil-military relations reveals a complex and evolving field. However, until recent 
years, much of it erroneously assumes that both the ‘civil’ and ‘military’ facets of a society represent 
two monolithic and homogeneous pillars, with any tension, rivalry, or envy existing only between 
them. Whilst a professional identity may exist and even dominate many militaries, the assumption 
that it overrides all other identities or loyalties a soldier may have is unfounded. Odom challenges 
these assumptions, but perhaps most pertinently states that ‘one finds that these [defence] 
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establishments are highly politicised institutions as diverse as the polities to which they belong. They 
are no easier to fit into a global model than the polities themselves.’57 The argument that modern 
militaries are indeed ‘highly politicised’ and ‘diverse’ raises many questions which have not been 
addressed in civil-military relations literature, and are compounded by the example of Iraq, where 
the state lost all authority and legitimacy after the military was disbanded. The military had 
represented the only ‘national institution in a deeply divided society,’ one which collapsed without 
it.58 This demonstrates the extent to which the role of the military goes beyond successful armed 
combat. Instead, the military can be seen to also act as a national institution which can unify the 
populations within, and provide legitimacy to, the state it serves. Thus, the questions of which 
groups should be included in the military, how they should be organised, and most importantly, 
what should be used to unify them to ensure the military remains cohesive and effective, become 
particularly significant. 
Cohesion, Division, and the Nation 
The relationship between identity and the military is as complex as that between the state and the 
military, however the dynamic can be divided into two themes: The impact which identity has on the 
military; and the impact the military has on identity. Identity poses a fundamental challenge to the 
military, as in order to be effective a military must be cohesive. However, as every society is 
composed of a multitude of identities (race, religion, ethnicity, class, and gender, to name a few), 
cohesion may be difficult to attain. Furthermore, the military can influence and even create identity 
by developing its own heritage and reputation, but also by serving as the focus of myths that are 
woven into a national narrative. The following section examines these interactions.  
Ethnic identity must be understood as adaptable and fluid. Religion, race, occupation, heritage, 
culture, class, language, region, and many other identifying markers can be interpreted to 
demarcate ethnic boundaries. However, whilst one ethnic group may be identified from its 
neighbours by their religion, for example, another ethnic group may share a religion with their 
neighbours and be differentiated from them by language. Cynthia Enloe offers this concise definition 
of ethnicity: An ethnic group is, at root, a collectivity whose members share a belief in a common 
heritage which is, in turn, legitimated and sustained through cultural expression.’59 
Echoes of Enloe’s words can be identified in the work of Benedict Anderson, who just a few years 
later offered his infamous definition of the “nation.” He states: ‘it is an imagined political community 
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– and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.’ He continues, elaborating that ‘it is 
imagined [emphasis in original] because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion.’60 Eric Hobsbawm contends that whilst modern nations claim to be 
‘natural human communities’ which are ‘rooted in the remotest antiquity,’ they are in fact 
composed of constructs such as ‘fairly recent symbols’ and ‘suitably tailored discourse (such as 
“national history”),’ and are therefore little more than the product of the ‘invention of tradition.’61 
By such a definition, nationality, like ethnicity, becomes an extremely fluid concept, the boundaries 
of which can expand or contract, both spatially and temporally, based on how they are imagined. As 
a result, both ethnicity and nationality do not necessarily correlate to borders, and ethnic groups 
and nations may exist across multiple states. In the context of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, an official lexicon developed which continues to inform the discussion around national 
identity to this day. The architects of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička 
federativna Republika Jugoslavija, SFRJ) utilised two designations for identity: narod, which 
translates to nation or people; and narodnosti, which means nationalities. In the framework of the 
SFRJ, the nations were represented by one of the constituent republics of the federation (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) while the nationalities enjoyed 
no such associations with territory. The post-war Bosnian constitution established at Dayton shares 
much of its vocabulary with those of Yugoslavia, with Bosnian Croats, Muslims, and Serbs being 
referred to as constituent nations or peoples, and other nationalities (such as Jews and Roma) being 
described as Others.  
Viewed through this lens, it becomes apparent that almost all militaries were and continue to be 
composed of myriad identities. Alon Peled observes: 
Throughout history, most military organisations have been multi-ethnic in nature, and this 
phenomenon is even more common in the post-soviet era. Most important, the fate of 
multi-ethnic armies is not sealed in advance for better or worse. In some cases, diverse 
ethnic groups have come together, fought bravely and defeated much more ethnically 
cohesive enemies. In other cases, armies have fallen apart from within or fallen apart on the 
battlefield.62 
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Discussion of the composition of armies and the complications that can ensue can be traced back to 
the fifth century BCE. In one of the most famous passages from The Histories, Herodotus, viewed by 
many as the ‘Father of History,’ meticulously records the extensive panoply of groups serving in the 
army of the Persian Emperor Xerxes, to whom they owed a shared loyalty. The appearance of each 
group, or ‘nation,’ is recorded in great detail, with the symbols, attire, and equipment illustrating the 
array of people serving in Xerxes’ army and showing that each group served in units defined by 
nationality.63 Chinese general and strategist Sun Tzu, writing almost contemporaneously with 
Herodotus, instructs that a general ‘having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must 
blend and harmonise the different elements thereof.'64 Further details of what this process entails 
are lacking, however it shows a consciousness of the potential problems in raising an army from 
‘different elements.’ A lineal descendent of Sun Tzu, Sun Bin (sometimes referred to as Sun Tzu II), 
offers some additional thoughts on the topic, noting that without ‘harmony among personnel... 
there is calamity even in victory.’65 He advises that a leader should ‘organise soldiers by homeland’ 
and ‘delegate authority to those who are leaders in their own localities.’66 
The Roman Army of both the Republic and the Empire addressed the questions of who should serve 
and in what capacity in several ways. The main combat unit of the Roman Army was the legion, each 
of which was unique due to ‘the standards and symbols on men's shields, as well...as other 
peculiarities of dress and routine.’67 Despite these differences however, the legions were composed 
exclusively of Roman citizens, a status eventually given to all free people living within the Empire in 
an attempt to forge an identity that would transcend regional and religious identities. Alongside the 
citizen legions however, Rome also relied upon additional foreign troops, known as foederati, which 
were ‘recruited from a single ethnic group, and often specializing in a particular fighting technique.’68 
The foederati increasingly came to dominate the Roman army, and would invariably serve in the 
name of Rome, but under the command of their own tribal leaders, in the manner described by Sun 
Bin.69 However, Rome’s increasing reliance on foederati troops led to its demise, and ultimately the 
leaders of foederati armies would carve the empire up for themselves. 
The decision of whether to enlist subordinate or ‘outside’ groups into the military, such as the 
Romans did with the foederati, continues to torment military planners to the present day. Such a 
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quandary is referred to as the ‘Trojan Horse dilemma,’ and can be summarised in one simple 
question: If recruited, trained, and armed, will ethnic soldiers become loyal soldiers or dangerous 
saboteurs?70 Ultimately it is this question which has dictated whether particular groups have been 
utilised, in various capacities and functions, by the military. 
Many strategists and military thinkers, such as Clausewitz, assumed that the Trojan Horse dilemma 
had been addressed by the dawn of modernity. As Peled observes, ‘in revolutionary France, the new 
ideas of nation, freedom, citizenship, and patriotism ended the tradition of military ethnic quotas 
and military manpower contracts between Emperors and ethnic leaders.’71 Notions of citizenship, in 
which the state offers its populace membership, rights, and participation promised to erase the 
anachronistic and divisive identities of the past. ‘French nationality was French citizenship: ethnicity, 
history, the language or patois spoken at home, were irrelevant to the definition of “the nation,”’ 
observes Hobsbawm.72 He also discusses the original understanding of “patriotism,” and stipulates 
that the ‘idea…was state-based rather than nationalist, since it related to sovereign people itself, i.e. 
to the state exercising power in its name. Ethnicity or other elements of historic continuity were 
irrelevant to ‘the nation’ in this sense.’73 Such an interpretation of the nation, however, was based 
on the erroneous assumption that non-state identities were a pre-modern phenomenon that would 
not be able to function in an era of rapid social and technological change. It was this assumption 
which led Clausewitz to identify soldiers solely by their citizenship. However, pervasive non-state 
identities such as ethnicity and religion failed to succumb to modernity and continued to flourish 
throughout the nineteenth century. Indeed, it can be argued that such identities ‘often acquire new 
vitality from precisely those aspects of modernity that were supposed to make them irrelevant – for 
example, from mass communications, industrialisation, elections, educated professionalised elites, 
urbanisation.’74 A prime example were the Pontifical Zouaves raised by Pope Pius IX to defend papal 
lands during the tumultuous period prior to Italian unification. Pius, facing rebellion in Tuscany, 
issued a call for “Swords of the Cross” in March 1860. 75 In response, 20,000 men from across Europe 
and the Americas gathered, using modern communication and transport, under the ancient banner 
of the Holy See.76 They employed modern military methods to fight a decade-long war in Italy and 
proved to be an effective force. What united them was not common citizenship, but a shared faith. 
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The longevity of non-state identities can be illustrated by events in France at the end of the century. 
In 1894 Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a member of the general staff of the French Army, was court-
martialled for allegedly leaking intelligence documents to Germany.77 He was found guilty, 
sentenced to life imprisonment, and exiled to French Guiana. It soon became apparent, however, 
that he had been wrongly convicted, and had in fact been framed. Brian Bond notes: ‘As a cold, 
unsympathetic character, a wealthy industrialist’s son and a Jew – the only one on the general staff – 
he was ideally cast for the role of traitor.’78 Dreyfus had been selected as an easy and believable 
scapegoat due to his Alsatian and Jewish heritage, which separated him enough from French 
Catholicism to be blamed without tarnishing the ‘honour of the army.’79 The Dreyfus Affair illustrates 
how a ‘modern’ state could still question the loyalty of elements within it: if the ideas that had come 
to symbolise the state, liberté, égalité, fraternité, were to be shunned, or if the state itself were to 
fail, then ‘other’ groups, such as Alsatians or Jews, may divert their loyalty to something ‘foreign’ 
rather than something more familiar, such as French nationalism or Catholicism. Furthermore, it 
highlights the difficulties inherent in trying to create an army (and a state) in which ideology or 
citizenship acts as a unifying identity that precedes all others. 
The coming of modernity and nationalism posed a particularly difficult challenge to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, which was composed of soldiers of a multitude of identities. The “Common 
Army” was formed from soldiers of German, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Polish, Ruthene, Slovene, 
Croat, Serb, Romanian, and Italian heritage, a complexity compounded by an equally varied 
confessional diversity.80 Istvan Deak argues that ‘the nationality problem in the Hapsburg Monarchy 
was insoluble’ and notes that on the eve of the First World War, of 329 independent units 
(regiments and specialist battalions), only 142 were made up of men who spoke the same language, 
163 used two languages, and in 24 three or more languages were in use.81 Whilst officers were 
compelled to learn the language of their soldiers for obvious practical reasons, little could be done 
by the Hapsburgs to accommodate its plethora of identities other than the continued use of the ‘a-
national dynastic ideology’ of Empire and Monarchy. Any effort to cultivate democratic, federalist, or 
other representative values to reconcile differing identities would entail abandoning the dynastic 
loyalty and feudal ideology which held the army together. Deak observes that ‘giving up these pre-
modern values would have involved a surrender to nationalism, the very force that threatened the 
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existence of the Monarchy and, hence, the Army.’82 The Common Army of the Hapsburgs would 
survive the battlefields of the First World War, but would disintegrate in the aftermath as its 
composite national groups found new states emerging in their name. 
Throughout the twentieth century, political ideology served as a unifying agent to build cohesive 
armed forces out of diverse groups, just as religion had done in the previous century. In the Spanish 
Civil War, 35,000 people from across the world volunteered to serve under the banner of the 
International Brigades. 83 Formed by the Communist International to combat Francisco Franco’s 
fascist forces, they were united by their belief in socialism rather than a shared homeland. The 
International Brigades were disbanded in 1938, and the following year the cause for which they 
fought, the Spanish Republic, fell to fascism. Just two years later, many of their former adversaries 
formed the Blue Division, a force in which 47,000 Spaniards served the cause of fascism as part of 
the German Wehrmacht.84 Additional troops from Spain served in Waffen SS Freiwilligen (volunteer) 
regiments, along with men from across occupied Europe. Indeed, ‘around half of the men that 
served in the Waffen SS during WWII were foreign (i.e. non-German) volunteers of conscripts.’85  
The puzzle of how to fit multiple identities into a single army emerged as one of the greatest 
challenges faced by peace-builders during the surge of civil conflicts that followed the end of the 
Cold War. In such conflicts, identity replaced ideology as one of the main drivers of hostilities, and in 
many cases the question of who would serve in the post-war armed forces was key in ending 
hostilities. Roy Licklider observes that of the peace agreements negotiated since 1989, ‘many…have, 
as a central component, provisions to merge competing armed groups in a single national army.’86 
The desire for integration is succinctly explained by Ronald Krebs and Licklider, who state:  
The intuition appears to be that a professional, communally representative force could allay 
vulnerable groups’ security fears by serving as a credible signal of the governments’ 
commitment to power sharing and by keeping communal or ideological compatriots under 
arms. Such a force could also provide a symbolic model for the political community, allowing 
all to identify with a larger national project.87 
                                                          
82 Ibid. p.46 
83 Anthony Beevor. The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936 – 1939. (London, 2006) p.157 
84 Gerald Kleinfeld & Lewis Tambs. Hitler’s Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia in WWII. (Mechanicsburg, 
2014) p.327 
85 Nigel Askey. Operation Barbarossa: The Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military 
Simulation, Vol. IIA. (Lulu Publishing, 2013) p.568  
86 Roy Licklider. “Introduction” in Roy Licklider, ed. New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces 
After Civil Wars. (Washington, DC, 2014) p.1  
87 Ronald Krebs & Roy Licklider. “United They Fall: Why the International Community should not promote 
Military Integration after Civil War.” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 3. (2015) p.94 
30 
 
New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars, discusses the military 
integration of formerly warring groups in Rwanda, the Philippines, South Africa, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. In all cases, it was 
reconciling the various identities that had become polarised by conflict that posed the greatest 
obstacle to efforts to military integration.88  
Throughout history the diversity of most societies has consistently presented a dilemma to those 
trying to forge an effective military. It has influenced the structure and organisation of all armed 
forces, led countless military leaders to question the loyalty of their own soldiers, caused the 
disintegration of centuries-old armies, united soldiers from across the world under a single banner, 
and been the determining factor between war and peace. By using nationality, religion, and 
ideology, political and military leaders can rally armies to their cause. However, as the boundaries of 
such identities are fluid and the prominence of one may be superseded by another, they can 
become the cause of division and conflict within the military.    
Armed forces are powerful institutions invested with considerable power and significant symbolic 
value. As a result, they exert a powerful influence of their own which can have a profound, if 
unintended, impact on the societies they serve. The military is the giver of the founding myths and 
gallant heroes of a national narrative, the protagonist in the historic trials the state has faced, and 
the clergy tasked with the sacred task of remembrance. Through these roles, the military becomes a 
mythomoteur, a generator of myths, and has a profound impact on identity. Anthony D. Smith, 
defined a nation as ‘a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and 
historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties 
for all members.’89 He later refined his position, positing that a nation was ‘a named community 
possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common 
laws and customs.’90 Constant to his definition is the importance of shared myths and memories to 
the formation of national identity. He would later argue that myths of sacrifice and war ‘are 
particularly effective in creating the consciousness and sentiments of mutual dependence and 
exclusiveness, which reinforce the shared culture, memories and myths of common ancestry.’91 John 
Hutchinson, discussing Smith’s work, notes that warfare creates heroes and epochal events which 
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provide ‘role models and reference points especially when taken up by poets, artists and writers 
who embed these in the collective consciousness.’92  
Hutchinson observes that ‘Smith conceives of the nation in Durkheimian terms as a sacred 
community that elicits mass sacrifice in its defence, although he observes that nationalism and its 
referent, the nation, combine both secular and “religious” qualities.’93 Smith offers an example of 
this ‘secular religion,’ noting the ‘many rituals and ceremonies of national remembrance for soldiers 
fallen in war “for their country.”’ He argues that at the collective level, such rituals and ceremonies 
serve as a ‘grim and solemn reminder of communal fate, of the trauma and survival of the nation in 
the face of its enemies and of the repeated blood sacrifice of its youth to ensure the regeneration of 
the nation.’94 Carolyn Marvin and David W. Ingle offer a further exploration of the idea of blood 
sacrifice. They argue that after enough blood has been sacrificed by a nation, ‘the slate of internal 
hostilities is wiped clean. The group begins again. The external threat is met. Our bad feelings 
towards one another are purged.’95 They also discuss the symbolic value placed on the U.S. flag, but 
argue it is the same for most state symbols:  
The flag in high patriotic ritual is treated with an awe and deference that marks it as the 
sacred object of the religion of patriotism. The flag is the skin of the totem ancestor held 
high. It represents the sacrificed bodies of its devotees just as the cross, the sacred object of 
Christianity, represents the body sacrificed to a Christian god.96  
Marvin and Ingle’s case can be illustrated most effectively if one considers the Flag Presentation at 
American military funerals. At such occasions, a ceremony is held in which the fallen soldier is 
interred, saluted, and then the flag which adorned the coffin is folded and given to their loved ones, 
recognising and symbolising the sacrifice they made for the nation. The lifespan of traumatic 
collective memories can be considerable as they are not only reinvigorated by ritual and ceremony, 
but also by pilgrimages to the sites of significant battles, war cemeteries, and museums. Arlington 
National Cemetery in Virginia and Mamayev Kurgan in Volgograd represent two such places that 
constitute the “holy sites” of the ‘secular religion’ of national identity, serving not just as sites to 
remember the fallen, but also as sombre reminders of sacrifices made on behalf of the nation, 
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reinforcing the collective memory. Such sacrifice, as Hutchinson summarises, ‘creates a compact 
between the living and the dead, reversing the attrition of individual egotism and class divisions, and 
forms a moral community of the nation.’97  
A School of the Nation? 
It has been established that complex relationships exist between the state and the military, and 
identity and the military. In some cases, such as in one of Huntington’s praetorian societies, these 
relationships result in the distinction between the concepts becoming blurred. This can be identified 
when the military essentially becomes the state (and arguably, identity), such as happened in 
Germany in the First World War, or Japan in the Second World War. However, when elements of 
these relationships exist independently, a considerable overlap can be identified in which a 
sophisticated dynamic between all three concepts has developed. This is manifested most tangibly 
through the efforts made by states to utilise identity to strengthen (or otherwise influence) the 
military, or alternatively to use the military as a tool to shape or build an identity. Furthermore, 
ethnic groups may utilise the military (or their record of service in it) in attempts to receive 
recognition or concessions from the state, or conversely, use the mechanisms of the state to 
influence the military, perhaps to lessen the dominance of a certain group.  
Enloe argues that ethnic identities are subject to influence by the military in a number of ways. She 
notes three possible outcomes which can result from interaction between the military identity: 
First, militaries can have no independent effect, but simply reflect sub-military, sub-political 
trends in social relations. Secondly, the military may have an independent effect in the 
direction of hastening the disappearance of ethnicity as a basis for inter-group relations. 
Thirdly, the military may have an independent effect in the opposite direction, so that it 
sustains or revitalises ethnic identifications.98   
Furthermore, she argues that ethnic identities have been ‘utilised’ by the state to recruit soldiers 
into the military. She muses that her colleagues: 
Tried to hide their puzzlement over why, when they were investigating violence in the 
Middle East and Ulster, British defence expenditures and agricultural policy in Mozambique, 
I should be spending my days sorting out Scottish clans and eighteenth century regimental 
grievances.99 
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She had hypothesised a link between the manifestation of state power in the American and Soviet 
Military-Industrial complexes and the state’s utilisation (or isolation) of ethnicity to mobilise 
militaries, claiming that in order to optimise security, state planners ‘think ethnically.’100 Enloe offers 
the following example to illustrate the point: 
Envisage a Scottish soldier serving in the British army; he is dressed in his formal regimental 
uniform of red tunic and plaid kilt. The red tunic symbolises his loyalty to the British 
monarch, while his kilt symbolises his Scottish identity.101 
She observes that this can be explained using one of two approaches. The ‘ascriptive’ approach 
would view the soldier as a man who views himself as Scottish, who has enlisted as a result of the 
traditionally high value which Scottish culture places on the military, and has been assigned to a 
Scottish regiment because the British state has recognised the existence of such ‘primordial ethnic 
bonds’ within the larger polity. In such an approach, the symbolic uniform would be understood to 
be a concession that state authorities have made ‘so as to reconcile primordial attachments with 
universalistic institutions.’102 A ‘situational’ approach would, she argues, question the assumption 
that the man automatically assumes himself a Scotsman, noting that he may instead primarily 
identify as a landless farmer or a Highlander. In this sense, a Scottish identity could develop ‘as a 
result of being socialised into an ethnically defined regiment.’103 Furthermore, his enlistment could 
be the product of messages from national and local elites claiming that it was the best way to gain 
acceptance in an English-dominated state. The recognition of ‘primordial’ symbols such as the kilt 
may not be a concession, but rather part of an effort to utilise ethnicity in a modernising state. Enloe 
notes that ‘modernisation, while it may make mortars more common than bagpipes and khaki 
fatigues more functional than kilts, does not automatically eliminate the saliency of ethnicity in the 
recruitment and deployment of the British military.’104  
Although modernisation had little impact on the ‘saliency of ethnicity,’ it led to a profound 
transformation of war. Large populations, technological developments, and industrialisation led to 
conflicts directly affecting increasing proportions of the populations involved. The American War of 
Independence, the French Revolutionary Wars, and the American Civil War all witnessed campaigns 
in which the civilian population and resources were specifically targeted on an unprecedented scale, 
either for utilisation or destruction, by the states involved. Such practices were employed on a 
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greater scale during the First World War, and in the aftermath of that conflict, the term “total war” 
first appeared in France and Germany ‘to describe the fighting but also to envisage even more 
violent conflicts.’105 As a result, Hobsbawm notes:  
State interests now depended on the participation of the ordinary citizen to an extent not 
previously envisaged. Whether the armies were composed of conscripts or volunteers, the 
willingness of men to serve was now an essential variable in government calculations.106  
The demands of mass warfare (in conjunction with other social factors), he continues, ‘made it 
imperative to formulate and inculcate new forms of civic loyalty (a “civic religion” to borrow 
Rousseau’s phrase),’ which emerged as ‘populist-democratic patriotism.’107 For the military, this 
patriotism was expressed by the concept of the ‘nation in arms,’ which Adam Roberts defines as: ‘A 
situation in which all the citizens (or at least the male citizens) are members of armed forces 
organized by, or owing allegiance to, national authorities.’108 He argues that ‘implicit in most, but not 
all, ideas of the nation in arms is the assumption that the nation and army are, or at least ought to 
be, a unity; that all the people are incorporated in the army on a common professional and legal 
footing.’109  
The levée en masse that followed the French Revolution is the first example of a nation in arms, as 
Omer Bartov observes: ‘Thus an army was formed which both in numbers and motivation, in social 
composition and self-perception, was inherently different from anything seen hitherto in Europe.’110 
He contends that ‘the individual serving in the nation armeé fought for France, rather than for the 
King of the French… Liberation from the monarchy thus also meant mobilisation by the state, even if 
it was ostensibly for the good of the community as a whole.’111 Furthermore, he argues, the 
revolutionary army ‘constituted a crucial factor in the creation of a new concept of national 
identity.’112 Defeat at the hands of France inspired a complete reassessment of the ‘allegedly 
invincible’ Prussian Army, and following the defeat of Napoleon, the need for ‘a more intimate union 
between the army and the nation’ was recognised.113 Bartov observes that, although the rhetoric of 
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the ‘nation as an entity whose survival and success were the business of all its members’ was 
present, the old Monarchy was never truly replaced. Thus, he argues:  
Patriotism and loyalty to the nation were therefore initiated, nurtured and directed from 
above, and the new army of liberation served both as the manifestation of this state-
controlled patriotism and as the means to disseminate those of its virtues deemed positive 
by the new regime.114 
By carefully utilising the rhetoric of the nation and nationalism, Prussia was able to mobilise more of 
its population for war than ever before. Nearly 700,000 Prussian men were deployed in the War of 
1866, and in 1870-71 1.2 million men were mobilised by the Northern German Confederation 
alone.115 Such figures, representing approximately 40 percent of an age class (the method of 
categorisation employed by the Prussians) allowed Prussia to defeat the armies of far larger states, 
such as France (which had abandoned the nation in arms following the Bourbon Restoration) and 
Austria, which could only field 25-30 percent of the equivalent age class.116 The nation in arms 
reached its zenith in the First World War, a conflict in which 65 million men were mobilised by the 
belligerents and their empires. Ten percent of France’s adult population (including half of all French 
men aged 20 – 32) and nine percent of British men aged under 45 were killed, and over half of the 
11 million Germans (of a population of 41 million) mobilised were killed or wounded.117 Crucial to 
convincing their populations to volunteer for war or accept conscription was the dissemination by 
states of nationalist propaganda and the rhetoric of national identity. In this manner, the military 
was strengthened by the state through the instrumentalisation of identity.   
Central to the application of the nation in arms concept is universal military service, whereby a 
substantial proportion of the population spend a specified period of time in the military in order for 
states to be able to maintain a large standing army, and train a large pool of reservists. The presence 
of a large section of society with military training has obvious strategic benefits (such as being able 
to mobilise vast numbers of reserves in the case of an attack), despite the claim that conscript 
armies tend to be less effective and require more resources on a per-soldier basis for the amount of 
military capability they provide.118 However, additional motives can be identified which go beyond 
strategy. Bartov notes that ‘most Frenchmen and Germans seemed convinced that fighting in the 
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national uniform meant fighting for the nation and for the preservation of what they understood to 
be the unique political, cultural, and social entity to which they belonged.’119 He argues that both 
nations ‘had internalised the central element of the modern nation state, namely, that military 
service was an expression of national identity.’120 Furthermore, military service offers states a level 
of access to their adult population that is unmatched by any other institution of governance. Indeed, 
during a term of service that, in many cases, lasts for a few years, recruits can be subjected to a 
range of training and education programmes which can be tailored to the agenda of policymakers 
and military leaders. A 1972 French Defence White Paper illustrates how the military was viewed as 
an institution in which disparate identities could be bonded together: 
Military service is an opportunity to make lasting friendships which are not bound by social 
constraint. The comradeship which emerges from sharing the same existence every day, the 
quality and the unselfishness of human relations which develop there, the integration of 
men from different milieus, trades and geographic origins, and the possibility of judging men 
without bias are all factors which can contribute to the personal enrichment of the man who 
is willing to make his contribution generously to the reality and esprit de corps of the small 
community that his section, platoon, company, squadron or company represents.121 
The belief that the military can succeed in overcoming the salience of non-state identities and 
somehow consolidate disparate groups into a unified national army has echoed across history. The 
Roman Legions performed this function millennia ago, along with the more recent armies of France 
and Germany. On the eve of the First World War, former US President Theodore Roosevelt argued 
that ‘the most important of all things is to introduce universal military service’ which would include 
‘foreign-born as well as native-born citizens’ in order to ‘Americanize the population.’122 Similar 
ideas can be identified in the Soviet Union, where according to Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Armed 
Forces had a role in educating citizens ‘in the spirit of deep loyalty to the Socialist Motherland, to the 
ideas of peace and internationalism and to the ideas of the friendship of the people.’123 The 
utilisation of the military by the state to influence society in such ways has led many to regard it as a 
“School of the Nation.” 
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Krebs explains that the enduring belief that the military has a social application is founded on three 
‘plausible mechanisms’ which link military service and the construction of cohesive national 
communities: socialisation, contact, and elite transformation.124 He notes that the military may 
‘socialize soldiers to national norms embedded in the military’s manpower policy,’ ‘bring together 
individuals of various ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds in common cause and in a 
collaborative spirit, providing a suitable environment in which to break down communal barriers,’ 
and ‘alter the views of future leaders who later use their positions of influence to spread their 
revised definition of the nation.’125 Many modernisation theorists contend that new states are faced 
with a challenge when attempting to form a nation, as the old societies they govern are marked by 
their ‘rural backwardness, their strong kinship ties, regional or ethnic loyalties, and lack of interest in 
anybody different from them.’126  
Florence Gaub argues that for such theorists, the military offers a solution to these problems, as 
‘mixing different groups into a highly modern, technologized institution that symbolises the state 
should hence form the ideal citizen, aware of transethnic and translinguistic identity that is needed 
to form a stable state.’127 Krebs remains sceptical as to whether the military can indeed influence 
individuals to ‘reconsider their identity, their attachments, and the definition of their political 
community,’ arguing that ‘identity is not subjective and universal, but rather inter-subjective and 
hence contextual. This fundamental insight limits the scope and permanence of the military’s 
potential impact.’128 Furthermore, Gaub observes that the assumption that the military can be used 
as a tool to teach its recruits a form of ‘official nationalism’ which is then disseminated into society is 
based on the assertion of broad generalisations, which are from a perspective in which development 
is a linear process towards the ethnocentric model of many Western societies. Despite such 
reservations, however, the belief that the military can serve as the vanguard of nation-building 
remains pervasive.  
The military can play numerous roles within society, from becoming directly involved in the affairs of 
state, to being utilised as a tool to forge new identities. In the context of a democratic state 
however, in theory the military has a much more limited scope for involvement in society. Zoltan 
Barany notes that ‘generally speaking, in the modern democratic state the only legitimate internal 
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role for the army is to provide relief after natural disasters.’129 Whilst this is true to an extent, 
numerous ‘democratic’ militaries continue to be tasked with duties beyond Huntington’s 
understanding of a detached and apolitical military, such as nation-building. However, the very 
presence of the military, even a volunteer force, has an impact on the society it serves, as Gaub 
argues: ‘it is, intentionally or unintentionally, a part of the wider social system.’130  
In addition to serving on a ‘macro level’ as the School of the Nation, Gaub identifies two further 
‘dimensions’ in which the military can influence the society it serves. On a micro level, she argues, 
'the military is a profession that socialises the individual’ as, upon joining the military, recruits enter 
a ‘total institution’ which separates them from the rest of society and regulates daily life.131 In 
pursuit of cohesion, a vital component of an effective military, the values of comradeship, 
corporatism, and cooperation are instilled in recruits, theoretically superseding pre-existing 
intergroup bias. Gaub illustrates this with the statement often used in the US Army, ‘there is no 
black or white, only (army) green.’132 The other ‘dimension’ discussed by Gaub exists on a meso 
level, where ‘the military interacts between society (or rather its diversity) and the state by 
expressing the state's attitude towards this diversity.’133 She reflects that ‘just as the ideal of the 
homogenous nation-state only rarely exists, so does the ideal of the perfectly homogenous army,’ 
and notes that as a result, in many cases the state may have to consistently rely on particular 
ethnicities, such as Sikhs in the Indian Army, or Berbers in the Moroccan Army.134 By relying on such 
groups, she argues, the military has ‘bolstered or even created self-perceptions of groups which 
frequently served as a basis for the formation of group identity,’ an idea which resonates with 
Enloe’s ‘situational’ approach to viewing the mobilisation of ethnicity.135  
Non-state identities refer to groups within a society who are, in some way, excluded from the 
majority community within a society, usually as the result of ethnic, confessional, or racial 
differences. In some cases, such isolation may be voluntary or even desired, but in many cases, such 
societal divisions exist as the result of prejudice, discrimination, or the state’s fear that the group 
could act as a Trojan Horse in the event of conflict. As a result, as Gaub contends, ‘the ethnic 
composition of the military reflects the ethno-political stratification on which the state rests; it 
mirrors who the state chooses to rely on in order to stabilise, and who it does not deem 
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trustworthy.’136 By the same token, when formerly excluded groups are mobilised by the state and 
treated not as cannon-fodder or labourers, but as soldiers as valued as any other, a clear message is 
sent to society, signalling that the group is now considered a trusted and reliable part of society. 
President Truman’s Executive Order 9981, which criminalised racial discrimination and heralded the 
end of segregated units in the U.S. Army, is a clear example of this. The army became the first large 
organisation in the U.S. to guarantee equal opportunities for African-Americans, sending a clear 
indication to society that (at least as far as the state was concerned) African-Americans were 
deemed worthy of ‘equality of treatment and opportunity’ and could be trusted with arms.137 
This dynamic, however, is not necessarily one-directional, and just as the state may use the military 
as a mechanism to display which groups within its society are trusted, groups within a society may 
use the military to demand recognition, equality, or other concessions from the state. The 
desegregation of the US Armed Forces can be seen to be the result of a change in attitude from the 
American establishment, but conversely, it also can be viewed as a direct product of African-
Americans utilising the military (specifically their contributions to it) to influence policy. The “Double 
V” campaign began in February 1942 following the publication of an article in the Pittsburgh Courier, 
titled “Should I Sacrifice to Live ‘Half American,’” in which James G. Thompson stated:  
The “V for Victory” sign is being displayed prominently in all so-called democratic countries 
which are fighting for victory over aggression, slavery and tyranny. If this V sign means that 
to those now engaged in this great conflict, then let colored Americans adopt the double VV 
for double victory. . . The first V for victory over our enemies from without, the second V for 
victory over our enemies within. For surely those who perpetrate these ugly prejudices here 
are seeking to destroy our democratic form of government just as surely as the Axis 
forces.138  
The campaign was successful in rallying African-American support for the war, and gained 
prominence after being adopted by the African-American press, celebrities, and servicemen such as 
the Tuskegee Airmen.139 Such utilisation of military service is explained by Krebs, who observes that 
‘to invoke military service in this fashion is to exploit a widely recognised norm to raise moral 
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consciousness, draw attention to an imbalance in the equation of rights and obligations, and trap 
state leaders in their own rhetorical commitments.’140 
When viewed as an institutionalised reflection of the ethno-political stratification of society, the 
military, specifically representation in it, constitutes a key strategic objective in the struggle for 
equality. As a result, whilst many African-Americans utilised their military service in their attempts to 
influence the state, others aimed to utilise the state in order to achieve important practical and 
symbolic reforms within the military. As such, during the Second World War the Double V campaign 
was complemented by the March on Washington Movement (MOWM), an organisation led by A. 
Philip Randolph, the General Organiser of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. Described as ‘the 
most effective African American protest organisation during the Second World War,’ the MOWM 
combined ‘unflinching patriotism’ with the fight against Jim Crow.141 The MOWM won a momentous 
early victory in 1941, when its threat of protest and disruption forced President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802, which declared:  
As a prerequisite to the successful conduct of our national defense production effort, I do 
hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that there shall be no discrimination in the 
employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, 
or national origin.142  
President Roosevelt, however, did not address numerous other demands of the MOWM, one of the 
most pressing of which was the desegregation of the armed forces. Randolph wrote in 1944 that 
‘pivotal and central to the whole struggle in the Negro liberation movement at this time is the 
abolition of Jim Crow in the armed forces,’ a point elaborated upon by the magazine Crisis, which 
stated: ‘This is no fight merely to wear a uniform. This is a struggle for status, a struggle to take 
democracy off of parchment and give it life.’143 Whilst ultimately unsuccessful in driving the reform 
of the US military during the Second World War, the MOWM would achieve its legislative demands 
just a few years after the war.  
As has been noted, President Truman initiated a reform process towards integration in July 1948, 
and won two thirds of the African-American vote later that year for his efforts. Krebs observes that 
the desegregation of the U.S. armed forces was ‘an unquestionably political act implying a boldly 
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race-free vision of the American political community.’144 He notes that, ‘at stake in the military’s 
racial policies was more than military efficiency: at issue was the very meaning of the American 
nation.’145 Whilst the precise circumstances of the desegregation of the U.S. military are still debated 
by historians, the utilisation of military service by African-Americans as a means to strengthen their 
case for equality within society is well established. Furthermore, the recognition of equality by the 
military carried significant symbolic value for the ongoing struggle for civil rights.  
Conclusion 
A considerable volume of scholarship has been dedicated to the relationship between the state and 
the military. Many theories claim to have answered the ubiquitous question “Who shall guard the 
guardians?” However, the prevailing model, adopted by the states of NATO and many others, is the 
separation of the military from the state, in the manner described by Huntington. This model, in 
which the military is ‘professionalised’ and ‘militarised’ to the extent that its only concern is 
‘successful armed combat,’ should be considered aspirational and utopian, as the military has an 
impact upon both the society it protects and the state it serves regardless of how far it is distanced 
from the mechanisms of power. Thus, civil-military relations should not be understood as the 
interplay between two monolithic institutions, but as part of a wider study of the dynamic between 
the state, the military, and society, all of which are influenced by one another.  
Identity in all its manifestations must be understood as fluid and adaptable. The boundaries of a 
nation or an ethnicity, and even which term is most appropriate, exist only as they are imagined by 
the individuals within (and without) the community. Furthermore, it has been well established that 
regardless of ongoing efforts to consolidate national identities to be in line with state boundaries, 
non-state identities remain pervasive and can even be seen to have flourished under the conditions 
of modernity. Understood through this prism, the military of any state can be viewed as a 
collaborative institution composed of a multitude of identities, rather than the physical 
manifestation of a homogenous nation. Furthermore, the military exists between the state and 
society, and as such serves as a barometer which illustrates the state’s attitude to groups within 
society, and groups within society’s investment and commitment to the state.  
Krebs argues that the field of civil military relations should properly be understood as ‘encompassing 
a wider range of questions about the relationship between the armed forces, the polity, and the 
populace.’146 The state can use identity to influence the military, and can use the military to mould 
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identity, whilst groups within a society (defined by their identity) can use the military to pressure the 
state, or use the state to shape the military. In any case, the military serves as a key tool of 
communication between the state and society, and a symbolic totem which can be utilised to 
indicate the boundaries of society. Thus, any analysis of the military must include the study of the 
society from which it is composed and the state it serves, as all militaries interact with both. 
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Chapter Two: Case Studies 
 
This chapter presents two cases studies which illustrate how many of the ideas and theories 
described in the first chapter have been applied in practice. The first is an examination of the 
Lebanese Army and its efforts to bring together the eighteen recognised religious groups of Lebanon 
into a robust military organisation following a protracted civil war. This process offers numerous 
insights of how the military can be employed as a tool of nation-building, particularly in post-conflict 
environments. Furthermore, the confessional diversity of Lebanon and its recent history of conflict 
makes it a pertinent example rich in parallels with post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second 
case study focuses on the British Army and the development of the regimental system, a unique 
method of military organisation that is now employed in a number of Commonwealth states such as 
India and Canada. This model is particularly worthy of note as it was the structure deemed to be best 
suited to the unified military of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
Case Study 1: The Lebanese Army 
In January 2007, Lebanon appeared on the brink of returning to the civil war that had devastated the 
country from 1975 until 1990. Veteran correspondent Robert Fisk, reporting from Beirut, noted 'I 
watched what historians may one day claim was the first day of Lebanon's new civil war' as a general 
strike degenerated into a sectarian battleground. Sunni pro-government protesters, Shia supporters 
of Hezbollah, numerous Christian sects (Marionites, Greek Orthodox and Catholic), as well as Druze 
and Alawites, jostled amongst themselves and each other for power.1 Fisk provides a vivid account of 
a confrontation between Shia and Sunnis on Corniche al-Mazraa, in Central Beirut: 
The mobs were there in their thousands, chorusing their hatred for those who lived across 
the other side of the boulevard. There were few officers. But after an hour, a Lebanese 
colonel ran down the street, a smartly dressed man, not even wearing a flak jacket, who 
walked straight into the highway between these two great waves of angry people, the stones 
banging off his helmet and body and legs. And the soldiers around me stood up and ran into 
the road to join him between these two enormous forces. I don't like journalists who fall in 
love with armies. I don't like armies. But yesterday it seemed that this one man was a lonely 
symbol of what stood between Lebanon and chaos. I don't know his religion. His soldiers 
were Sunnis and Shias and Christians - I had checked, of course - all dressed in the same 
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uniform. Could they hold together, could they remain under his command when their 
brothers and cousins, some of them, must have been among the crowds? They did. Some 
even grinned as they hurled themselves at the hooded men and youths too young to have 
known the last civil war, pleading and shouting for the violence to end. They won.2 
As Fisk points out, the soldiers in the Lebanese Army (LA) were from numerous religious 
backgrounds, more in fact, than he says. Indeed, historically almost every religious or ethnic group in 
Lebanon has been represented in the military (two Jewish LA officers were dismissed in 1952 and 
were never replaced).3 During the war against Israel in 1948, Shia, Sunni and Druze Muslims fought 
alongside Marionite, Greek Orthodox and Catholic Christians, just as Fisk observed in 2007.4 In 
addition to its confessional diversity, distinct regional, social, and class divisions further complicate 
the identity of the LA. It could be expected that an army formed from such a patchwork of disparate 
identities would, in the many periods of crisis experienced by Lebanon, either fracture into rival 
forces or be dominated by one group. However, even during the darkest years of the civil war, when 
the LA had very limited capability and almost no authority, it at least remained a Lebanese 
institution. A study of the origins and development of the LA will provide an understanding of the 
circumstances from which such a seemingly successful multiethnic military has emerged. 
Consideration will be given to the structure and organisation of the LA, along with the rhetoric of its 
commanders, and non-combat functions the LA has performed in the state, such as ceremonial and 
educational roles. The insights presented will not only illustrate the complexity of the dynamic 
between the state, identity, and the military, but will also offer historical examples which can later be 
utilised as elements of a comparative analysis.   
In 1943 Lebanon attained independence from France. A 1932 census, the last official one held in the 
country, indicates that the population of Lebanon was composed of 28 per cent Marionite Christians, 
22.4 per cent Sunni Muslims, 19.6 per cent Shia Muslims, 9.7 per cent Greek Orthodox, 6.8 per cent 
Armenians (Catholic and Orthodox) and 5.9 per cent Greek Catholics.5 In total Christians had a 
marginal majority in population (50.4 per cent), and this, coupled with them being more politically 
active, led to the French heeding their calls in the prelude to independence to be separate from 
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Syria.6 Many Christians considered themselves essentially French and wished to retain close ties with 
their former patron. In contrast, however, most Sunnis, the dominant Muslim group both numerically 
and politically, were advocates of pan-Arab nationalism and union with the Arab hinterland, primarily 
Syria. The 1943 National Pact provided the blueprint for the composition and outlook of the nascent 
Lebanese state, and represented a compromise between the various worldviews of the communities 
in Lebanon. Lebanon would be an Arab state, however, it would neither seek an alliance with a 
Western Power nor would it pursue pan-Arabism. It was, in essence, to remain neutral in 
international affairs.7 Furthermore, the Pact endorsed the principle of intercommunal power-sharing, 
and the ratio of six Christians to five Muslims was agreed as the composition of Parliament, which 
would be elected on a confessional and geographical basis. The highest posts would be divided 
between the dominant communities, with a Marionite President, Sunni Prime Minister and Shia 
Speaker of Parliament.8 
It was not until August 1, 1945, that the Lebanese government received command of the Lebanese 
component of the Troupes Speciales du Levant, the French colonial forces, and formed the LA.9 
Initially, the LA was a small force of 3,000 men commanded by Fuad Shihab (a Marionite trained in 
France), and was dominated in its officer corps by Christians.10 Furthermore, Christian dominance 
was retained at numerous command levels, where they filled the roles of Head of Military 
Intelligence, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Commander, President's adjutant, and the heads of the 
branches of the army. In addition, the Military Academy and the Republican Guard were led by 
Christians, as well as most combat units, including artillery and armour.11 Christians would continue 
to dominate the officer corps until the beginning of the civil war. However, amongst enlisted 
personnel the number of Muslims, especially Shias, steadily rose.12 
Due to Lebanon's internationally neutral stance, difficulties in maintaining a confessional balance in 
recruitment, and Christian fears that an increasingly Muslim army could at some point be turned 
against them, the LA remained a small force concerned almost exclusively with internal security.13 
However, as Oren Barak states, ‘the new-born institution lacked cohesion, discipline and esprit de 
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corps, and its officers and men held disparate views of the identity of their state and its foreign 
policy.’14 
During the 1948 war between Israel and its Arab neighbours Lebanon, for the most part, took a 
defensive role, with its contribution largely being limited to allowing its more powerful allies to use 
Lebanese territory to manoeuvre troops, volunteers, and supplies. However, on June 5 and 6, the LA 
fought the Israeli Defence Forces in a village called Malikiyya (in present-day Israel), achieving a rare 
victory. The battle had much symbolic significance for the LA. Oren Barak, in his study of the 
commemoration of the battle, observes that the victory: 
Bore many qualities that are the stuff myths are made of: manifestations of professionalism, 
discipline and esprit de corps (as manifested, for instance, in the combined use of infantry, 
artillery and armour); acts of bravery and sacrifice; readiness to come to the help of brothers 
in their time of need thus fulfilling the sanctified duty of the Arab states toward the 
Palestinian cause; and, above all, a victory over a powerful and sinister enemy.15 
During the 1950s the LA faced more challenges. A general strike directed against Prime Minister 
Khoury in 1952 led to calls for military intervention, which Shihab refused. Then, in 1958, President 
Camille Chamoun requested the army break-up riots, but Shihab again declined. Shihab argued that 
the LA's role was the protection of the state, and that the unrest was directed against the particular 
government in place, rather than the state, and he therefore refused to act.16 This established a 
positive image for the LA, one in which the army respected the political and constitutional structures 
of Lebanon and remained aloof of the quarrelsome inter-confessional politics that beset the state. 
Shihabism, as Shihab's approach became known, meant ‘abstaining from confessionalism and 
politics, and was the basis of abnegating ethnic diversity.’17 It restricted the LA to the role of the 
‘safeguard of democracy and Lebanon's unity.’18 This ideology would underpin the army throughout 
the civil war and influence its eventual re-emergence. 
In 1969, following the Six Day War between Israel and many of its Arab neighbours, Lebanon signed 
the Cairo Accords.19 Lebanon had remained relatively detached from the Arab-Israeli conflict since 
1948, however under the terms of the Accords southern Lebanon became a base of operations for 
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Palestinian militants. Fearing that Lebanon could be drawn into the conflict with Israel and unnerved 
by the presence of a Palestinian force so large within Lebanon's borders, Christian militias began 
arming, and were quickly followed by other sectarian, ideological, and regional militias.20 These 
militias quickly grew and soon outnumbered the LA. The Phalangists, a Christian militia, commanded 
8,000 men, the total strength of eight Palestinian militias totalled 22,900, the Communists and 
Progressive Socialists fielded 5,000 each, and numerous other political and confessional militias each 
had thousands of men at their command. In 1975, the LA had a total of 15,250 troops.21  
The inaction of the LA in the face of retaliatory Israeli strikes against the Palestinian militants in 
Lebanon, coupled with the Christian image it had developed primarily due to the predominance of 
Christians in the officer corps, led to many accusations that the LA had become a Christian, rather 
than pan-Lebanese, force. Fearing such allegations could escalate into rebellion, the government 
hesitated to deploy the LA to end clashes that had erupted between Palestinian militants and 
Christian militias.22 Indecision in the face of escalating violence led to desertions from both the LA 
and the police, the eruption of further violence, and the splintering of the LA. In 1976, a Sunni 
lieutenant formed the Lebanese Arab Army, a breakaway group of Sunni soldiers. At the same time, a 
General attempted a coup d’état, and Major Sa'ad Haddad formed another small army in the south 
of the country.23 
The fighting in the Civil War was largely restricted to clashes between militias, who often attempted 
to assert dominance over their own confessional group as much as fighting those of other faiths. The 
LA remained largely paralysed during the war, and experienced significant desertions, as well as 
numerous defections of soldiers and officers to the militias. Barak estimates that ten per cent of LA 
officers and soldiers remained in their positions, 15 per cent defected to militias, and 75 per cent 
simply went home.24 In 1984, the 6th Brigade, composed mostly of Shias, refused orders to confront 
the Shia militia Amal, choosing instead to join up with Amal to fight Palestinian militias, prompting 
one of the most traumatic defections of the war.25 The same year, Michel Awn (a Marionite) became 
Commander of the LA, and began shaping it to suit his personal needs. The loss of legitimacy 
experienced by the LA, stemming from accusations that it was a Christian force and thus did not 
reflect the social composition of Lebanon, led to the loss of its monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force and the collapse of its institutional cohesion. As a result, it was powerless to fulfil any of its 
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obligations as a military, leaving the state without the means to enforce its authority for 15 years.  
In 1988, following a constitutional crisis, Awn was named Prime Minister, a role usually reserved for a 
Sunni, and then, after Christian groups in Lebanon rejected a US-Syrian sponsored candidate for 
President, claimed the role for himself.26 Acting as President, Prime Minister and Commander of the 
LA, Awn declared war on the Phalangists and then on Syrian troops in Lebanon, who had been 
deployed to parts of Lebanon as peacekeepers for most of the war. A rival government, led by Salim 
Hoss (the former Prime Minister), was formed and drew considerable support in its opposition of 
Awn. Emile Lahoun (a Marionite) was chosen as Army Commander for the Hoss government, and 
implored Awn’s soldiers to join the new government. This led to the institutional division of the LA 
for the first time since its inception. However, confessional identities were ignored, as the split was 
between Awn’s personal supporters and those who opposed him.27 Awn was eventually driven out of 
Lebanon by Syrian air strikes, opening the door for Hoss. The new Lebanese government enjoyed a 
degree of legitimacy as it was the product of the Ta’if Agreement, which had been signed by the 
surviving members of Lebanon's Parliament (last elected in 1972) in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, on October 
22, 1989.28 The Civil War would end almost a year later, on October 13, 1990, having cost the lives of 
150,000 people and wounded at least 300,000 more, whilst more than 750,000 had left the 
country.29 During the conflict, much of Lebanon had been occupied by Syrian Forces, a multinational 
peacekeeping force had come and gone, and Israel had invaded in 1982. As a result, in addition to 
the human cost, the country had suffered severe damage to its infrastructure, as well as its political, 
constitutional, and state structures. 
Reconstruction 
There had been numerous attempts at rebuilding the LA during the war. In October 1978 proposals 
for the establishment of two armies, one Christian and one Muslim, or four armies, one Christian, 
one Shia, one Sunni and one Druze, had been dismissed in favour of a unified national army.30 
Muslim officers were recruited, giving a confessional parity in the officer corps, and “Friendship 
Camps” were set up for common training of soldiers from different faiths. Positions in the higher 
echelons of command were shared, and the National Defence Law of 1979 clarified the somewhat 
ambiguous chain of command, giving control to the President, who would have to answer to layers of 
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representative councils, entrenching the need for political consensus.31 These attempts, however, fell 
prey to political disagreements and fears that, if strengthened, the LA would support the Christians. 
Following the Israeli invasion in 1982, further attempts were made to rebuild the army, this time with 
the support of the US. Conscription was introduced to facilitate a rapid expansion of the LA, and a 
US-led train and equip programme, the Lebanese Army Modernization Programme (LAMP), was 
introduced to strengthen its military capabilities and ‘produce a credible nucleus for a larger, more 
capable military.’32 The reinvigorated LA attempted to impose peace. However, continuing fears that 
a strong army would be a tool of Christian power impeded the reform process, and the alienation of 
some groups led to its near-collapse.33 Although these efforts all failed, Barak observes, ‘the 
government attempted to reconstruct the army time and again, reflecting the deep conviction of 
Lebanon's leaders that the successful revitalization of this institution was a prerequisite for a 
successful political settlement that could end the war.’34 
Whilst the Ta’if Agreement brought about an end to the war, Lebanon remained a fragile state. Gaub 
notes how 'Lebanon was controlled by numerous militias and ruled by warlords, and neither the 
army nor the police had a say in the security organisation of the country.'35 The Ta’if Agreement 
updated Lebanon's power-sharing arrangements to reflect changes in the country's demographics, 
providing the political consensus needed to embark on strengthening Lebanon's state institutions, 
particularly the LA.36 The new LA faced numerous challenges in its attempt to rebuild itself into an 
effective military which was also representative of all Lebanon. It had to ‘reunite its scattered 
remnants, restructure the religion-based brigades, increase its size, integrate former militias, get rid 
of the Christian image and impose itself as the one and only source of coercion.’37 
The first step in the LA's process of reconstruction was the incorporation of Awn's followers into the 
legitimate army. The 3,000 – 5,000 men who had stayed loyal to Awn represented some of the best 
soldiers the LA had, and were mostly Christian. To reject them would not only weaken the LA and 
isolate Christian groups, but also make any attempt to create a confessionally balanced military 
difficult. Gaub observes that ‘the reunification of these two parts, albeit successful, remains taboo in 
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the Army,’ with the LA preferring to downplay or deny it had ever split.38 Reunification was followed 
by a restructuring of the brigade system, which since the French Mandate had organised units on a 
confessional-geographical basis, resulting in units such as “The Shia Brigade of the Bekaa Valley.”39 In 
order to remove these confessional-geographical loyalties the brigades were mixed, initially at the 
officer level, and then with a battalion from one faith being moved into a brigade dominated by 
another. In 1992, individual soldiers were assigned to new units as part of project “Total Integration,” 
in which a certain amount of personnel were shifted around brigades to make every brigade 
confessionally balanced.40 Furthermore, battalions would now rotate their deployment every six 
months, moving from one area of Lebanon to another.41 
In 1993, conscription, labelled as Flag Service, began. This was in part to facilitate the enlargement of 
the LA, seen as a vital measure for it to reassert its dominance. By 1994 the LA consisted of 40,000 
men, and by 2004, 60,000, four times its size in 1975.42 In addition, the LA was equipped with 400 
tanks, 1,000 armoured vehicles and 200 artillery pieces, establishing it as the dominant military force 
in Lebanon.43 The introduction of conscription also had other aims, with the LA stating it would help 
the youth escape ‘narrow partisanship’ and ‘blind sectarianism,’ reflecting a belief in ‘military service 
as a vehicle to overcome the societal divisions that led, among other reasons, to the civil war.’44 Thus, 
the LA can be seen to have been employed as the School of the Nation, with the intention being to 
unite communities that had become polarised from the civil war through contact, interaction, 
education, and training.  
In order to facilitate the military’s new role, numerous measures were taken to shake off the 
Christian image. For the first time its composition was disclosed by the Minister of Defence, revealing 
that although Christians retained a predominance in the ranks of Brigadier and Colonel, Muslims now 
filled the majority of posts from Major down. Furthermore, Muslims formed a slight majority, at 52.2 
per cent, of the total officer corps.45 A total of 6,000 former militiamen were integrated into the LA 
and Lebanon's other security institutions, 5,000 of whom were Muslim. Amal, the largest Shia militia, 
offered 2,800 men, and 1,300 Druze were incorporated.46 Whilst these numbers represent a fraction 
of the total strength of the militias, ‘it expressed in a very tangible manner the reconciliation that 
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was so badly needed.’47 The incorporation of a high proportion of Muslim militiamen, coupled with 
selective recruitment, allowed the LA to achieve its stated aim of a 50:50 ratio of Christian to Muslim 
personnel. Some estimates have suggested that the ratio is closer to 40:60, with Muslims now 
holding an overall numerical majority, which reflects assumptions (there has not been a census since 
1932) that Muslims represent the largest demographic group in modern Lebanon.48 
The balancing of the LA into a 50:50 institution in theory, and perhaps a Muslim-dominated 
institution in practice, achieved much in creating a new, non-partisan image for the LA. This image 
was put to the test as the LA began reasserting itself over the remaining militias. In 1991 the LA 
raided 250 militia bases and began confiscating weapons. Militias that did not disarm and engage in 
politics rather than violence found their leaderships arrested, and protests were dispersed. Gradually 
the LA took up positions at military and government sites across Lebanon, replacing militia garrisons. 
Its actions in confronting militias of all confessions and restoring public order earned it the support of 
many in the population.49 
In addition to establishing its monopoly on coercion, the LA sought to re-establish its legitimacy.  The 
legacy of Shihabism was invoked and the tomb of the Unknown Soldier was rebuilt in Beirut, drawing 
a path of continuity from before the Civil War to the present. In addition the LA became the only 
formal institution to commemorate soldiers and civilians killed during the Civil War.50 The memory of 
the Battle of Malikiyya was invoked, ‘representing the army's finest hour, when members of different 
ethnic groups and regions had fought side by side and managed to overcome the enemy of Lebanon 
and the Arabs.’51 Reminding the LA, and the Lebanese population, of their former victories and the 
continuing presence of their common enemy served to offer a simple unifying narrative that had 
almost been forgotten. The publishing of memoirs, articles, and books on the Battle of Malikiyya 
reminded the LA’s men 'of their common, glorious past, embedding it in the institutional memory of 
this now fragmentized body.'52 The LA managed to reclaim its position as a symbol of a unified, pan-
confessional Lebanon, which despite the Civil War, retained enough appeal to re-emerge from the 
conflict. Gaub observes:   
While all kinds of ideologies were fighting each other between 1975 and 1990 in Lebanon – 
pan-Arabism, pan-Syrianism, Communism, Marionite confessionalism – none was strong 
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enough to win over the others. One could deduce that Lebanese nationalism remained as 
the only answer.53 
The importance of international support for the reconstruction of the LA cannot be understated. 
Lebanese officers were offered training in Syria, which also provided much of the LA's new 
weaponry.54 Furthermore, the US and Saudi Arabia pledged to assist in the reconstruction, with the 
LA receiving non-lethal vehicles and helicopters from the US, in addition to an initial $42 million in 
military aid.55 Brigadier-General Nizar Abdel-Kader, writing for the LA's Defence Magazine, quotes a 
US official in Beirut, who stated: 'Our cooperation with the Lebanese Army is very broad and 
comprehensive, and it is all about strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces as the sole, legitimate 
defense of the country.'56 International support such as this not only provided the LA with the 
necessary materiel to rebuild itself, but also served to underscore its legitimacy. The reconstructed 
LA became a large, powerful, and legitimate army, backed by Syria, the US, France, and the United 
Nations. 
The reform of the LA since the Ta’if Agreement has been a marked success. Up until the present day 
the LA has ‘been successful in staying clear of divisive politics and in maintaining its cohesion when 
national politics continued to degenerate.’57 The two attempts at reconstructing the army during the 
Civil War, although ultimately unsuccessful, served to lay key foundations for a rapid transformation 
once peace had been restored. Barak argues that:  
In the period of 1977-79. . .the Army was the harbinger of broader political and social 
change. First, Christian-Muslim parity in the officer corps was attained in 1977-78. Then, in 
1979, the National Defence Law introduced power-sharing mechanisms into the Army 
command.58  
The third attempt to reconstruct the LA would prove successful, ‘this time not only with Syrian aid 
and supervision and with international backing and support, but according to a new political 
consensus embodied in the Ta’if Agreement of 1989.’59 In 1991 the Lebanese Defence Minister 
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proclaimed ‘there is no state and no legitimate rule without a unified army.’60 Given political support 
such as this, the LA became the vanguard of reform in post-war Lebanon, as Barak notes: ‘the most 
salient reform...took place in the army.’61 Through ensuring that it was not dominated by a single 
group, and acting indiscriminately against militias of all faiths, the LA was able to reimagine itself as a 
pan-Lebanese institution. Restructuring created brigades and units that were composed of mixed 
groups at every level which therefore had no affiliation to a region or group. Furthermore, reclaiming 
past glories and highlighting continuities from before the Civil War allowed the LA to portray itself as 
legitimate and permanent, transcending the upheavals that had devastated the country. Whilst the 
LA ‘has managed to impose itself as the symbol of unity, reconciliation, transethnicity and a peaceful 
Lebanon as such, the state (or rather politics and politicians) is the symbol of war-time, 
fragmentation and interethnic strife.’62 
The extent to which the construction of a multiethnic military in post-war Lebanon is, of course, 
limited by the re-emergence of Hezbollah as a military force after it initially participated in the 
structures established by the Ta’if Agreement and ‘dismissed any notion of otherthrowing the 
Lebanese regime.’63 Although Hezbollah maintained a low-intensity conflict against Israeli forces and 
their allies in the south of Lebanon, it was not until 2000 when its operations escalated considerably. 
As Israeli forces withdrew, Hezbollah stepped up their attacks and rapidly advance into the formerly 
occupied territory.64 The presence of Hezbollah in Lebanon undermines the LA’s monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force, as well its claim to represent all groups within Lebanese society. 
Three key themes can be identified from the case of the reconstruction of the LA after the Civil War. 
First, it became clear that attempts to reform or rebuild the LA whilst the conflict continued were 
impeded not by opposition, reluctance or incompetence at the military level, but by the breakdown 
of political consensus. Once a renewed political consensus had been reached in the Ta’if Agreement, 
backed by international and regional actors, reforms to the LA proceeded rapidly and effectively. 
Second, in order to attain an image of unity, drastic changes had to be made to the structure of the 
LA. Units lost their identity, normally derived from their geographic origin or confessional 
composition, and soldiers were redistributed, merged and re-branded in order to create new units 
that could only be identified as Lebanese. Furthermore, the officer corps and chain of command 
were vigorously reformed, with officers who did not fit the new model of the LA being retired or 
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dismissed, proving that there was no place for sentimentality in the reform process. Thirdly, the 
reforms which took place in the LA led the entire reform process in post-war Lebanon, setting a 
precedent and an example to other institutions. Thus, while militias were disarmed and state 
authority was gradually reasserted, the reconstructed LA became a symbol of a unified and peaceful 
Lebanon. 
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Case Study 2: The British Army 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) is the product of centuries of 
political upheaval and institutional consolidation. In 1535 Wales was formally annexed to the 
Kingdom of England, in 1542 Henry VIII claimed the title of King of Ireland for the English monarch, 
and in 1603 King James became the first sovereign to rule over both England and Scotland. The 
English Civil Wars (1642-51) led to the consolidation, albeit briefly, of the three kingdoms into the 
English Commonwealth, which was nominally a republic. The restoration of King Charles II, however, 
led to a return to the former structure, in which a single monarch ruled over three separate 
kingdoms. In 1707, the kingdoms of England (including Wales) and Scotland were formally unified by 
the Act of Union, creating the Kingdom of Great Britain. Almost a century later, in 1800, the Kingdom 
of Great Britain was formally unified with the Kingdom of Ireland, forming the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, which existed until the formation of the Irish Free State in 1921. Linda 
Colley argues that the Acts of Union with Scotland and Ireland were the direct result of ‘the threat 
posed by France’ and suggests that ‘recurrent wars with France had made it possible for the 
different countries, social classes and ethnic groups contained in Great Britain to have something in 
common.’1 It was in these recurrent wars with France that the British Army and its regimental 
system were both forged.  
The origin of the modern British Army (BA) is usually ascribed to a ceremony which took place upon 
the return of Charles II to England in 1660. The soldiers of the former New Model Army, victors of 
the English Civil Wars, laid down their arms, then picked them up again in the name of their new 
king.2 Since this ceremonial act, the BA has enjoyed an uninterrupted existence as an institution to 
the present day. Throughout its lifetime, the BA has been a multiethnic force, and while the 
technology and nature of conflict has developed dramatically during this period, the manner in 
which the BA has approached questions of identity has been remarkably consistent.  
The following overview of the development of the composition of the BA provides an illustration of 
the complexity challenge British military planners faced when they were trying to forge a cohesive 
army from the various ethnic groups that form the UK. Indeed, the earliest demographic data for the 
British Isles, the 1821 censuses of Great Britain and Ireland, highlights the diverse range of ethnic 
and religious identities within the polity.The censuses revealed a total population of almost 21.5 
million, 52.3 percent of whom lived in England; 32.4 percent in Ireland; 9.9 percent in Scotland; 3.4 
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percent lived in Wales; and 1.5 percent were serving in the military.3 The population was further 
divided by religion. Although the majority of the population were Protestant (predominantly 
Anglican), a significant minority were Catholic, most notably in Ireland, where they constituted a 
majority.  
 The longevity of the BA suggests that the puzzle of how to form a cohesive military from such 
diversity was solved. Although no clear policy or intention can be identified regarding recruitment, 
structure, and organisation for the initial two centuries of the history of the BA, the ad-hoc solutions 
that sustained it for that initial period were gradually formalised in the late-nineteenth century. The 
product of this process was the regimental system, a method of organisation that not only offers a 
unique solution to the challenge of building multiethnic armies, but one that has also been widely 
praised for the cohesion and effectiveness it instills in armies that employ it. This has led to the 
system being employed by militaries across the world. Furthermore, as the organisational method 
applied to the unified Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, an analysis of the design and 
development of the regimental system will provide an understanding of how and why a system 
formerly the preserve of the anglosphere was employed by the military of Bosnia and Herzegovina.    
The New Model Army inherited by Charles II upon the Restoration was rapidly reduced in size, and 
was eventually limited to a few regiments of Guards.4 Separate military establishments existed in 
both Scotland and Ireland at the time. However, the army in Scotland was negligibly small and while 
the garrison in Ireland was much larger, it was loosely organised.5 However, as the pressures of war 
and empire increased, so the size of the BA grew, and its composition became ever more complex. 
The BA filled its ranks with soldiers from a panoply of other countries, such as Danish and Hessian 
mercenaries and Hanoverian and Dutch royal guards.6 Significant contingents were provided by 
refugees, such as the Huguenots, one of whom, Field Marshall Jean Louis, Lord Ligonier, rose to the 
rank of Commander-in-Chief from 1757-66.7 Furthermore, during the fight against Napoleon, the BA 
grew to an unprecedented size, leading to shortages in recruiting. As a result, during this period 20 
percent of the BA was composed of ‘foreign soldiers,’ including ‘French royalists, Germans, Greeks, 
Corsicans, and Negroes.’8 Such groups, constituting clear minorities and being motivated by financial 
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contracts rather than national loyalty, presented few problems to the British military leadership. It 
was the incorporation of groups within the British Isles, such as Scots and Irish, which posed the 
greatest challenge.  
In 1681, the Second Royal North British Dragoons, or Scots Greys, was formed, the first standing 
Scottish unit in the BA.9 The Nine Years War (1688-97) led to the unofficial merging of the military 
establishments of England, Ireland, and Scotland, a process which was institutionalised with the 
formal union of England and Scotland, both militarily and politically, a decade later. The merging of 
the English and Scottish military establishments resulted in the significant inclusion of Scottish 
officers and soldiers in the BA, as well as the establishment of numerous Scottish units. Between 
1714 and 1763, 25 percent of the officers in the BA were Scottish, a number far greater than their 
proportion of the population.10 The Jacobite rising of 1745, launched in the Scottish Highlands by 
Bonnie Prince Charlie, did little to stem the recruitment of Scots into the BA, and can even be argued 
to have catalysed it. Between 1725 and 1800, 37 Highland regiments, totalling 70,000 men, were 
raised.11 Prime Minister William Pitt the Elder would defend the decision to recruit the erstwhile 
rebels, stating: 
It is indifferent to me, whether a man was rocked in his cradle on this side or that of the 
Tweed. I sought for merit wherever it was to be found… and I found it in the mountains of 
the north. I called it forth, and drew it into your service, a hardy and intrepid race of men! 
…These men, in the last war were brought to combat on your side: they served with fidelity, 
as they fought with valour, and conquered for you in every part of the world: detested be 
national reflections against them!12   
By 1759, Scots comprised 16 percent of the soldiers based in Britain, and 27.5 percent of the soldiers 
and 31.5 percent of the officers based in North America.13 Hew Strachan observes that the 
recruitment of highlanders served both the British and Highlanders. The British needed more men 
and found a ready supply of them among the displaced population following the clearances of the 
Highlands. Furthermore, removing men of military age from the Highlands would reduce the chance 
of another rebellion. For the Highlanders, Strachan contends, ‘military service offered a way back 
from rebellion and defeat,’ as those families ‘whose titles and estates were forfeit were able to 
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redeem both by raising regiments and so proving loyalty to the Hanoverians.’14 Thus, the British can 
be seen to have ‘exploited clan loyalties to form regiments while simultaneously destroying the clans 
themselves.’15  
The BA which fought Napoleon was disproportionately Scottish, as they constituted approximately 
17 percent of the force. However, in the ensuing years this proportion fell, to 13 percent in 1830, 
and 10.5 percent in 1870 (by which point the Scots comprised 8 percent of the UK population). By 
the 1870s, falling numbers of Scottish recruits resulted in five ostensibly Scottish regiments having 
fewer than 15 percent of their personnel hailing from Scotland.16 However, as Strachan notes, ‘the 
warrior image of the Highlands proved both powerful and resilient’ and was eventually appropriated 
by the Scots as a universal symbol of Scotland.17 An 1862 History of the Scottish Regiments in the 
British Army, written by a Scotsman, illustrates the extent to which a Scottish military identity had 
been reconciled with service in the BA: 
Consistent with the bold and adventurous spirit of the Scotsman, we find him pushing his 
fortune in almost every land under the sun; with brave and manly heart going down to the 
battle of life… Of all the many and varied departments of life in which the Scotsman has 
been distinguished, he is most pre-eminent in the honourable profession of a soldier.18 
The mass-recruitment of Highlanders by the British, and the subsequent expansion of Highland 
identity to encompass Scotland as a whole, offers a clear example of ethnic mobilisation. Existing 
pre-modern identities were institutionalised by the BA, which created a ‘warrior race’ of soldiers, the 
boundaries of which were gradually expanded to include even urban lowland Scots. As a result, 
Catriona Kennedy and Matthew McCormack observe, ‘the rising reputation of Highland troops 
within the British army has been viewed as a vital means of cementing Scotland’s attachment to the 
Union,’ while J.E. Cookson argues that the Highland regiments became ‘proud symbols of Scotland’s 
ancient nationhood and of her equal partnership with England in a British Empire.’19  
In 1689 the Royal Irish Regiment joined the English military establishment, becoming the first Irish 
unit of the BA. Despite a pervasive belief among the leadership in London that Catholics were 
‘unreliable by definition’ and therefore Irish Protestants should remain in Ireland to suppress any 
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uprisings, many Irish of both faiths served in the BA.20 Indeed, Protestants only made up 
approximately ten percent of the population. Although the Protestants had more reason to serve in 
the BA and were considered more trustworthy by the British government, Irish Catholics joined the 
military in increasing numbers, to the extent that in the First World War they made up around three-
quarters of the casualties from the island.21 Stephen Conway notes that of the BA soldiers based in 
Britain in 1756 only 4.4 percent were Irish. However, he stipulates that most Irish recruits served 
overseas. Although precise figures are, according to Conway, unavailable, he illustrates the extent of 
Irish service abroad with the composition of 11 regiments which gathered in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 
1757. Forty-three percent of the soldiers were English (and Welsh), 40 percent were Irish, and 17 
percent were Scots.22 The pressures of the American War of Independence led to the Catholic Relief 
Bill in 1778, which allowed both Irish and British Catholics formally to serve in the BA.23  
By the time of the Napoleonic Wars approximately 159,000 Irishmen were serving in British 
Regiments, in addition to eight Irish regiments recruited in Ireland, leading some historians to 
estimate that as many as half of the Duke of Wellington’s army in the Peninsular War was Irish.24 In 
1830, the Irish contingent of the BA peaked at 42.2 percent, far outweighing Ireland’s proportion of 
the UK’s total population. By 1868, following the famine and ensuing migration, this figure had fallen 
to 30.4 percent, and by 1890 only 14.5 percent of the BA hailed from Ireland.25 Considering the 
history of British military activity in Ireland and the colonisation of parts of the country by 
Protestants, the extent of Irish participation in the BA is surprising. However, as Kennedy argues: 
‘the French revolutionaries’ aggressive drive for dechristianization meant that the war against 
republican and even Napoleonic France could now be presented as a struggle between European 
Christian order and an imperialistic atheist state.’ Thus, she continues, ‘there was no paradox in an 
Irishman accepting a commission in the British Army.’26  
Furthermore, Kennedy notes how ‘the army was not a crucible of Britishness, insofar as it did not 
strive to impose a single, unitary identity on its Irish recruits’ and ‘the national regiments cultivated a 
                                                          
20 Conway. “War and National Identity in the Mid-Eighteenth-Century British Isles.” p.878 
21 Robin Bury. Buried Lives: The Protestants of Southern Ireland. (Dublin, 2017) p.16 
22 Conway. “War and National Identity in the Mid-Eighteenth-Century British Isles.” p.879 
23 Catriona Kennedy. “’True Brittons and Real Irish’: Irish Catholics in the British Army during the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars.” In Catriona Kennedy and Matthew McCormack, eds. Soldiering in Britain and Ireland, 
1750 – 1850. (Basingstoke, 2013) p.40 
24 Peter Karsten. “Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792 – 1922: Suborned or Subordinate.” Journal of Social 
History, Vol. 17, No. 1. (1993) p.36; Desmond and Jean Bowen. Heroic Option: The Irish in the British Army. 
(Barnsley, 2005) p.xiv 
25 Karsten. “Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792 – 1922: Suborned or Subordinate” p.36 
26 Kennedy. “True Brittons and Real Irish.” p.44 
60 
 
distinctive form of regimental Irishness.’27 The recruitment of Irish into the BA can therefore be seen 
as another example of ethnic mobilisation, in which the non-state (at the time) identity of Irishness 
was embraced by the British military leadership, and Irishmen served in an institution which 
recognised and entrenched their identity, rather than attempting to supplant it with a British one. 
Central to facilitating the successful mobilisation of Scottish and Irish soldiers into the BA was the 
form of administration and organisation pioneered by the British military: the regimental system.  
The Regimental System 
Despite its widespread application and well-documented history, any definition of the regimental 
system must remain fluid. Socio-economic developments, coupled with advances in technology and 
military organisation, mean that the parameters of what a regiment is – in terms of structure, 
composition, identity, and purpose – are constantly changing. David French, in his detailed study of 
military identities in the BA, postulates that ‘the language of the “regiment” is so shot through with 
anomalies that to talk of a “regimental system” is itself almost a misnomer, for there was much 
about it that was anything but systematic.’28 Perhaps the only consistent observation of the 
regimental system focuses on its abstract, emotional appeal. When joining a regiment, a soldier 
enters a community which offers them an inspirational heritage, a legacy to defend, and the support 
of a “family” in a manner considerably more personal than the faceless bureaucracy of an army 
organised along the lines of the continental system. Such a dynamic, it is argued, fosters esprit de 
corps and boosts the morale of troops, ultimately leading to increased combat effectiveness and 
cohesion. This understanding of the regimental system is perhaps best illustrated by Queen 
Elizabeth II, who, when addressing a group of regimental colonels in 1956, told them that the British 
Army: 
More perhaps than any other in the world, has always lived through the regiment and the 
regimental tradition. In the hour of battle, it has repeatedly relied on it, on the pride and 
comradeship of men who would sooner die than betray the traditions of their corps or be 
unworthy of the men of old who fought before them under its colours. There is no first 
among the regiments and corps of my Army and there is no last; all are bound in the same 
spirit of brotherhood and proud service to sovereign and country and each regards itself – 
with every reason – as second to none.29 
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The regiment was both the key operational and administrative unit of the BA prior the formal 
establishment of the regimental system. During this period, ‘for the individual, the regiment was 
[emphasis in original] the army. Officers would be commissioned and promoted in the regiment, 
while men would be recruited into the regiment and remained with it until death or discharged.’30 In 
1871, Edward Cardwell, the Secretary of State for War, passed the Regulation of the Forces Act, 
laying the foundation for the modern regimental system. The Act divided the country into 66 
districts loosely based on the counties and regions of the UK, each of which would house a 
regimental depot and support two battalions, which together would form a regiment. One battalion 
would serve abroad for a period usually of five years, whilst the other would remain in its home 
county and focus on recruitment and training.31 The creation of territorial designations and the 
establishment of links with local communities under the Cardwell reforms had mixed results. In 
some cases, the reforms simply formalised existing practices and required little implementation. 
However, in many instances the efforts have been described as ‘the reinvention of “tradition” with a 
vengeance,’ and the idea that all of the regiments constituted a community or family has been 
dismissed as ‘largely bogus.’32 The reforms introduced by Cardwell created regiments from units as 
disparate as the 27/Inniskilling Fusiliers (based in Ireland) and the 108/Madras Infantry (based in 
India), and in some cases, the composite parts of the regiment rarely interacted. The two regular 
battalions of the Sherwood Foresters, for example, did not meet at all between 1899 and 1938.33   
In 1881, Hugh Childers, building upon Cardwell’s work, continued the reform process and attempted 
to reinforce regimental identities. French points out that, in pursuit of these new identities, ‘the 
regimental and military authorities manipulated symbols, rituals, ceremonies, and “histories” to 
create a new regimental esprit de corps.’ Most regiments were named after their home county, such 
as The Devonshire Regiment, however those with distinct ethnic identities had them recognised, 
resulting in the formation of units such as The Royal Irish Regiment, The Welsh Regiment, and The 
Black Watch (Royal Highlanders). The ethnic distinctions between the regiments were highlighted in 
the uniforms of the soldiers. English and Welsh regiments sported roses on the lace of officers and 
white facings on the redcoats of their soldiers; Scottish regiments bore thistles, yellow facings, and 
some wore kilts; and shamrocks and green facings decorated the Irish regiments.34 Furthermore, the 
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battle honours inscribed on the regimental colours (the flag historically carried into battle) not only 
distinguished units from each other, but also served as a record of a regiment’s history. 
Modifications, based on past glories, were also made to the uniforms of the soldiers in a regiment. In 
1801, for example, the 28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment was awarded the honour of wearing 
an extra Sphinx emblem on the back of their headdresses to commemorate the bravery displayed at 
the Battle of Alexandria, where they were simultaneously attacked in the front and rear by French 
forces.35 Customs such as this led to a situation in which, as French states:  
No two regiments in the British Army wore exactly the same uniform. Variations might in 
some cases be quite minor – a different pattern of button or cap-badge – but the functions 
of the differences were quite deliberate. They were a visible symbol of the common identity 
that each member of the regiment shared, and they enhanced each regiment’s sense of 
separateness.36 
The expression of unique identities by the regiments of the British Army was not restricted to names 
and uniforms. Numerous measures were taken to instil a distinct cultural identity for each regiment 
in order to further embellish their separateness. Each regiment possessed an unpaid titular head of 
the regiment in the form of a Colonel, usually a retired or serving senior officer, who, whilst serving a 
purely symbolic role, would act as a patriarchal figurehead and preside over institutions that created 
‘the image of the regiment as a community’ such as the Regimental Association.37 The Regimental 
Associations offered financial and emotional assistance to present and former soldiers and their 
families, organised regimental events, erected memorials to fallen comrades and published 
regimental journals and histories.38 The journals focussed on military and sporting triumphs of the 
regiment, and also offered extracts from the historical records and tales of heroism, while most of 
the histories ‘presented a chronological account of the significant achievements of the regiment, 
concentrating on wars and battles, rather than on the dreary years of garrison service that was the 
lot of most soldiers.’39 The focus on rooting the regiment deep in the past and ensuring the 
continuation of its traditions is explained to some extent by Lieutenant General Sir Alastair Irwin: ‘To 
one degree or another the past provides a powerful motive for performing well in the present. And 
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so, we must not lightly sever the direct links with that past.’40 However, it is evident that such links 
with the past are, to some extent, created.  
The activities of the Regimental Associations underpinned the effort to foster unique identities 
among the regiments of the British Army. French argues that, far from being an organic process, the 
Regimental Associations acted with ‘the explicit purpose of influencing behaviour of men in the 
present and the future,’ and intended to ‘bolster pride in the regiment amongst its members, to 
encourage the present generation to enlist, and then to emulate the heroic deeds of their 
predecessors.’41 One regimental history, for example, warned that ‘the past is the heritage which 
nothing can take from you, but the present and the future are in your hands, see that you are 
worthy of these great traditions.’42 Irwin observes that the celebration of heritage and identity in the 
Regimental System offers soldiers ‘a sense of belonging to an entity which has an existence, a past, 
present and future of its own.’43 The community, he continues,  
extends over several generations, across all ranks, serving and retired. In belonging to this 
community its members benefit from a powerful sense of mutual support, of comradeship, 
of obligation to others in the regimental family. These provide the encouragement and 
moral strength necessary to sustain the regiment or corps through good times and bad.’44 
Furnishing the regiments of the BA with regional and national attachments and names, unique 
uniforms, and individual histories served to delegate the question of identity to the regiments 
themselves. This allowed each regiment to tailor the accoutrements of its appearance and heritage 
to represent the personnel who, in theory at least, served in the regiment. Kennedy argues that ‘the 
regimental system, moreover, meant that the BA was able to manage an array of different personal, 
regional and national attachments that reflected the composite character of the UK and its 
component patriotisms.’45 In many cases, the composite character of the UK was exaggerated. The 
1881 reorganisation, if applied consistently, should have resulted in the reduction of kilted Highland 
regiments from five to two and half. However, this proposition met with institutional resistance 
(supported by the Queen), and the result was ‘the reverse of manpower logic’ and the preservation 
of all five regiments, which had formerly English regiments grafted onto them. Furthermore, the 
‘highland craze’ was extended to all Scottish regiments, and Lowland regiments adopted ‘semi-
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highland’ features such as ‘basket-hilted broadswords, pipe bands and tartan trews.’46 The special 
attention paid to the Scottish regiments during the 1881 reforms led to the overrepresentation of 
Scotland within the BA, and served to ‘confirm, and even to extend, the specifically Scottish 
identities of Scottish regiments.’47  
Little evidence can be found to suggest that any effort was made by the British military leadership to 
create a “British” or “UK” identity in the military. The Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief of 
the BA in the mid-nineteenth century, the time of the first reforms, postulated that a ‘truly British 
army was being forged, made up of English, Irish and Scottish battalions, which by serving together 
in the empire promoted a form of national homogeneity.’48 Indeed, during this period the military 
was the only profession whose members ‘uniformly operated in an all-British context.’49 However, 
camaraderie between soldiers that have fought together does not necessarily lead to the erosion of 
ethnic identities or the emergence of a new, overarching identity. Nor does it reflect a conscious 
effort by the military to create one. Kennedy contends that ‘there is little evidence that the BA tried 
actively to propagandize its captive audience of soldiers.’50 She continues, speculating that ‘what the 
army may have offered was a flexible and, in an important sense, specifically military identity,’ 
noting that ‘if there was little institutional effort to foster an attachment to the British nation, the 
army, nonetheless, provided a context for interaction and encounters between soldiers from across 
the four nations.’51  
The British approach to overcoming the challenge posed by building an army from multiple ethno-
national groups can be defined by the military’s recognition and institutionalisation of the varied 
identities from which it was formed. Enshrining regional and national identities within the 
administrative units of the BA signalled that both Scottish and Irish identities were as integral to the 
military as the numerically dominant English identity. That in many cases the personnel within each 
regiment had little or no attachment to it, as with the multitude of Irishmen serving in English 
regiments, or with Lowland Scots or English serving in Highland regiments, appears to have done 
little to dilute these regimental identities.  
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French, in his excellent study of military identities, concludes his chapter on the regimental system 
by highlighting the machinations and circumstances which led to its implementation and 
development:  
Regiments were culturally defined organisations that were bound together by shared 
historical memories, customs, and a myth of descent, not by the common ethnic or local 
origins of their members. They were the product of a particular set of historical 
circumstances, the Cardwell-Childers reforms, and of the need identified by the military 
authorities to find a way of instilling morale and discipline into the large number of short-
service recruits that the Regular Army needed. The idea of a ‘regiment’ was something that 
was artificially constructed by the Colonels of Regiments and their senior officers. In many 
cases their efforts were rewarded with success.52  
That the regiments were no more than the product of ‘invented tradition’ and military policy serves 
to underscore that, despite the somewhat organic appearance of the BA, its approach to 
multiethnicity is the product of informed decision and design. Three key themes can be identified 
from the success of this design. First, the institutionalisation of the main composite identities of the 
BA through the establishment of regiments with regional and national affiliations can be viewed to 
have minimised the perception that the BA was a tool to erode and destroy ethnic identities, and 
was instead a tool by which such identities could become incorporated into the wider polity. Second, 
little to no effort was made on behalf of the state to utilise the military to shape, manipulate, or 
create a “British” identity. Indeed, the evidence suggests a laissez-faire attitude in which soldiers 
naturally interacted with personnel and units from across the UK, developing a sense of their shared 
purpose, with the state and the military offering minimal direction to such developments. Third, the 
overrepresentation of ethnic groups such as Scots and Irish, compounded by the exaggeration of 
identities such as those of the Highlanders, illustrates the process of ethnic mobilisation as described 
by Cynthia Enloe.53 Although the circumstances of the overrepresentation are most likely explained 
by myriad circumstances such as poverty, the outcome was a military which represented something 
closer to a partnership between the nations, rather than an English army supplemented with Irish 
and Scottish auxiliaries.  
Conclusion 
The case studies illustrate a number of approaches that have been employed by the state to create a 
cohesive and representative military from a multiethnic society. In both the Lebanese and the British 
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cases, it was critically important to construct a military in which all of the constituent identities of 
society were represented. However, where Lebanon’s military leadership designed its army (after 
the civil war) to be ethnically balanced in its composition, but removed all indicators of religious or 
geographic attachments from its units, the British military paid little attention to the individual 
identities of its soldiers, and instead assured the representation of all ethnic groups through 
embedding the heritage and identity of each group in particular units. Furthermore, although both 
armies perform the role of a social agent and contribute to creating an identity shared among their 
composite elements, the attitude of the leadership of each army is markedly different. In Lebanon, 
the use of conscription, mixed units, and rotational deployments around the country indicates a firm 
commitment to the idea that the military can serve as a school of the nation. Indeed, the priority 
given to forming a unified army when attempting to rebuild the state during and after the civil war 
suggests the military was seen as the most important tool for unifying the population and rebuilding 
Lebanese identity. In contrast, British military planners have rarely made use of conscription, and no 
efforts have been made to employ the British Army consciously to forge identities other than 
regimental ones.  
The fact that two different armies have developed seemingly successful yet contrasting solutions to 
the same problem illustrates that there is no “correct” way to structure a multiethnic army or utilise 
the military within a society. It does, however, present an opportunity to identify two different 
models, each of which are inspired, but adapted to a specifically military context, by Sabrina Ramet’s 
exemplary analysis of the approaches with which the leadership of socialist Yugoslavia viewed the 
pervasive “national question.”54 The first can be described as “Integral Organisation.” This model is, 
in many ways, consistent with the concept of civic nationalism, which Smith notes is ‘based on the 
idea that the nation was a rational association of citizens bound by common laws and a shared 
territory.’55 Thus, when Integral Organisation is utilised, recruits serve on the basis of their 
citizenship and are organised, for example, in ethnically mixed units. Furthermore, little recognition 
is offered to names and symbols other than those of the state and the military. This combination of 
factors makes the military, whether the intentional result of policy or not, a social agent and an 
institution of integration, one which can be utilised by policymakers to attempt to forge a state-wide 
national identity.  Viewed in this manner, the post-Ta’if Agreement Lebanese Army can be seen as an 
example of this model, as soldiers were organised in mixed units without any symbolic attachments 
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to ethnic groups, and the Lebanese government actively employed the military as a tool to forge a 
shared national identity based on service, citizenship, and civic nationalism.    
The other model, best illustrated by the regimental system of the British Army, is “Organic 
Organisation.” This method is, to an extent, the inverse of Integral Organisation, and reflects an 
approach in which ethnic groups are incorporated into the wider polity as constituent elements of it, 
much like in many consociational forms of governance. Arend Ljiphart contends that:  ‘democratic 
government in divided societies requires two key elements: power sharing and group autonomy’ and 
points out that ‘these two characteristics are the primary attributes of the kind of democratic system 
that is often referred to as power-sharing democracy, or to use a technical political-science term, 
“consociational” democracy.’56 Employing names and symbols associated with ethnic groups to 
differentiate military units from each other, and in some cases organising personnel on the basis of 
ethnicity, offers a significant degree of group autonomy. Furthermore, the organisation of military 
units in this way can be viewed, at a symbolic level, as the division of military power and 
responsibility between the constituent groups that compose the state. Indeed, such units can even 
be viewed as bastions and vehicles of ethnic identities, which not only protect them, but enhance 
them. Major General VK Srivastava and Colonel GD Bakshi of the Indian Army, a military which 
employ the regimental system, illustrate this view:  
The Indian Army is a microcosm that faithfully represents the rich and vibrant diversity of 
the Indian macrocosm. . .this unique regimental system creates a mini ethno-universe of 
sorts – a cultural microcosm that faithfully replicates and preserves the cultural and ethnic 
background and context that the recruit comes from.57 
Understood in this way, the regimental system draws numerous parallels with consociationalism. 
Like in many divided societies that are governed by consociational administrations, the British Army 
has solved the challenge of building a multiethnic military by ensuring it is an institution which 
preserves and values Irish, Scottish, and Welsh identities, rather than employing it as a tool to forge 
a prescribed British one.   
The following chapter explores the ways in which Yugoslav policymakers attempted to build a 
cohesive and effective military from the various nations and nationalities that they governed 
through the prism of the ideas discussed in this chapter. It charts an evolving approach, in which 
both the integral and organic models of military organisation were employed. Together with this 
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chapter, it provides vital context for understanding both the military history of the Western Balkans 
and the political challenges and dilemmas that stood in the way of those who aimed to build a 
multiethnic military in post-Yugoslav Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Chapter Three: The Yugoslav People’s Army – A Precursor? 
 
The Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska narodna armija, JNA), the army of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička federativna Republika Jugoslavija, SFRJ), was one of the largest 
military forces in Europe during the Cold War. Alongside Yugoslav territorial defence forces, it was 
credited with making Yugoslavia ‘an invincible bastion for every aggressor’ an ‘armed fortress’ and a 
‘veritable hornets’ nest for any enemy force.’1 From its origins as a modest force of 12,000 
communist agitators at the outset of the Second World War, the JNA developed and expanded to 
become an integral part of Yugoslav society.2 As the Yugoslavs developed their unique interpretation 
of socialism, so the role and structures of the JNA would change to reflect the evolving nature of the 
state it served. It succeeded in its task of deterring invasion from both East and West and remained a 
cohesive force through numerous political and economic crises. However, in the final years of its 
existence, the JNA became a pawn in the machinations of various nationalist leaders as they vied for 
power during the collapse of the Yugoslav state.3 This chapter will provide an historical overview of 
the origins and development of the JNA, examine its relationship to the Yugoslav state and Yugoslav 
identity, and analyse the myriad ways in which it was utilised to address the twin challenges of 
defending the state from external (and internal) aggression and unifying a population with disparate 
ethno-national identities into a cohesive fighting force. 
Origins 
In April 1941, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was invaded and occupied by Axis forces, which effortlessly 
routed the Royal Yugoslav Army. The exiled King Peter II convened a government in London, whilst a 
former officer in the Royal Yugoslav Army, Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović, organised a resistance 
movement in occupied-Serbia, centred around irregular formations composed of Chetnik 
Detachments. The Chetniks (četnici) were characterised by their monarchist and Serb nationalist 
ideology, and whilst they would later establish modus vivendi and collaborate with the occupying 
forces, they were initially recognised by the British as allies. During the initial months of the war, the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, KPJ) remained underground. 
However, following the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the President of the KPJ, Josip 
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“Tito” Broz, issued a proclamation to the peoples of Yugoslavia to ‘rise up against the German, 
Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian invaders.’ 4 Meanwhile, the Party began organising military units 
and formed the National Liberation Movement (Narodnooslobodilački pokret, NOP) to lead the 
uprising.  
The Partisans, as the members of the NOP were called, employed guerrilla tactics and strategy to 
combat their more numerous, better armed, and more prepared opponents. Initially, the scope of 
their operations was limited due to the overwhelmingly disparity between their own forces and 
those of the Axis occupation, which were also supported by troops raised by local quisling 
governments. These early operations were carried out by small groups, often simply carrying out 
ambushes and raids in their local area, as Nikola Ljubičić, a Partisan who fought alongside Tito 
throughout the war and became Secretary of Defence in 1967, recalls: 
In the initial period of the National Liberation War. . . our military organisation featured a 
wide network of territorial units of different types, names and sizes. But the basic form of 
military organisation was the National Liberation Partisan Detachment.5   
Whilst the Communists led the Movement, they were careful to garner support from as much of the 
Yugoslav population as possible. Retaining a broad base not only strengthened the legitimacy of the 
Partisans, but it also allowed them to fill their ranks and increase the scale of their operations more 
rapidly. Vladimir Dedijer, another Partisan (who later fell out of favour with the regime), notes how: 
Tito stressed that the Partisan detachments were called National Liberation Detachments 
because they were the fighting formations not of any political party or group. . . but were 
the fighting forces of the people of Yugoslavia and should therefore include all patriots, 
whatever their views.6 
On 22 December 1941, exactly six months after Tito proclaimed the beginning of the uprising, the 
first regular military formation of the NOP, the First Proletarian Brigade, was established in Rudo, 
Bosnia. Dedijer records that after observing the high number of workers and miners in some units, 
Tito decided to bring them together into a larger force than the usual Partisan Detachments. The 
new units were elite, with service in them being considered the ‘highest honour for every individual 
fighting man.’7 They were ‘characterised by their firm discipline and by their methods of warfare,’ 
were distinguished  from other units by flying the hammer and sickle standard and wearing the red 
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star on their titovka (adapted from the Russian pilotka) caps, and were not ‘bound to regions where 
they had originated, but would fight in all parts of Yugoslavia.’8 Whilst the National Liberation 
Detachments offered localised resistance to the occupiers, the Proletarian Brigades were supposed 
to emulate the “shock” units of the Red Army and serve as a foundation from which an army capable 
of liberating all Yugoslav territory could be built. Furthermore, the Proletarian Brigades were 
intended to be drawn from all Yugoslav populations. It was believed that by fighting shoulder-to-
shoulder, the brigades would help to ‘overcome the deep divisions in the Yugoslav society’ and 
‘mould a “new man.”’9 In practice, however, the First Brigade remained dominated by Serbs and 
Montenegrins, and contained ‘only sprinklings of “fighters” from other nations.’10 
In terms of doctrine, personnel, and ideology the Proletarian Brigades were the genesis of the JNA. 
As the war developed they increased both in size and number, alongside regionally based units that 
were commanded principally by officers from the respective region, who answered to a regional 
command and gave orders using the respective local language.11 In early 1942, the NOP was 
renamed, becoming the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (Narodnooslobodilačka vojska 
Jugoslavije, NOVJ), and later that year, Dedijer records, it consisted of 150,000 fighters. This figure 
would double within a year.12 Yugoslav Communists who had fought in the International Brigades of 
the Spanish Civil War (known as “Spaniards”) were key in organising and leading the rapidly 
expanding army. Twenty-nine of them became Partisan generals, and every Partisan army was led by 
a Spaniard. Even Tito’s deputy, Ivan Gosnjak, had fought in Spain.13 The Party consolidated control of 
the army through commissars, who established ‘Political Sections’ within Partisan formations for 
‘the transmittal of political directives.’14 
On 29 November 1943, the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko 
vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije, AVNOJ) met in the town of Jajce, in central Bosnia. The 
council had been formed a year before to administer territory liberated by the Partisans and 
represented the political leadership of the resistance movement. The dominance of the KPJ in the 
armed forces of the NOVJ was reflected in the composition of the AVNOJ. For all intents and 
purposes, the latter was simply the political arm of the Partisan movement, and the former was the 
                                                          
8 Ibid. p.172 
9 Anton Bebler. “Political Pluralism and the Yugoslav Professional Military.” in Jim Seroka & Vukasin Pavlovic, 
eds. The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of Democratic Transformation. (New York, 1992) p.106 
10 Ibid. p.106 
11 A. Ross Johnson. “The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch.” p.182 
12 Dedijer. Tito Speaks. p.186, 202 
13 Johnson. “The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia.” p.182; Bebler. “Political Pluralism and the Yugoslav 
Professional Military.” p.110 
14 Ibid. P 182 
72 
 
military arm, as William Deakin, a British officer who served alongside the Partisans, notes: ‘The 
political and military aspects of the direction of the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement were 
deliberately and inextricably intertwined.’15 The meeting in Jajce culminated with the formal 
rejection of the authority of the exiled monarchy, the declaration that a new Yugoslav state based 
on ‘democratic federal principles’ had been formed, and the appointment of Tito as Marshal of 
Yugoslavia and Prime Minister.16 There was little that King Peter II and his government in London 
could offer in response, particularly as the Partisans’ strength and reputation increased across 
Yugoslavia.   
By the end of the war the NOVJ had grown into a formidable force which incorporated between 
700,000 and 800,000 fighters organised in forty-eight divisions and four armies, and was renamed 
again, this time to the Yugoslav Army (Jugoslavenska armija, JA).17 It had developed from a largely 
Serb and Montenegrin (75 – 80 percent) force to an army which, to an extent, reflected the Yugoslav 
population: The Partisans claimed that in May 1944 the national composition of the NOVJ was 44 
percent Serb, 30 percent Croat, 10 percent Slovene, 5 percent Montenegrin, 2.5 percent 
Macedonian, and 2.5 percent Muslim.18 Such claims are supported by the observations of outsiders 
such as Deakin, who notes that ‘the central conclusion of our observations was that the Natoinal 
Liberation Army, in marked and forceful contrast to the pan-Serb, anti-Croat, and anti-Moslem 
obsessions of the Mihailović Četniks, was a Yugoslav military organization.’19 Whilst the NOVJ had 
received limited supplies from the British, and Soviet forces had provided considerable assistance in 
the Belgrade Offensive, the Partisans had liberated the majority of Yugoslav territory by themselves, 
making Yugoslavia (with the exception of Albania) the only country in Europe able to claim it had 
liberated itself.20 Central to the Partisans’ success was the mantra of “brotherhood and unity,” which 
A. Ross Johnson argues signified ‘opposition both to the Serb hegemony of interwar Yugoslavia and 
the national fratricide of World War II.’21 The inclusivity of brotherhood and unity, coupled with a 
respectful policy towards Yugoslav civilians during the war and the ultimate victory of the Partisans, 
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laid a solid foundation upon which the nascent state could draw legitimacy across its territory and 
consolidate its position in the aftermath of war.  
The cost of their victory was considerable, however, with Yugoslav estimates placing wartime losses 
at approximately 1,700,000. Dedijer lamented: ‘Every ninth Yugoslav gave his life in the war.’22 These 
figures are likely to have been exaggerated, as James Gow notes: ‘around 1 million Yugoslavs died, 
according to calculations broadly accepted by non-partisan experts.’23 On Victory Day (9 May 1945), 
Tito gave a speech celebrating the triumph of the partisans. He lauded the soldiers of the NOVJ, 
telling them:  
Your immortal deeds will live forever in the hearts of our peoples and their future 
 generations. The arena of the glorious battles of the Sutjeska, of Zelengora, Kozara, and the 
 Neretva, etc, will remain eternal monuments to your heroism and that of your fallen 
 comrades. They will inspire future generations of our peoples and will teach them how to 
 love their country and how to die for it. They will be monuments of our national pride in the 
 struggle for freedom and independence. 
The new Yugoslav Army, an Army forged in the fires of the fiercest battles, an Army which is 
comprised of yourselves, a true people’s army which has won such glorious victories, must 
remain, and will remain, the unshakable defender of the achievements of our superhuman 
struggle.24 
Through recognising the sacrifices and bravery of the partisans, promising eternal monuments, and 
designating a role for the army following the war, Tito was outlining his vision for the SFRJ. The 
costly victory earned by the Partisans provided the founding myth and a common focus of 
memorialisation for the new state, whilst the JA would preserve what had been won – national 
liberation and social revolution. This narrative, emphasising the shared nature of the triumph, was 
embraced by the Yugoslav military leadership, as Branko Mamula, a Partisan and later Yugoslav 
Minister of Defence, illustrates: 
 Each of our nations and each of our nationalities were the vehicles of the struggle for their 
 own national emancipation and that all of them together, by their common struggle 
 managed, despite adversity, to score a victory over a militarily far superior enemy.25 
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In March 1945, the JA was quickly reorganised into a more conventional fighting force, a process 
Adam Roberts argues this was because ‘Soviet influence and Soviet-style administrative socialism 
were at their height in the country’ and Yugoslavia’s main challenge at this point was ‘reasserting 
central authority in a fragmented country.’26 The Soviets had sent their first military mission to 
Yugoslavia in February 1944, and following Victory Day their assistance rapidly increased. Thousands 
of Yugoslav officers and soldiers were sent to the Soviet military schools, the JA was organised on 
Red Army lines, and became increasingly armed by Soviet weaponry, including 125,446 rifles, 38,210 
sub-machine guns, 14,296 machine guns, in addition to hundreds of tanks and aeroplanes, and 
thousands of artillery pieces and mortars.27 Whilst the transformation of the JA into a conventional 
army may seem at odds with the Yugoslav experience of the Second World War, James Gow 
contends that this decision resulted from Yugoslav belief in Soviet institutions (particularly the 
effective and experienced Red Army), and was consistent with other efforts to emulate Soviet 
structures during Yugoslavia’s ‘statist’ (or Stalinist) phase.28  
Within a few years, however, the differing visions Stalin and Tito had for the future of the Balkans 
would prove to be irreconcilable. A key point of contention was Tito’s independent foreign policy, 
particularly his ambition to incorporate neighbouring Albania. Jeronim Perović, in his analysis of 
Soviet documents relating to the period, challenges the ‘version propagated in the official Yugoslav 
historiography’ and argues that ‘the main reason for the conflict was Stalin’s dismay when Tito 
continued to pursue an expansionist foreign policy agenda.’29 Robert Niebuhr concurs, noting that 
‘there was simply little room for a strong personality like Tito, whose rise to supremacy in Belgrade 
threatened to upset the global competition for power.’30 As a result, in June 1948 Yugoslavia was 
condemned and at a meeting of Cominform and expelled from the organisation.31 The following 
year, the Soviets renounced the Soviet-Yugoslav friendship treaty and began a series of military 
manoeuvres in neighbouring countries.32  
Fear of Soviet invasion led to a rapid reconsideration of Yugoslavia's defensive capabilities, resulting 
in the formation of Partisan units, the establishment of Partisan headquarters throughout 
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Yugoslavia, and the caching of weapons and explosives.33 By 1949, 149 regiments and 20 
independent brigades had been formed by the JNA to supplement their defensive capacity.34 
Yugoslavia’s isolation in the Communist world forced it to look westwards for assistance, and whilst 
Tito continued to denounce imperialism, economic aid was negotiated from Britain, France, and the 
United States in 1950, followed by American military aid in 1951. This would continue until 1958, 
and provided the Yugoslav Army with an array of heavy weapons and aircraft.35 On Army Day, 22 
December 1951, the military was renamed in order to signal severance with the past, finally 
becoming the JNA, and the Soviet model and commissar system were abolished.36 The threat of 
invasion stimulated further military expansion, and by 1952 Yugoslavia boasted an army of half a 
million men and a defence budget, as a percentage of the national economy, that was the biggest in 
the world.37  
Post-war Consolidation and “Integral Yugoslavism”    
On 31 January 1946, the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was 
promulgated. A clear link can be identified between the legitimacy of the regime and its wartime 
credentials: authority in the new Yugoslav order, the constitution explained, ‘derives from the 
people and belongs to the people,’ who had ‘exercised their authority through the people’s 
committees. . . which had originated and developed during the struggle for national liberation. . . 
and are the fundamental achievement of that struggle.’38 The constitution established Yugoslavia as 
a federation of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro, along with the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous region of 
Kosovo-Metohija. The new Yugoslavia, in contrast to the interwar kingdom, lent considerable 
respect for the national sensitivities, linguistic rights, and cultural needs of almost all of the Yugoslav 
population. Two broad categories were recognised: The “nations” (narodi), consisting of Serbs, 
Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and (from 1971) Muslims; and the “nationalities” 
(narodnosti), consisting of Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Romanians, 
Ruthenes/Ukrainians, Czechs, and Italians.39 The constitution enshrined the sovereign rights, 
security, equality, and national freedom of the nations (through the republics), and the right of the 
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nationalities to ‘their own cultural development and the free use of their own language.’ 40 However, 
not all groups within Yugoslav territory were included in the constitutional provisions. Gypsies were 
guaranteed “individual rights” but were only afforded equal status with other national groups in the 
Republic of Macedonia, whilst ethnic Germans (half a million of whom had lived in Yugoslavia prior 
to 1939) who survived the war and ensuing reprisals had their property confiscated and were 
interned in work camps until March 1948. Many left when they could, and those who remained after 
1948 were employed in state industry and even conscripted into the JA.41  
 
 Percentage of Total Polulation Pecentage of JNA Officer Corps 
1948 1971 1981 1946 1970 1991 
Croats 24 22.1 19.7 22.7 14.7 12.6 
Macedonians 5.2 5.8 6 3.6 5.6 6.3 
Montenegrins 2.7 2.5 2.6 9.2 10.3 6.2 
Muslims 5.1 8.4 8.9 1.9 4 2.4 
Serbs 41.5 39.7 36.3 51 57.4 60 
Slovenes 8.9 8.2 7.8 9.7 5.2 2.8 
Other* 12.6 13.3 18.7 1.9 2.8 6.7 
*Includes ‘Yugoslavs’, Albanians, Hungarians, etc. 
Table 1: National composition of JNA Officer Corps compared with national composituib if Yugoslav population42 
The JA was quick to begin adapting its own structures to reflect Yugoslav society because, as Gow 
argues, ‘the armed services’ legitimacy is dependent, to some considerable extent, on their 
congruence with the society that spawns them. . . the armed forces’ composition must be generally 
representative of social and ethnic cleavages within society.’43 Conscription evidently led to a 
significant cohort of the JA/JNA being proportionally representative, in terms of national identities, 
of the (male) Yugoslav population. However, approximately half the personnel in the JNA were 
career soldiers. Table 1, shown above, indicates the national composition of the officer corps, and 
offers a comparison with the national composition of the whole Yugoslav population. It reveals the 
challenge faced by the Yugoslav military establishment in attempting to bring together the nations 
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and nationalities of Yugoslavia into a single army, and illustrates the prevalence of Montenegrins and 
Serbs throughout the army’s lifetime. It can be noted, however, that from its formation, all of the 
nations were represented to some extent within the officer corps. Florian Bieber argues that the 
multiethnic nature of the army was ‘not only key in the general effort to structure Yugoslavia as an 
inclusive state but also based on the experience of the Royal Yugoslav Army, which lacked legitimacy 
because it was viewed by non-Serbs as being dominated by Serb officers.’44 Mile Bjelajac notes that 
following the war ‘one of the most important preoccupations of the state and military management 
was to adapt the nationality structure [of the army] to the nationality structure of the population’ 
and stipulates that the KPJ ‘hoped that the problem of legitimacy in a multi-ethnic society would be 
overcome by appropriate representation of non-Serbs among Generals and the officer corps in 
general.’45 
The initial efforts to create a more representative military, coupled with the federal structure of the 
state and constitutional provisions that were made, were intended to establish the legitimacy of the 
new Yugoslavia. However, such policies were not necessarily intended to be permanent, as Sabrina 
Ramet argues: 
The federal system was presumed to be largely an ephemeral formality and relinquished 
little authority to the republics. The national heterogeneity was the sole raison d'être for the 
establishment of federalism, with each republic except Bosnia-Herzegovina named after and 
consecrated as the official political embodiment of a discrete national group. The anticipated 
process of homogenization would, therefore, erode the basis for the federal system.46 
This hypothesis is strengthened if the changes in the structure and role of the JA in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, which reflected political developments within Yugoslavia, are considered. 
From the AVNOJ declaration in 1943, until the Eight Congress of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia (the successor of the KPJ; Savez komunista Jugoslavije, SKJ) in December 1964, the 
dominant school of thought within the Yugoslav leadership was that the nations and nationalities of 
Yugoslavia would homogenise into a new socialist nation.47 It was during this period that the term 
“Yugoslav” was first considered as a national category, and the idea of “Yugoslav Culture” was 
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endorsed, signifying Party recognition of “Yugoslavism” (Jugoslovenstvo).48 Yugoslavism developed 
alongside the state that espoused it, undergoing transformations and reinterpretations when it was 
deemed necessary. Initially, at least, it represented what Ramet describes as ‘Integral Yugoslavism’: 
the belief that a new Yugoslav nation was in the process of forming, and that ‘national specificity and 
affective attachment to Yugoslavia were…antagonistic.’49 One of the leading proponents of this 
thinking was Aleksandar Ranković, an ardent centralist whom many viewed as having “Stalinist” 
tendencies, who, as head of all public and secret police forces (and Organisation Secretary of the 
SKJ), was the third most powerful man in socialist Yugoslavia.50 The military became a leading 
instrument in the efforts to forge a Yugoslav identity.     
The JA/JNA was a conscript force in which all able males served. The period of service changed 
several times, but in 1972 was set at fifteen months for Ground and Air Forces, and eighteen months 
for the Navy, with a reduction to twelve months for persons ‘of a high education.’51 The conscripts, 
as a matter of policy, underwent training in republics other than their own, and would serve in units 
of mixed nationality.52 Such a model can be explained by two key factors. Primarily, mixing 
conscripts and career soldiers from across Yugoslav territory clearly indicates an intention to utilise 
the military as a “School of the Nation” in which men of different trades, ethnicity, and geographical 
origin are forged into the vanguard of the Yugoslav nation-building project. However, as the SFRJ 
leadership believed that ‘every nationalism is dangerous’ a more palatable rationale was offered.53 
Mitja Ribičič, as President of the Federal Executive Council, summarises:  
Our point of departure is the working man and self-manager as the basic factor. . . the 
dilemma over the creation of armies belonging to each nationality has no real basis in our 
society, as the peoples and nationalities already have their army, created in revolution and 
through joint efforts and sacrifices.54 
The JNA was the army of the Yugoslav working class, a revolutionary army, in which there was no 
place for reactionary tendencies such as nationalism, and by extension, military organisation on the 
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basis of nationality. Tito emphasised as much following the Croatian Crisis in 1971: he said that 
Croatian separatists, by calling for a ‘Croatian Army,’ had wanted:  
Little by little to take the army in their own, Croatian hands . . . they will have to wait a long 
time for this. I believe that the Sava will first have to start running upstream toward the 
Triglav before that happens.55  
With conscripts from various nations being deployed and trained away from their homes, language 
came to pose a challenge to integration efforts. Whilst Serbo-Croat was spoken across Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro, it contained numerous regional dialects, the most 
dominant of which were ekavica and ijekavica. Furthermore, Slovenian and Macedonian were 
distinct languages, and an additional complication to the linguistic composition of Yugoslavia can be 
found in the use of two alphabets. Generally, Slovenia and Croatia used the Latin script, whilst 
Macedonia used Cyrillic, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro used both. The JNA found 
a balance between functionality and national equality by employing the ekavica (largely spoken in 
Serbia) variation of Serbo-Croat written in the Latin script as the language of command.56 This 
language represented an effort to inculcate Yugoslav soldiers and officers with a shared language, 
and with it, a shared identity. 
For multiple national groups to unite in an area as venerated and symbolic as the military, a shared 
focus of loyalty that can transcend national differences must be present. For Yugoslavia, this was 
Tito. Revolutionary, Partisan leader, heroic liberator, Field Marshal, Supreme Commander, Secretary 
of Defence, Prime Minister and President, Tito was inextricably intertwined with the both the 
Yugoslav state and military. His wartime credentials earned him unparalleled prestige across 
Yugoslav society, especially in the army, whilst his national identity (half Croat, half Slovene) helped 
to allay fears of a return to Serb hegemony. Partisans who had fought for (and alongside) him in the 
Second World War dominated the institutions of Yugoslavia. Bjelajac purports that in 1954, 86.7 
percent of JNA officers were former Partisans; in 1959, eighty percent; in 1963, 73.8 percent; and in 
1969, 43.9 percent.57 Robin Alison Remington describes this ‘generational cohort bonded to the 
military’ as ‘the “club of 1941.”’58 Ljubičić, one of the members of the “Club of ‘41,” expresses his 
veneration clearly. He notes ‘Tito’s greatness as a revolutionary, as the inspirer and strategist of the 
revolution on Yugoslav soil’ and argues that his wartime strategy was ‘the equivalent of a scientific 
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discovery’ which ‘opened a new epoch in the history of war.’59 Edvard Kardelj, another “Club of ‘41” 
member and a prominent architect of the Yugoslav state, declared: 
 It is at this point that Tito's great role in the history of the working class and peoples of 
 Yugoslavia begins. For Tito is the leading creative personality of our revolutionary workers' 
 movement, armed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with the highest perceptions and 
 means, which assured its success and victory.60 
Ann Lane notes that during the early 1950s ‘Tito, as founding father of Yugoslav state was elevated, 
or perhaps elevated himself, into the role of cult figure.’61 Tamara Pavasović Trošt argues that ‘one 
can quickly conclude that Josip Broz Tito possessed – and indeed succeeded in building the 
perception of – the qualities of genuine charismatic authority’ and further stipulates that he was 
‘particularly successful in maintaining his public image and using it as an anchor for a united 
Yugoslavia.’62 Even following his death in 1980, Tito remained a powerful figure in the JNA. Miroslav 
Hadžić observes that he became used as ‘a model, a theoretical and methodological standard, as 
legitimacy, supreme evidence, an ideological and political whip, and also a totem.’63 
Along with Tito, socialism provided a key pillar of unity in Yugoslavia. For the military, it served as a 
powerful integrative agent and provided an inclusive, supranational ideology which could offer the 
most direct solution to the problems arising from creating an army from multiple nations. If soldiers 
and officers could be convinced to subscribe to socialism and identify as socialists, they would come 
to share an ideology which emphasised their equality and class (rather than national) identity. The 
army, therefore, was not only responsible for defending the state and forging a Yugoslav identity, 
but also became the custodian of the achievements of the revolution and responsible for its 
continuation, a duty made clear by Tito in 1971: ‘the task of our army is not merely to defend the 
territorial integrity of our country, but also to defend our socialism when we see that it is in danger 
and that it cannot be defended by other means.’64 In order to diffuse and promote Yugoslav 
socialism, both within the military and out into society, the army was utilised, as ‘a key instrument 
by which conscript youths were socialised into the values of the Yugoslav Communist system.’65 
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Soldiers were given obligatory reading from the Party and the military’s own press, had to attend 
political and ideological lectures, and were encouraged to participate in recommended political and 
social activities in civilian society.66 Furthermore, they received political education and training 
(političko obrazovanje i vaspitanje) which provided them with ‘Marxist-based scientific knowledge 
about society and man, the working class as the mainstay of revolutionary changes, the War of 
National Liberation and the socialistic revolution, [and] about building a self-managed society as a 
community of equal nations and nationalities.’67 Gow notes that ‘the result of this education, other 
political work within the army and, presumably, peer-group pressure, was the nurturing of a 
“brotherhood and unity” spirit and the “Yugoslav” idea.’68 
During the Second World War, the Yugoslav Communists had been careful to portray the NOP as an 
open organisation largely free from strict ideological tenets. However, as the war progressed the 
communist element of the Partisans became increasingly pronounced, and by Victory Day the JA was 
undoubtedly a socialist army: the KPJ grew from a pre-war figure of 12,000 to a 1945 membership of 
140,000, the vast majority of whom had joined via the military.69 Dean observes that ‘the 
institutional roots of party and army are the same: they grew together out of the Partisan struggle 
and in that formative period were highly integrated organisationally and ideologically,’ whilst Vašić 
argues that the army was simply the military arm of the KPJ.70 The only political organisations 
soldiers within the JNA were allowed to be associated with were the KPJ (after 1952 the SKJ) itself 
and its youth wing, and any vestige of religious representation that remained from the NOVJ was 
repressed.71 The open and enforced politicisation of the military was a notable success. The JNA 
itself proudly stated that the SKJ ‘exists in every military collective, unit and establishment and more 
than 90 per cent of the leading cadres belong to it,’ continuing that the purpose was to ensure the 
‘highest level of ideo-political consciousness possible.’72 Marko Milivojević reports that in 1978, 
100,000 of the JNA’s 240,000 men were in the SKJ, with all commanding officers and nearly all senior 
enlisted men being members as ‘membership of the [SKJ] is a condition that has to be met by 
anyone who wishes to be considered for officer status.’73 Such was the presence of the Party in the 
military that the JNA developed its own Communist Party, the SKJ-JNA, which accounted for 5-6 per 
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cent of the total SKJ membership.74 Ljubičič describes the SKJ-JNA has having ‘concerned 
themselves...with everything of significance for the Army’s development,’ elaborating that: 
They actively promote the revolutionary and all-people’s character of the Army; educate 
Army men in the spirit of the Yugoslav socialist revolution; develop socialist morale; 
consolidate the brotherhood and unity of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia; [and] 
foster Yugoslav socialist patriotism and internationalism.75 
In a reform of the organisation of the SKJ in 1974, a Central Committee was formed in which the JNA 
was given fifteen seats (ten percent of the total), the same proportion as the autonomous provinces, 
giving it a ‘stronger voice…than ever before,’ and made it the most politically represented military in 
Europe (except for Albania.)76  
The military was an institution which embodied the society many in the Yugoslav leadership aspired 
to build. In theory at least, it transcended the national divisions within Yugoslavia, was vehemently 
socialist, and free from external pressures and commitments. The JNA’s position as the vanguard of 
socialist Yugoslav society placed it in a uniquely privileged position, from which it was offered a high 
degree of formal autonomy and sovereignty within the state. It was not until 1966 that its finances 
were even scrutinised, and until the 1980s the budget was linked to national income.77 In addition, 
the JNA controlled large parts of the economy (most significantly, the entire defence industry) and 
conducted its own foreign trade. Indeed, estimates suggest that the JNA produced eighty percent of 
the combat material it required, and Yugoslav arms exports to non-aligned countries exceeded the 
value of arms imported by Yugoslavia.78 The power and wealth acquired by the JNA was manifested 
in the everyday lives of the officers and personnel of the JNA, as Vašić illustrates: ‘[They] had their 
own apartment blocks, their privileged shops, their medical care, their courts of law; the army bank 
offered them privileged credits, their wives were employed without problems.’79 Petrović describes 
the system as a “society within a society” as they would also holiday in specific JNA resorts, and 
would attend exclusive concerts, dancing evenings and theatre in JNA dom vojske (Home of the 
Army) cultural centres.80 Furthermore, the army had its own political representation, enjoyed 
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generally high social esteem among the country’s population, and its leadership was ‘in a unique 
position in the communist world to comment publicly and critically on sensitive public issues.’81 The 
elevation of the JNA to such a position in society represents a more tangible effort to supplement 
the ideological focus of Yugoslav Socialism with incentives to literally “buy-in” to the idea. Through 
establishing legitimacy and utilising ideology, education, party membership, and the privileged 
position it enjoyed in society the JNA went to great lengths to push integrative measures and forge 
bonds between its soldiers that transcended national divisions and would ensure unity.  
There remains a further method of integrating the multiplicity of identities that was central to both 
the military and the state: memorialisation. The considerable number of Yugoslavs who died in the 
Second World War provided a shared experience of loss, victimhood and tragedy. The struggle of the 
Partisans against a militarily superior foe conveyed a message of shared sacrifice and heroism, and 
the Partisan victory offered a narrative of strength in unity and shared triumph. Together, this 
collective memory of the Second World War provided the fertile ground for the founding myth of 
the state and the JNA to be developed. 
In his Victory Day speech Tito had envisioned ‘eternal monuments’ and ‘monuments of our national 
pride’ being created to honour the fallen and celebrate the heroism of the Partisans.82 Following the 
war such monuments were built at the sites of enemy atrocities and Partisan battles across 
Yugoslavia. The importance of these locations were emphasised, and such sites became the 'altar of 
the homeland, the holy grounds of the new socialist religion.'83 Vladana Putnik describes the 
memorials thus: ‘They depicted the martyrdom of the partisans and the civil victims as sacrifices in 
the struggle against fascism and for the establishment of communism.’84 The Battle of Sutjeska, one 
of the significant engagements of the war, was memorialised with an initial monument at Tjentište 
in 1949, which was then replaced in 1958 and further enriched by an additional memorial complex 
completed in 1974. Putnik observes that memorials such as Tjentište, often built in inaccessible 
locations, were symbols of the state which became ‘obligatory places for the student excursions to 
visit.’85 In addition to the monuments, public holidays marked significant days of the Second World 
War. The fourth of July became Fighter’s Day and memorialised the beginning of the uprising against 
the Axis occupiers in 1941, and the twenty-first (later twenty-second) of December became Army 
Day, and commemorated the formation of the NOP in 1941. Monuments across Yugoslavia and the 
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public holidays enjoyed across the country dispensed a message of the shared, Yugoslav, nature of 
the conflict. 
Another key aspect of the memorialisation process conducted by the SFRJ was in cinema, most 
significantly the production of Partizanski filmovi (Partisan Films). Jurica Pavičić notes that 
‘throughout the forty-three years of Yugoslav cinema, partisan film was commercially the most 
successful, ideologically the most representative and culturally the most typical film of all genres.’86 
The Partisan Films often depicted the great tales of the struggle and ultimate victory of the 
Partisans, in productions such as Battle of Neretva (1969), Walter Defends Sarajevo (1972), and 
Battle of Sutjeska (1973). Pavičić argues that ‘all of them organise their narrative around the 
legitimisation of the new regime through its war merits.’87 The partisan films served to illustrate a 
clear narrative of the righteousness of the Partisan cause and the importance of unity, whilst also 
highlighting the martyrs and heroes’ sacrifices to the causes of liberation and socialism, reinforcing 
and promulgating the founding myth of both the state and the JNA. 
The JNA itself, whilst often the object of memorialisation, conducted commemorative events. 
Ceremonies and military parades can be regarded as a common feature of most societies and serve 
to commemorate the fallen and reiterate a national narrative. The JNA was no exception to this, but 
it did develop a rather unique perspective on memorialising the Partisans. The plan for responding 
to a NATO invasion from the North-West, for example, was named “Sutjeska 2,” while large-scale 
training exercises were given names such as “Freedom-71” and would often take place on the site of 
Partisan battles. “Podgora-72” was a demonstration in celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the 
navy and air force, and enacted a hypothetical attack on Tito's wartime headquarters on the island 
of Vis. As part of the “Kornati-74” exercise wreaths were laid in memory of the Partisans ‘to remind 
the younger generation of the national liberation struggle.’88 The evocation of the Partisan legacy in 
planning and training illustrates an attempt by JNA officers (who were mostly former Partisans) to 
imbibe recruits and conscripts with a sense of the wartime struggle, celebrate the founding myth of 
the JNA, and promote the ideology of brotherhood and unity. 
The celebration and commemoration of the Partisans gave the JNA a clear identity and offered it a 
glorious, and importantly, shared, founding myth: It was the multiethnic Yugoslav Communists and 
Partisans who, through struggle and sacrifice, had defeated the occupiers. Memorialisation in this 
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manner legitimised the regime, laid the foundation for the ‘Yugoslav socialist patriotic’ identity, and 
celebrated Partisan ideals such as brotherhood and unity. Whilst impossible to quantify, the impact 
of such culturally significant messages doubtlessly catalysed the ideological and structural 
integrative efforts of the JNA. 
A Changing Approach and “Organic Yugoslavism” 
Between 1948 and 1952, a series of domestic and international political events instigated a dramatic 
reconsideration of Yugoslavia’s state structures and geo-political position. For inspiration, the 
Yugoslav leadership returned to Marx and Lenin, and devised the doctrine of ‘workers self-
management’ which delegated control of the means of production to the workers themselves, 
rather than the state controlling it in their name. Furthermore, central planning was shunned in 
favour of a more decentralised structure which offered more power to the republics.89 These 
changes were gradually introduced throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s, but it was not until 
1964, at the Eighth Party Congress, that a firm commitment was made dispelling any assimilationist 
intent:  
The erroneous opinions that our nations have, in the course of our socialist social 
development, become obsolete and that it is necessary to create a unified Yugoslav nation 
[are] expression[s] of bureaucratic centralism and unitarism. Such opinions usually reflect 
ignorance of the political, social, economic, and other functions of the republics and 
autonomous provinces.90  
Ramet notes that ‘this was unquestionably a turning point both for Yugoslav nationalities policy and 
for interrepublican relations’ and resulted in the republics becoming ‘fully legitimate agents of 
popular sovereignty’ while the Yugoslav state became genuinely federal in its structure.91 Whilst the 
“Yugoslav” category (introduced in 1961) was retained as an option on the census, the period in 
which a “Yugoslav” identity was assumed to be gradually replacing those of the nations of Yugoslavia 
came to an end.  
From 1964 onwards, the policy of integral Yugoslavism was replaced with “Yugoslav socialist 
patriotism.” The new approach lacked the supranational, assimilationist element of its predecessor, 
and was conceptually defined as: ‘the identification with, feeling for, and love of the socialist self-
managing community’ which represented a ‘moral force for the unity of the socialist self-managing 
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community of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia.’92 Ramet describes this new approach to the 
national question in Yugoslavia as “Organic Yugoslavism,” and argues that it included devotion to 
Yugoslavia as a whole, as well to one’s republic.93 The move away from integral Yugoslavism was 
cemented following the removal of Ranković, one of its most influential sponsors, from his positions 
of power in 1966.94 Robert Dean notes that ‘as the decentralization of party and state authority 
proceeded in the late 1960s, the army remained something of an institutional anomaly – monolithic, 
hierarchical, centralized’ and observes that 'the all-Yugoslav JNA seemed a threat to the rights of 
Yugoslavia's constituent republics,’ a situation which led nationalists to demand the reorganisation 
of the JNA into monoethnic units, each with their own language of command.95 Whilst the 
nationalist demands were ignored, scrutiny of the JNA continued and, for the first time the federal 
defence budget was subjected to serious criticism in the Yugoslav parliament in December 1966.96 
The developments within the political apparatus of Yugoslavia, coupled with concerns regarding its 
budget, demanded the JNA reform its own structures. This pressure for reform was compounded in 
1968 when Soviet-led forces invaded Czechoslovakia and awareness of the Soviet threat was 
redoubled.97 
Upon hearing of the invasion, Tito convened an extraordinary meeting of his top civilian and military 
leaders on the island of Brioni and, behind closed doors, involved them in an unprecedented debate 
on Yugoslavia’s defences. It was agreed that the JNA was unready for a Soviet invasion, and that 
Yugoslavia’s defensive capacity needed to be significantly increased.98 Since the formation of the 
Warsaw Pact in 1955, the JNA had been supplementing its standing army with a significant reserve 
of partisan formations and from 1959 the official doctrine in case of invasion had been ‘combined 
open-partisan warfare.’99 It was agreed at Brioni that the existing doctrine, which utilised 
Yugoslavia’s knowledge, experience, and geography, was the most appropriate model, but needed 
to be rapidly and considerably expanded. Furthermore, the promise of comprehensive military 
reform would allow the JNA to be brought in line with socio-political developments within 
Yugoslavia.  
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Total National Defence (Opštenarodna odbrana, ONO) was the product of the meeting on Brioni. It 
offered an affordable and effective countermeasure to invasion, placated those calling for an 
increase in the power of the republics, and was largely drawn from the Yugoslav experience of the 
Second World War. Nikola Ljubičić, one of the architects of ONO, offers an explanation: 
 The National Liberation War of the Yugoslav peoples, waged under unfavourable 
 international military-political circumstances and with inferior military equipment, 
 graphically illustrates what can be accomplished by a people who are well-organised, 
 smartly led, and ready and resolved to fight for their vital interests. The Yugoslav liberation 
 war confirmed that the morale of the people and their armed forces – though military 
 weapons and equipment are hurled at them in massive quantities and the war is protracted 
 and exhausting – is the most important, the decisive factor in victory.100 
At its most basic level, ONO proposed to arm and train as much of the population as possible in 
partisan warfare. Whoever attempted to occupy Yugoslavia could, the theory went, win some 
significant victories against the JNA, but would then be faced by millions of trained, armed and 
organised citizen-soldiers. Estimates suggested that a force of two million soldiers would be needed 
to effectively subjugate the country.101 Although ONO was in many ways inspired by the Yugoslav 
experience in the Second World War, it was not a product of nostalgia. Ljubičić observed the 
successes of technologically inferior forces in China, Algeria and interwar Indochina, but recognised 
the unique significance of Vietnam: 
 There, a relatively small, poor, impoverished, long suppressed but unified, resolute, morally 
 strong and invincible people for eleven years successfully fought off the million-strong army 
 of the USA and its quislings. Enormous quantities of technical equipment, numerical 
 superiority, the most up-to-date combat equipage, including chemical and biological, the 
 appalling terror and devastation – none of these could defeat the morally firm and 
 determined Vietnam people.102 
The National Defence Law of 1969 formally introduced ONO, and established Territorial Defence 
(Teritorijalna Odbrana, TO) formations in each of the republics and provinces.103 The new defence 
policy was believed to be consistent with the workers self-management tenet of Yugoslav socialism, 
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and was therefore considered to be wholly appropriate, as Mijalko Todorović, a member of the 
Executive Bureau of the SKJ illustrates: 
To expand the rights and responsibilities of federal republics, communes, working 
organisations and other self-managing units does not imply any weakening of our people's 
unity and defensive power but on the contrary, strengthens and raises them to a new, 
higher level of self-management.104 
The TO forces were financed by their respective republics and provinces, utilised the respective local 
language for administration and command, and stored their weapons locally. Whilst the 
commanders were usually from the JNA, in every other regard the TO units were organised by 
regional defence ministries, which were given jurisdiction to direct national defence efforts within 
their respective territories, making each one an essentially separate and distinct army.105 Herrick 
describes the introduction of TO forces as ‘a defence structure that allows for the national character 
of each of its republics and provinces,’ whilst Cynthia Enloe notes that, for the first time, ‘racial-
ethnic categories...were openly accepted.’106 In addition, it was agreed that twenty-five percent of 
each republic's troop contribution would be stationed in their home republic, limiting the exposure 
of conscripts to other nations and nationalities.107 ONO represented a dramatic change in the JNA’s 
place in Yugoslavia. It was no longer a distinctly Yugoslav institution that was, to some extent, 
responsible for trying to forge a new Yugoslav identity, but instead became a “co-equal” military 
force alongside multiple republican armies which offered each republic (particularly Slovenia, which 
had the most homogenous population of the Yugoslav republics and therefore a TO force that was 
organised, financed, composed and commanded by Slovenes) ‘one of the trappings of national 
sovereignty.’108  
The placement of over one-million trained reservists, complemented by further civil defence 
organisations comprising another million, to the jurisdiction of the republics and provinces had a 
profound impact on the JNA. Whilst the JNA would retain command in joint tactical operations, it 
had ‘lost its monopoly of responsibility for defence and became nominally (although not de facto) 
one of two co-equal components of the newly named Armed Forces of Yugoslavia.’109 The legal 
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status of the two sections of the Yugoslav military, however, remained ambiguous. Traditionally 
territorial forces offer little more than support to the conventional army, however, as Ljubičić 
argued, with the JNA/ONO ‘there is not a hierarchy of elements in the system of nation-wide 
defence, but a combination of reactions in which any success by one expands the radius for action 
by others.’110 Ljubičić's assertions would later be confirmed in the 1974 Constitution, which 
postulated that: 
 The Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia form a single whole and 
 consist of the Yugoslav People’s Army, as the joint armed forces of all nations and 
 nationalities and of all working people and citizens, and of the Territorial Defence as the 
 broadest form of organized defence forces.111 
The 1974 Constitution also enshrined other modifications to the structure and organisation of the 
Yugoslav Armed Forces. The JNA was to become the first army in history that was constitutionally 
bound to be proportionally representative of the population it defended: 
 In terms of composition of the officer cadre, and appointment to higher command and 
 leadership positions in the Yugoslav People’s Army, the principle of proportional 
 representation of republics and autonomous provinces will be applied.112 
To achieve this aim promotion quotas were used to lessen Serb dominance, and recruitment was 
focused on attracting cadets from under-represented republics. The reorganisation of 1974 
immediately led to proportional national representation in all officer schools, the reserve officer 
corps, and TO units.113 However, proportional representation by republic did not imply proportional 
representation by national origin, and the significant numbers of Serbs living outside of the Republic 
of Serbia were free, for example, to serve in the military as representatives of the republic where 
they resided. Furthermore, in practice the attempts to mould a more proportional military were 
limited to the Slavic nations only, and even in this form were subject to internal criticism by the two 
over-represented groups.114 Proportional representation was never achieved in the officer corps, 
and in fact the proportion of Serbs would steadily rise until 1991. Among the leadership cadre (the 
highest-ranking Generals) however, a degree of proportionality had already been achieved, with 
Croats in fact becoming the most over-represented nationality. Furthermore, parity was almost 
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achieved among the lower-ranking Generals, with only Montenegrins being significantly 
overrepresented.115 The ONO approach to military organisation illustrates the entrenchment of 
Yugoslav socialist patriotism in the Yugoslav defence sector and signalled that the attempts to utilise 
the JNA as the school of a new, Yugoslav nation had ended.  
In addition, the 1974 constitution established the equality of languages and alphabets. This led to 
the authorisation of the Slovenian and Macedonian languages (and the Cyrillic alphabet) in 
command and training, the publication of educational literature and material in various languages, 
and JNA recruits were offered local language courses wherever they were stationed.116 These 
measures were expanded further in 1988, when the main journals of the JNA, Narodna Armija 
(People's Army) and Front (Front), were published in Slovenian and Macedonian, and multi-language 
signs were introduced at all barracks and military installations.117 Such measures show a clear 
rejection of the attempt to create a unifying language shared by all Yugoslavs, and in its place a 
recognition of the linguistic diversity within the JNA. 
The JNA, in its 1974 format, would remain broadly unchanged until the fabric of the SFRJ itself began 
to unravel. The death of Tito in 1980, economic stagnation, and the collapse of the USSR and 
European Communism would place tremendous obstacles in the path of the SFRJ. The SKJ was 
disbanded in 1990, leaving an ideological and political void. In its place, the centrifugal force of 
nationalism grew in strength in many of the republics. As the last Yugoslav institution, the JNA 
became the final obstacle to independence for the nationalist movements within some republics and 
was soon depicted as such. Bjelalac suggests that in Slovenia the JNA came to be portrayed as an 
occupying, foreign, and fascist force. As a result, Slovenia refused to contribute to the federal 
defence budget or allow Slovenian recruits to join the JNA.118 As tensions between the republics 
increased, the JNA, seeking ‘reliable and usable’ forces, formed ethnically homogeneous Serbian 
units for special use in Slovenia in 1991.119 As the Yugoslav crisis escalated the JNA found itself 
caught between increasingly vitriolic debates between the leaders of the republics. The collective 
Presidency that had replaced Tito was all but paralysed by the crisis and General Veljko Kadijević, the 
Minister of Defence of the SFRJ and de facto leader of the JNA, would not intervene (either in the 
name of Yugoslavia or Serbia) in the crisis without a mandate from the Presidency.120 As tensions 
between the republics erupted into declarations of independence the JNA, given two thirds of its 
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conscripts were Serbs, had few options.121 Hadžić, a former JNA officer, offers this concise analysis of 
events: ‘The Army could not save the country it belonged to and so in order to survive it had to lean 
towards the one that Milošević offered. And he was the only one making the offer.’122 
Conclusion 
The Partisans founded the socialist Yugoslav state in the midst of war, establishing a federal system 
which they hoped would placate nationalist concerns and provide unity and stability once victory 
was achieved. The struggle, sacrifice, and ultimate triumph of the Partisans provided the founding 
myth of Tito’s Yugoslavia and established the legitimacy of the nascent state. In the years following 
the Second World War, following the example set by the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia entered a phase of 
development focused on centralising authority and strengthening the power of the state. During this 
period, the military was an invaluable tool for advocates of integral Yugoslavism. Its access to (and 
control over) hundreds of thousands of men from across Yugoslavia placed it in an unrivalled 
position to inculcate the population with an ideological framework that legitimised the socialist 
Yugoslav state and its belief that ‘national differences would wither away.’123 The military 
leadership’s attempts to build a unified army out of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia 
during this phase mirrored the state’s efforts to unify the population, with a focus being placed on 
shared loyalty to Tito and socialism, and the authority of the Party within the military being 
strengthened. Furthermore, military personnel enjoyed one of the most privileged positions in 
society, while the military as an institution was the subject of memorialisation and became 
‘accustomed to official public praise and a virtual aura of sanctity.’124 These factors helped to make 
service in the army, and with-it, regular exposure to the leadership’s efforts to forge a Yugoslav 
nation, more legitimate and appealing.  
Following decades of ideological and political development, however, integrational agendas were 
cast aside by the political leadership of Yugoslavia. Following this change of policy, attempts were 
made to re-imagine the JNA as the protector of the rights and identities of the nations and 
nationalities of Yugoslavia rather than a monolithic, assimilationist threat. Tito remained as a shared 
focus of loyalty, and a more clearly defined brand of Yugoslav socialism served to provide a unifying 
ideology: however, the introduction of TO forces undermined the JNA’s role as the protector of all 
the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia and brought its legitimacy into question. After a series of 
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crises in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, coupled with the rise of nationalist leaders across many of the 
republics, the JNA (and the Yugoslav state) came to be viewed, like its interwar predecessor, as a 
device of Serb dominance. With Tito gone and the wisdom of socialism brought into question, the 
only factors left holding the JNA together were Yugoslavia’s complex constitutional order, the fading 
legacy of the Partisans, and the political and economic privilege enjoyed by its increasingly isolated 
leadership.   
Throughout its various incarnations the JNA remained vital to the Yugoslav state. Tanja Petrović has 
noted that ‘the Yugoslav army and its officers were considered one of the most important pillars of 
Yugoslav unity,’  and Johnson observes that the JNA was ‘the custodian and ultimate guarantor of 
the Yugoslav State and the Communist System.’125 Indeed it can be argued that ensuring the unity of 
Yugoslavia was the single main task of the military: according to a 1971 poll conducted by Nedeljne 
informativne novine, a Belgrade weekly, only twelve percent of professional JNA personnel (officers 
and non-commissioned officers) thought that foreign aggression was the most likely source of 
conflict, with over half of high-ranking officers (from the rank of Major up) believing ‘nationalism 
and chauvinism’ were the greatest danger facing Yugoslavia.126 Such results indicate that many 
within the JNA, particularly in the upper echelons, were fully aware that their primary concern was 
keeping the country together. Minister of Defence Admiral Branko Mamula, writing in the JNA 
journal Narodna armija in 1983, described the role of the JNA in Yugoslav society thus: 
The links between the army and the people have been confirmed and strengthened. The 
reputation that the army enjoys in our society, as the backbone of the system of nationwide 
defense; a breeding ground of brotherhood, unity, and Yugoslav socialist patriotism; and an 
important factor of security, internal cohesion, and stability of Yugoslavia has been 
maintained.127  
The sheer range of duties the JNA was expected to perform (the backbone of defence, a breeding 
ground of Yugoslav socialism, and an important factor of state cohesion) by the Yugoslav leadership 
long after the Yugoslav nation-building project was abandoned illustrates the extent to which the 
state was wholly reliant on the military for cohesion.  
The challenge of maintaining this cohesion grew steadily more complex until, in 1991, Yugoslavia 
began to collapse. The following chapters chart how the units and structures of the JNA were divided 
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and adapted to become the foundations of an array of armed forces which fought each other to 
establish new states on what had been Yugoslav territory. 
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Chapter Four: The Army of Republika Srpska  
 
The Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike Srpske, VRS) was the military of the Serb Republic 
that was proclaimed by Serb leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina, BiH) in May 
1992. Owing to its origins as part of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska narodna armije, 
JNA), the VRS maintained a significant supremacy over its adversaries in numerous areas, including 
equipment, training, and organisation, offering it complete dominance on the battlefield throughout 
most of the 1992-1995 war in BiH. Despite such advantages, however, the VRS failed to force the 
government of BiH to capitulate, and as the conflict developed, its opponents grew increasingly 
powerful and coordinated. By the final year of the war, the VRS was struggling to attain any 
significant victories or retain the ground it held, its troops were demoralised and overstretched, and 
its logistics and communications infrastructure, key to its momentous early triumphs, lay in ruins. 
Faced with defeat on the battlefield and mounting pressure from the international community and 
their allies in Belgrade, the Bosnian Serb leadership acquiesced first to a ceasefire and then to the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. The terms of the Agreement offered the VRS a chance to escape total 
defeat on the battlefield but fell short victory: the state for which it had fought, Republika Srpska, 
would survive, but in a reduced form and within BiH, rather than as part of what remained of 
Yugoslavia or a Greater Serbia.  
The project to create a Greater Serbia had offered enough appeal to unite disparate nationalist Serb 
leaders in Croatia, BiH, Montenegro, and Serbia.1 However, beyond a relatively vague desire to unite 
their respective Serb populations, these leaders had little else in common. The most significant 
divisions among them stemmed from the Serb experience of the Second World War. Marko Attila 
Hoare observes that:  
For the first year of its existence the rank-and-file of the Partisan movement was 
overwhelmingly Serb and though this numerical dominance lessened as the war progressed, 
the Serbs continued to participate disproportionately in the movement at an all-Yugoslavia 
level until the end of the war.2 
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As a result, significant numbers of the Serb population across Yugoslavia were directly linked to the 
legacy of the Partisans and identified with its heritage. In BiH, the Bosnian Serbs had been the 
driving force of the Partisan resistance, contributing approximately 70 percent of the strength of the 
two major Partisan units in the republic and, after the war, receiving 64.1 percent of Bosnian 
Partisan pensions.3 This population was mostly spread across the northern regions of Bosnian Krajina 
and Northern Bosnia, and was centred on Banja Luka, the largest predominantly Serb city in the 
republic. However, many Serbs, particularly in BiH and Serbia, rejected the socialist ideology of the 
Partisans and favoured the advancement of Serbian Orthodox Christianity and the restoration of the 
exiled Serb monarchy, which had ruled Yugoslavia prior to the Axis invasion. Their wartime 
movement was focused on the remnants of the Royal Yugoslav Army, and adopted the name Četnici 
(the Chetniks), a word derived from the Serbian word for the members of a guerrilla force. Although 
the Chetniks had collaborated with Axis forces before being been soundly beaten, both militarily and 
diplomatically, by the Partisans, many Serbs continued to laud the merits of the movement after the 
war.4 In BiH, the most vocal support of this nature came from Bosnian Serbs in the mountainous 
regions of the Drina Valley, which bordered Serbia and Montenegro. Such ideological and historical 
separations within the Serb community were only amplified by the rivalries within the leadership of 
each outlook, and other divisions, such as the distinct experiences of the rural and urban population.  
As the forces that supported a Greater Serbia gathered, such divisions became increasingly 
apparent. This not only led to friction over how the war should be conducted within the Serb 
leadership but was also the cause of confusion among their adversaries, as Ejup Ganić, a member of 
the Presidency of BiH recalls. In October 1991, he visited a village near Trebinje which had just been 
burnt down by JNA soldiers. He recalls that:  
On the way back I noticed these soldiers of the [JNA] – they had the long hair of the Chetniks 
and they greeted me with three fingers raised. Then I asked “Is this the Yugoslav Army or 
Chetniks? What am I seeing?” The commanders deputy told me “it’s up to you Ganić to 
decide what they are, who they are.”5 
A few years previously, a JNA soldier evoking such imagery would have been severely punished for 
discrediting the legacy of the army’s Partisan founders and undermining the military’s vehemently 
anti-nationalist reputation. However, as the JNA was ‘Serbianised,’ both in terms of its composition 
                                                          
3 Ibid. p.27 
4 See Chapter 3. 
5 Ejup Ganić. “Interview for The Death of Yugoslavia by the BBC.” (1995) Liddell Hart Centre for Military 
Archives. p.5 
96 
 
and outlook, parts of it became increasingly Chetnik. When the VRS emerged from the JNA, this 
division deepened.  
The confusion over the identity of the soldiers not only reflects the rapidly changing political 
landscape in BiH, but also hints at another key division that beset the Serb leadership: the question 
of who was in overall command of the army remained unanswered throughout the war. The matter 
was complicated by the de jure separation of the VRS from the renamed Yugoslav Army (Vojska 
Jugoslavije, VJ) while it in fact continued to operate as an integral part of it. As a result, Slobodan 
Milošević, President of Serbia and the sponsor of Serb efforts in BiH, Ratko Mladić, Commander and 
figurehead of the VRS, and Radovan Karadžić, President of Republika Srpska and the military’s 
constitutional civilian commander, could all claim to wield supreme authority over the VRS. Although 
they essentially operated as a triumvirate, throughout the conflict their relationship was rivalrous as 
each had different, and somewhat irreconcilable, visions for how the VRS should develop as a 
military and how it should fight the war. 
This chapter examines the development of the VRS during the conflict, taking into account the 
numerous factors that influenced this process. The impact of events on the battlefield will be 
considered, alongside the rivalry and competition between the triumvirate, and the efforts of VRS 
officers themselves to shape their army. Together, this will illustrate how the VRS was transformed, 
in terms of organisation, ideology, and symbolism, from part of a multiethnic, socialist, and Yugoslav 
army into the military of an exclusively-Serb state.  
Partisans, Chetniks, and the ‘Military Line’ – The Origins of the VRS  
Unlike its opponents, the core of the VRS originated from a well-established and professional 
military, the JNA. Once considered a champion of ‘brotherhood and unity’ and a cornerstone in 
efforts to promote cooperation between the peoples of Yugoslavia, by early 1992 it had been 
stripped of conscripts and many professional soldiers from Slovenia and Croatia at the behest of 
those republics’ respective leaderships. This increased the Serb contingent of the JNA from a pre-
June 1991 total of 35 percent of conscripts and 40 percent of professional soldiers to over 90 
percent in both categories, undermining its legitimacy as a Yugoslav institution while also offering an 
opportunity for Serb leaders to inherit a powerful tool of coercion.6 Such a turn of events had been 
anticipated by a powerful network of political and military leaders within the disintegrating Yugoslav 
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state which served as a ‘chain of command which ran parallel to the old Yugoslav Army, through the 
state security department and the interior ministry.’7  
Known as the Military Line (Vojna linija, VL), this network was established by Milošević and 
coordinated by Serbia’s State Security Service (Služba državne bezbednosti, SDB), which had become 
a crucial tool for the Serbian president to project power both within Serbia and into the rest of 
Yugoslavia. In essence, the VL rejected the Titoist leanings of many in the Yugoslav leadership in 
favour of the ‘Serbianisation’ of the state and the military.8 Part of the SDB’s operations in the years 
leading up to the collapse of Yugoslavia had been to create this network of like-minded influential 
individuals across the institutions of the Yugoslav state, ensuring that each was prepared to support 
their agenda by having them sign an oath of loyalty to Milošević.9 One of their recruits was Mladić, 
who was duly promoted to the rank of Major-General and, on April 25, 1992, reassigned to the JNA’s 
Second Military District, which included Eastern Croatia and almost all of BiH, as deputy commander. 
Two weeks later, on May 10, he assumed command of the District.10 His redeployment ran alongside 
that of thousands of other Bosnian Serb JNA personnel who were brought from across Yugoslavia to 
replace outgoing soldiers from other Yugoslav republics, in a manoeuvre designed to pre-empt 
demands that the JNA be withdrawn from BiH following independence. While the JNA itself would 
leave, its significant Bosnian Serb contingent (85 percent of JNA troops in BiH in 1991) could 
legitimately remain.11 President of Yugoslavia and close ally of Milošević, Borisav Jović, explained the 
rationale behind this manoeuvring in December 1991:  
When BiH are recognised internationally, the JNA will be declared a foreign army and its 
withdrawal will be demanded, which is impossible to avoid. In this situation, the Serb 
population in BiH. . . will be left unprotected and endangered. Slobo feels that we must 
withdraw all citizens of Serbia and Montenegro from the JNA in BiH in a timely fashion and 
transfer citizens of BiH to the JNA there. . . That will also create the possibility for the Serb 
leadership in BiH to assume command over the Serb part of the JNA.12  
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Thus, the VL was able to organise, prepare, and deploy the core of an army in BiH which could be 
formally handed over to a cooperative (Serb) source of authority within the newly-recognised 
country if it became independent.   
The Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS) was established in July 1990 and 
functioned as the political leadership of Serbs in BiH, despite numerous localised Bosnian Serb and 
multiethnic parties being established across the country.13 However, in the December 1990 
elections, the SDS won both Serb seats in the Presidency, as well as gaining the second greatest 
share of seats (behind the dominant Bosnian Muslim party) in both houses of BiH’s Parliament, 
cementing its place as the unrivalled Bosnian Serb authority in BiH. The strength of the SDS, coupled 
with its broadly pro-Milošević outlook, led the VL network to offer it support throughout 1991, 
including the provision of arms.14 Despite wielding significant influence within the newly elected 
institutions of the state, the SDS leadership rejected BiH’s legitimacy entirely, as Karadžić explains:  
President Milošević did not see the international recognition of [BiH] as an event of crucial 
importance... We even joked about this and he said that although Caligula declared his horse 
a senator, the horse never became one, and added that the same applied to [President of 
the Presidency of BiH, Alija] Izetbegović. He had international recognition but no state. And 
we really thought that.15 
As a result, the SDS orchestrated a campaign to undermine and de-legitimise the nascent Bosnian 
state and prepare for its collapse. In April 1991 a number of predominantly-Serb municipalities 
formed an economic and cultural association, which initially held no power, but soon developed 
their own assemblies and police forces. Many of them also stopped sending taxes to the government 
in Sarajevo.16 In September, these assemblies proclaimed the formation of an array of Serb 
Autonomous Regions (Srpska autonomna oblast, SAO) in BiH, including Krajina, Romanija and Stara 
Herzegovina, ‘with the aim of separating from the Republican government agencies in Sarajevo.’17 In 
November, the SDS organised a plebiscite primarily for the Bosnian Serb population, asking voters 
whether they wished to remain in Yugoslavia. The outcome was purportedly 100 percent in favour, 
and over the following months the JNA and SDS increasingly coordinated the establishment of 
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municipal governments, paramilitary forces, and checkpoints.18 On 19 December 1991, the SDS 
promulgated a document to the Serb administrations labelled as ‘Top Secret’ and titled For the 
organisation and activity of organs of the Serb people in BiH in extraordinary circumstances. James 
Gow, who served as an expert witness for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia on this topic, argues that this document ‘indicates preparations for the creation of these 
para-governmental structures through the establishment of what are called crisis headquarters.’ He 
notes that such preparations were made ‘almost certainly under the tutelage of the Serbian [SDB].’19 
In the first months of 1992, the SDS withdrew from the institutions of the Bosnian state entirely. On 
January 9, the Serb People’s Assembly, itself formed from the framework of the crisis headquarters, 
proclaimed the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srpska Republika Bosna i Hercegovina, 
SRBiH), which was renamed the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska, RS) in August 1992.20 This was 
followed in March by the promulgation of a constitution, the parliamentary session of which was 
broadcast live on television. One Bosnian Serb MP commented in the last session that ‘at long last I 
have lived to see Bosnian Krajina become Western Serbia’ while another said ‘now the Turks will 
shake with fear from us.’21 The constitution made the objectives of the SRBiH (and the military duties 
of its citizens) clear with its stipulations regarding national defence, with Article 109 stating: ‘It is the 
right and duty of all citizens to protect and defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
[Serb] Republic and Yugoslavia, organizing within the framework of the armed forces of the JNA and 
the TO.’22 In short, the Serb Republic was to continue as part of Yugoslavia, and it was the duty of all 
Bosnian Serbs to ensure this was the case.  
The SDS campaign against the Bosnian state neared its conclusion in early April 1992, when Serbian 
paramilitaries, led by Željko “Arkan” Ražnatović, brutally massacred dozens of Bosnian Muslims in 
the city of Bijeljina in northeastern BiH in a cynical move designed to create terror among the non-
Serb population and drive them from their homes.23 After the attack, Arkan welcomed Biljana 
Plavšić, one of the SDS members of the Presidency of BiH, to the city and was publicly kissed and 
offered thanks by her for his efforts.24 Similar events took place over the following weeks in Foča, 
Višegrad, and elsewhere. Two days after the massacre in Bijeljina, Karadžić decided to withdraw 
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Plavšić and her colleague, Nikola Koljević, from the Presidency of BiH. Their removal, he argues, 
meant that the Presidency ‘would then become illegitimate, because we were a part of that 
government, the Serb representation accounted for one-third of its membership.’25 Thus, through 
establishing a parallel administration, boycotting Bosnian institutions, and creating terror among the 
Bosnian Muslim population, the SDS was able to almost fatally undermined the Bosnian state and lay 
the institutional foundations of the SRBiH. 
On April 3, a day before the two Serb members of the Bosnian Presidency withdrew from the 
institution, the Federal Defence Secretary of Yugoslavia, General Blagoje Adžić, ordered the JNA to 
‘hasten the withdrawal’ from BiH.26 With them, they took confiscated Bosnian Territorial Defence 
(Teritorijalna odbrana, TO) weaponry, as well as ammunition, supplies, fuel, and even some 
industrial military facilities. However, only 20 percent of the troops (approximately 14,000 soldiers) 
left BiH, with most instead staying at their posts.27  
The following month, on May 4, the decision to split the JNA into the VJ and VRS was announced, to 
take effect on May 19. In the interim, both Mladić and Karadžić prepared the military and civilian 
frameworks which would govern the new army. Mladić’s second-in-command, Manojlo Milovanović, 
recalls that on May 11 the ‘narrow circle of the Headquarters of the future army was formed, 
comprised of four generals, seven colonels, and one captain – all of them professional military 
personnel, of the now-former JNA.’28 He notes that this group of senior officers determined ten 
principles which would define how the VRS should function. Many of them concerned the transition 
from the JNA, stating that the VRS should ‘use all manpower and material assets left from the JNA 
and territorial defence in the area of RS and make them the base for the future VRS,’ and advising 
that they did not need to ‘create a new art of war – tactics or strategy, but should adapt JNA 
guidelines and rules of engagement to the needs of the VRS.’29 Other principles concerned structure 
and administration of the VRS, such as the role of municipalities in supplying the military, or affirmed 
the VRS’s commitment to upholding international law and UN regulations. Of most note, however, 
were the many items that focussed on establishing and strengthening the grip of the Headquarters 
over the military. The second item, for example, stipulated that ‘all paramilitary formations that are 
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formed on the territory of RS are to be included in the VRS, and those that refuse will be broken up 
and exiled,’ while the third explicitly stated that the SDS-controlled Crisis Centres were to be 
‘excluded from the system of command over VRS units.’30 This brought any Serb militias that had 
been raised and armed by the SDS into the VRS and formally removed the influence of the political 
leadership from within the ranks of the military. Furthermore, the fourth principle determined that 
the military would ‘exclude the already-resurrected Chetnik strategy of warfare’ and proclaimed that 
there would be ‘no Chetniks, no Partisans, just warriors for the defence of RS.’31 These principles 
removed certain aspects of the emerging military that the SDS had influence over, even threatening 
their paramilitaries if they did not recognise the VRS’s monopoly on the use of force.  
This message was made even clearer by item seven, which announced that the military would create 
‘strict subordination, senior officers in command will appoint by a system of “up down” and not by 
elections from the “bottom,”’ and item eight, which decreed that the ‘military of RS has to be 
depoliticised as an organisation, and command staff including NCOs, officers, generals, and civil 
personnel in the service of the VRS can’t be members of political parties.’32 Indeed, the 
Headquarters even promulgated their own vision of the role and purpose of the VRS, a privilege 
usually reserved for the civilian commander of a military:  
The moral fibre of the VRS is to be built and developed on Serb heritage, tradition, 
patriotism, awareness of war goals, religion, professionalism of its command cadre, and the 
sense of justice and humanity in relation towards the wounded, dead and captured soldiers 
and their family members.33 
Of most note in this statement is the omission of any reference to RS and its institutions of state, 
including the presidency, suggesting they were viewed as superfluous. Through asserting military 
dominance wherever any ambiguity regarding command and authority over the VRS arose, Mladić 
and his deputies enforced a break with a long tradition of political involvement in the Yugoslav 
military, a tradition that was continued in the armies of its adversaries. The formal separation of the 
civil and military facets of the state in this way came at the expense of the SDS. The Party of 
Democratic Action (Stranka demoktratkse akcije, SDA), the main representative of Bosnian Muslims 
in the BiH state, and the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ), a BiH 
extension of the ruling party in Croatia, were both pivotal in raising troops and organising the armies 
they led through the war. This allowed them to embed their influence and control into their forces. 
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For the SDS, the military of the state they governed was pre-fabricated, with an established chain of 
command, structure, and heritage. With an assertive figurehead such as Mladić in command, they 
had little hope of influencing the military by any means other than conventional constitutional 
channels. 
The following day, the SDS established the legal framework for the formation of the military. The law 
also stated that: ‘The former units and headquarters of the territorial defence are renamed into 
commands and units of the Army, whose organisation and formation will be established by the 
President of the Republic.’34 The SDS had reminded Mladić that it was the duty of the president to 
organise and form the army, however they did not claim any privileges within the military sphere 
beyond constitutional authority and civilian oversight.  
While these preparations were underway in BiH, in Belgrade Air Force General Božidar Stevanović, 
part of the VL network, escalated an ‘intelligence operation’ he had been running in order to 
strengthen Milošević's control of the armed forces. Having already had a number of generals fired 
earlier in the year, Stevanović presented Milošević with an additional 38 names, all of whom were 
removed from their positions. In total, over a third of the JNA's 150 generals were purged as a result 
of being deemed 'unreliable' or 'traitors' by the operation.35 With the JNA firmly under the control of 
the VL and preparations made in BiH, its de jure division into two armies went smoothly.  
The VRS inherited an extensive array of personnel and equipment from the JNA. A military history of 
the conflict by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suggests that in total, Mladić had between 
100,000 and 110,000 former JNA troops at his command when he assumed the position of Chief of 
VRS Headquarters.36 Gow contests this figure, postulating that it was more likely to have been 
between 60,000 and 80,000, only 50,000 of whom were operational.37 Estimating figures such as this 
is problematic, particularly in the case of Yugoslavia. As a result of conscription, almost every man 
served in the JNA for a period of time, and many of them were retained as reservists after 
completing their service. Furthermore, in a series of large mobilisations of the population by the JNA 
in the years prior to the establishment of the VRS, Serbs and Montenegrins were increasingly the 
only people to respond. As a result, most of the men who joined the VRS had at least some JNA 
experience. If considering the number of serving JNA troops that were transferred to Mladić’s 
command, however, Gow’s figure is far more plausible. It was the established framework provided 
by the transfer these standing units to the VRS which allowed it to rapidly expand to include Bosnian 
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Serb personnel of varying experience, creating a figure that correlates more with the estimates of 
the CIA. The transfer of organised military units offered the VRS additional advantages, the most 
potent of which was the arsenal it received: approximately 300 - 500 tanks (including 50 advanced 
M-84s, a Yugoslav-updated T-72), 200 – 300 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), 400 field artillery 
pieces over 100mm, 48 multiple rocket launchers, and 350 120mm mortars, as well as a modest air 
force of 35 aircraft.38 By contrast, its opponents were unable to acquire enough uniforms and rifles 
to send their soldiers into battle and were outnumbered in terms of heavy weapons by more than 
ten to one.39  
The VRS enjoyed a significant number of other advantages as a result of its heritage. Key to the 
success of the VRS throughout the war was its ability to communicate across the entire Bosnian 
theatre (and beyond) almost instantly through the use of deeply lain telephone lines that converged 
on Han Pijesak. Here, a complex of tunnels, bunkers, and underground facilities had been purpose-
built to be the headquarters of the entire JNA in case of an invasion of Yugoslavia. In addition to 
unparalleled communications, Han Pijesak also offered the VRS a vital secure location to base their 
command and intelligence units.40 Furthermore, prior to its withdrawal, the JNA was ordered to 
prepare ‘a map analysis of [BiH] which will clearly show: what is situated in secure areas; what can 
be successfully defended, with adequate reinforcements, until the conditions for evacuation are 
created; what can be evacuated through threats and force…’.41 Maps and plans such as this, created 
by a professional military preparing for war, provided the VRS with the capability to move units and 
supplies across the country with maximum efficiency, whilst also limiting their opponents’ resources.  
Although such a wealth of materiel and infrastructure undoubtedly provided the VRS with an 
overwhelming advantage on the battlefield, the most significant benefit the VRS inherited from the 
JNA was the continuing institutional link with the VJ. The support which the VRS received from this 
link was prominently manifested in three key areas. Firstly, throughout the war the VRS was able to 
rely on the VJ and the Serbian SDB for a steady supply of ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and other 
materiel vital for resisting the Army of the Republic of BiH (Armija Republike Bosne i Herzegovine, 
ARBiH) and its attritional doctrine. In addition, when the situation required it, contingents of the VJ 
were also deployed to BiH, with as many as 20,000 troops and 100 tanks being sent to assist the VRS 
throughout the conflict.42 Secondly, following the establishment of the Serb Army of Krajina (Srpska 
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vojska krajine, SVK) in Croatia, the VJ, and the VRS, the three forces retained a shared officer corps.43 
This not only allowed for the relocation of officers when necessary, but also maintained a broad pool 
of experience, ensured a ready supply of professional staff, and most importantly, allowed newly 
promoted officers to receive adequate training for their roles away from the front. Finally, the link 
with VJ proved invaluable as it allowed the VJ to subsidise the VRS during a long and costly war that 
was impossible for Republika Srpska to finance independently. The VRS was a large, technically 
advanced army, and would represent an overwhelming burden on the relatively small Bosnian Serb 
population. More significantly, the VRS’s failure to capture any cities other than Banja Luka and 
Bijeljina, coupled with the ethnic cleansing campaigns that were orchestrated in captured territory, 
left it with ‘an economically and demographically bankrupt territorial base from which to wage a 
war.’44 Bojan Dimitrijević, a prominent Serbian historian of the period, describes how an 'imaginary 
unit' of the VJ, the 30th Personnel Centre (Kadrovski centar, KC), was established as 'some kind of 
shadow name for the VRS' in order to oversee 'all of its administrative tasks.’45 Through the KC, the 
VRS was able to considerably offset the cost of its own upkeep as officers’ wages, pensions and 
social care for the injured, as well as compensation for the families of fallen soldiers were all 
managed and paid for in Belgrade.  
Two former JNA corps formed the core of the VRS. Not only were there a substantial number of 
troops, but the corps also had an established chain of command, trained staff officers, as well as 
logistics and support units, allowing for organised rapid expansion through the incorporation of 
numerous other Serb military formations in BiH. The most significant of these formations were the 
elements of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Teritorijalna odbrana 
Republike Bosne i Herzegovine, TORBiH) which had rejected Izetbegović’s call to arms and sided 
instead with the Serb Republic. Initially, these units were placed under local SDS jurisdiction but 
deferred to JNA command when its troops were present. Their numbers were significantly swelled 
by volunteers, many of whom were Bosnian Serb reservists and conscripts who had been mobilised 
by the JNA in April 1992 (in a move deemed ‘invalid’ by Alija Izetbegović, leading most other 
Bosnians to ignore it) and had been allowed to keep their weapons upon completion of their 
service.46 General Milutin Kukanjac, commander of JNA forces in BiH at the time, later explained: ‘I 
mobilised the troops and those who joined got arms. The Serbs responded to the mobilisation call 
and the Croats and Muslims did not.’47 Some of these conscripts and reservists gathered into their 
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old units, such as the Banjalučki Corps, a JNA formation which became the VRS I Krajina Corps, while 
others joined up with local TO units.48 Together, these volunteers boosted the number of Serb TO 
troops from the original 11,000 who had defected from the TORBiH to a considerable force of almost 
60,000.49  
Not all volunteers joined the structure of the TO however, with many men from both BiH and Serbia 
forming independent units of their own, contributing a paramilitary aspect to the growing military 
might gathering in the name of the SRBiH. The paramilitary troops rarely contributed to battlefield 
operations, and instead fulfilled other roles ranging from special forces operations, such as when the 
“Wolves” seized the television transmitter on Kozara Mountain in the spring of 1992, offering the 
Serb leadership a broadcasting monopoly across many parts of BiH, to ethnic cleansing campaigns 
such as the one carried out by Arkan and his volunteers from Serbia in Bijeljina.50 The military forces 
of the SRBiH were supplemented by a 15,000-strong Ministry of the Interior (Ministarstvo 
unutrašnjih poslova, MUP) armed police force that was formed on April 1, mainly from Serbs who 
had formerly served in the MUP of BiH.51  
Central to the rapid mobilisation of such significant numbers of men was an operation conducted by 
the VL network in the months prior. In 1990, the Serbian SDB began distributing Second World War-
era rifles from Serbian MUP and TO stocks to ‘groups likely centred on the local SDS municipality 
board.’52 Weapons were also smuggled into BiH from Montenegro, with one such convoy being 
captured by police loyal to the Bosnian government in late 1991, leading Izetbegović to lament to 
Colm Doyle, Head of the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM), that he ‘saw the JNA not 
only as an army of occupation but as a force providing logistical support to the Bosnian Serbs.’53 His 
observation proved to be astute, as the testimony of Mustafa Candić, a Bosnian Muslim JNA 
intelligence officer at the time, illustrates. Candić remembers how the JNA distributed confiscated 
TORBiH weaponry to Bosnian Serbs from places such as ski lodges, and recalls a moment when a JNA 
officer, Major Čedo Knežević, responded to an enquiry about the weapons by saying ‘I have lots of 
them and I can give you some. Here is a friend of ours. He can confirm that I can arm half of the 
United States, if you want.’54 Candić also notes that the distribution was not based on ‘old 
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friendships’ as Milošević suggested to him, but was instead a coordinated series of military 
operations codenamed Proboj (Breakthrough) 1 and 2.55  
Additional weapons were transferred from the JNA itself. Doyle, whose role in the ECMM included 
escorting JNA ‘troop and equipment convoys [from Croatia] through Bosnia in order to determine if 
their final destination was to be Serbia or elsewhere,’ reports that unregistered convoys travelling 
westwards led the ECMM ‘to suspect not all JNA units withdrawing from Croatia were heading for 
Serbia.’56 In one such instance, on his way to a meeting with Plavšić in Pale at the end of April 1992, 
he records being forced off the road ‘in order to give way to a convoy of M-84 tanks heading in the 
same direction. Here was the first evidence of large elements of the JNA moving to Pale, and in the 
process reappearing as the [VRS].’57  
Through the various operations and manoeuvres discussed, the VL network was able to prepare a 
vast military force in BiH before conflict broke out. Serving JNA troops, Bosnian Serb reservists and 
conscripts, paramilitary formations, and MUP units were all armed, organised, and in position, ready 
to fight when the time came.  
Early Victories and Rival Visions: 1992 and 1993 
By the time the VRS had formally been established on May 19, 1992, scattered incidents of violence 
across the country had escalated into open conflict. One of the first major battles occurred in 
Northern Bosnia during April and May 1992 and resulted in Croat and Muslim forces, operating 
under the banner of the Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, HVO), severing the 
strategically vital Posavina Corridor. The corridor linked Serb territory in Croatia, the Serb Republic of 
Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina, RSK), and Serb-held areas in Bosnian Krajina with the Drina Valley 
and, most significantly, Serbia itself. Upon its formation, the first major task which the VRS faced was 
reversing the HVO offensive and re-establishing the contiguity of Serb territory. In early June, the 
VRS I Krajina Corps began preliminary operations in the area, and within three weeks had re-opened 
the corridor.58 Over the following months, the VRS steadily pushed opposition forces back, capturing 
the towns of Modrica, Odžak, and Bosanski Brod in some of the largest engagements (sometimes 
involving ‘more than 50,000 troops on both sides,’ according to CIA estimates, although this figure 
was likely lower) of the entire war.59 The CIA explains that this operation, which was successful 
against ‘experienced and numerically superior Croatian, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Army forces,’ 
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was the result of the VRS’s ‘typical mixture of professional leadership, organisation, and fire-power, 
enhanced in these operations by the commitment of most of the VRS’s battle-tested former JNA 
units.’60  
The capture of the so-called “Corridor of Life” and the establishment of the northern border of RS on 
the river Sava (upon the banks of which Bosanski Brod lies) had been the second of a number of war 
aims that had been approved by the Bosnian Serb Assembly in May 1992. The third reiterated the 
constitutional provision that RS would join the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Savezna Republika 
Jugoslavija, SRJ), which had been formed on April 27 from the remaining republics of Yugoslavia, 
Serbia and Montenegro. All that remained to completely fulfil this aim was to finalise the republic’s 
borders, the parameters of which were outlined in the fourth war aim. It stipulated that the border 
with the ‘Muslim and Croat section of Bosnia should run along the Neretva and Una Rivers, in 
addition to the Sava,’ claiming the majority of BiH for RS.61 RS also claimed part of Sarajevo, as well 
as access to the sea. Within months, most of these aims had been achieved by the VRS: the Posavina 
Corridor remained open throughout the war, VRS troops were stationed along much of the Sava and 
Una, and parts of Sarajevo were occupied while the rest was besieged. Although BiH government 
forces held some ground, much of which (including areas around the Drina, Neretva, and Una rivers) 
was coveted by the RS leadership, the VRS successfully facilitated the ‘creation of a territorially 
contiguous Bosnian Serb state,’ which covered more than 60 percent of BiH, during 1992.62 The 
capture of this territory included significant victories at Jajce, where a beleaguered Croat-Muslim 
resistance collapsed, Bosanska Krupa and Bosanski Novi, both on the Una near Bihać, as well as at 
numerous towns in the Drina Valley. In all cases, the non-Serb population was expelled, often ‘under 
a rain of mortar rounds,’ or hounded by paramilitaries.63 On November 19, Mladić issued 
Operational Directive 04, which escalated this process by ordering the VRS Drina Corps to ‘inflict the 
heaviest possible losses on the enemy, and force them to leave the Eastern Bosnia areas of Birač, 
Žepa and Goražde together with the Bosnian Muslim population.’64 
Despite its rapid advance and battlefield successes, the VRS faced serious challenges as soon as it 
was formed. It was a particularly large army (in 1992, it was second only to the VJ in all of former 
Yugoslavia), however the Bosnian Serb population only totalled 1.35 million. This left it with very 
little strength in depth, and almost no military reserves. As a result, the VRS:  
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would never have the ability to deliver a knock-out blow to its enemies or adequately hold a 
frontline of more than 1000 kilometres. Even during 1992, the VRS was repeatedly forced to 
shuttle units across the country from battle to battle.65  
Furthermore, although in most cases the former JNA units in the VRS such as the I Krajina Corps 
easily defeated their opponents, the large concentrations of volunteer and TO formations in Eastern 
Bosnia struggled, revealing a considerable disparity in capability within the military. Milovanović 
explains that the quality of the TO formations depended on where they were recruited, as the 
‘economic condition of the municipality’ would dictate what equipment and combat ability they had. 
He notes that this led ‘the Headquarters and corps commanders to form strong support units, and 
the corps even trained individual brigades from their constituency for manoeuvre in other areas.’66 
Such a solution could only be successful if the VRS retained advantages in communication and 
transportation over its opponents and was therefore able to reinforce vulnerable areas before they 
were overrun. As a result, converting ‘the mob of TO personnel into properly organised, well-led 
light infantry brigades, while simultaneously reigning in many of the virtually autonomous volunteer 
units,’ was a challenge that dominated VRS operations away from the battlefield during 1992.67  
As command and control, ideological outlook, and training standards were centralised in the first 
months of the war, the rivalry between Karadžić, Milošević, and Mladić over authority of the VRS 
began to manifest. Karadžić hoped to break with the heritage of the JNA, saying that he ‘wanted to 
make an army which would not be communist, a true army of the people.’68 However, the VRS 
Headquarters had distanced him from having much sway over the development of the military. Just 
days after the formation of the VRS, Mladić ordered the artillery and tanks of the Sarajevo-Romanija 
Corps, which was encircling Sarajevo, to begin shelling the city.69 General Života Panić, the last 
Minister of Defence of socialist Yugoslavia (he replaced Adžić on May 8) and first Commander of the 
VJ, attests that in shelling Sarajevo, Mladić acted against the wishes of Milošević, who feared ‘an 
anti-Serb media campaign’ and was ‘very opposed to it.’70 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali reported to the Security Council that Mladić was to blame, however in response sanctions 
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were placed on the SRJ, vindicating Milošević’s concerns.71 Thus, within a fortnight of its formation, 
Mladić used his operational authority to consolidate control over all Bosnian Serb armed forces in 
BiH, outline his vision for the future of the army, and overrule his main rivals. 
Another organisational task which the VRS had to overcome was managing the transition of its 
institutional identity away from that of its socialist predecessor. The first steps in this direction were 
made on June 28, when VRS troops gave an oath of allegiance at a ceremony attended by members 
of the presidency, government, and much of the military leadership. The oath read: ‘I (name and 
surname), swear by my honour and my life to defend the sovereignty, territory, independence and 
constitutional order of my fatherland and faithfully serve the interests of its people. So help me 
God.’72 June 28 was Vidovdan, a Serbian Orthodox religious holiday and the designated memorial 
day of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, making it the most significant day of the year for Serb identity. 
Following the oath-giving ceremony, it also became the day upon which the deeds and sacrifices of 
the VRS were commemorated. The association with noteworthy celebrations of both the Serbian 
national narrative and the Serbian Orthodox Church, coupled with the invocation of ‘fatherland’ and 
‘god’ in the oath, illustrate that although the structures and personnel of the JNA remained, a 
complete severance with its ideological and symbolic heritage had been made. However, although it 
is clear that the Orthodox faith was used to fill the void, no mention of the RS or its institutions was 
made in the oath.  
By the end of the year, the VRS had reorganised and given some level of training to the TO troops 
and volunteers that had joined it in May, and now had at its command at least 80,000 well-equipped 
soldiers organised in seven Corps and 51 manoeuvre brigades.73 Furthermore, much of the 
administrative infrastructure of the JNA had been adapted for use by the VRS. A former military 
training centre was repurposed as ‘The Military Training Centre of the VRS’ and the socialist-era 
positions of Organisation, Mobilisation, and Personnel Officer, and Ideological-Political Officer were 
retained on the Headquarters staff, the latter being re-designated ‘Head of Morale, Religious, and 
Legal Issues.’74 The officers who held these posts (and commanded the training centre) all answered 
directly to Mladić. Furthermore, in all properly organised VRS formations, morale, religious, and legal 
officers took the place of JNA ideological-political officers.75 Through these officers, Mladić could 
                                                          
71 United Nations Security Council Resolution 757. (30/05/1992)  
72 Milovanović. “Stvaranje i razvoj vojne Republike Srpske u toku odbrambeno otadžbinskog rata u BiH, 1992. 
do 1995. god.” p.31 
73 The corps were: VRS Headquarters, I Krajina, II Krajina, Eastern Bosnia, Sarajevo-Romanija, Herzegovina. 
International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1993. (London, 1993) p.74 
74 Jovo Blažanvoić. Generali Vojske Republike Srpske. (Banja Luka, 2005) pp.71-9 
75 Milovanović. “Stvaranje i razvoj vojne Republike Srpske u toku odbrambeno otadžbinskog rata u BiH, 1992. 
do 1995. god.” p.34 
110 
 
dictate what would replace the socialist political education and training which the soldiers received, 
increasing his level of influence over the development and ideological outlook of the military further.  
Maintaining structural continuity with the JNA also offered the VRS another considerable advantage 
over its opponents, who were forced to conceptualise and build the institutions, structure, and 
offices of their respective militaries whilst fighting a war. Despite this advantage, however, the VRS 
failed to prevent the Bosnian government from raising considerable armed forces of its own and 
holding many strategically significant cities, facilities, and transport routes. As a result, in 1993 
disputes over the manner in which the VRS was prosecuting the war and how the conflict should be 
ended deepened the animosity within the triumvirate.  
In January 1993, UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and European Community (EC) representative Lord 
Owen promulgated the first comprehensive proposal for ending the war. Vladimir Petrović notes 
that ‘the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs was unanimously and adamantly resisting the peace offer’ 
as they felt it was ‘provocatively anti-Serbian.’76 Milošević, however, feared a rejection of the plan 
could lead to increased sanctions or a military intervention, but was unable to force Karadžić to 
agree to the terms. Nina Casperson argues that SDS resistance to the plan stemmed from Mladić, 
whose ‘vehement opposition and thirty-five-minute-long impassioned speech against acceptance 
was one of the decisive factors in parliament's rejection of the plan.’77  
Indeed, while the negotiations were taking place, Mladić continued VRS operations, including 
significant offensives in Eastern Bosnia. It was in this period, Casperson observes, that a faction 
within the SDS hailing from Krajina, along with some members of the opposition, began aligning 
themselves with Mladić, illustrating his growing political influence, and also the emergence of a 
‘regional division of the RS.’78 Owen would recall that ‘I think Mladić became very powerful from 
then on. And that's not to say he was powerful as a military leader, but I think he began to have a 
political constituency.’79 Although he usually deferred to Milošević, it is evident by his actions that 
peace, at least under the terms set by Vance and Owen, was not a priority. Petrović argues that the 
Bosnian Serb leadership showed ‘a lack of interest in economic difficulties posed by sanctions, as 
well as an absolute determination to terminate the statehood of BiH.’80  
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In September 1993, the ranks of the VRS were strengthened by an unlikely source. The majority-
Bosnian Muslim town of Velika Kladuša lies near Bihać, just across the border from what was, during 
the collapse of Yugoslavia, RSK. During the socialist period, it was home to Agrokomerc, an 
agricultural business which developed into one of the biggest conglomerates in Yugoslavia under the 
stewardship of Fikret Abdić. In the 1990 elections, Abdić had run for a seat in the Presidency on an 
SDA ticket, and had won more votes than any other candidate. However, for unknown reasons he 
did not claim his victory, and instead left the role of Chairman of the Presidency to Izetbegović. Abdić 
took a lower-ranking seat on the Presidency of BiH, but returned to Velika Kladuša, leaving the 
coordination of the war to Izetbegović and his allies. Then, in the autumn of 1993, after representing 
the BiH government at the Owen-Stoltenberg negotiations in Geneva over the summer, Abdić 
proclaimed the establishment of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (Autonomna 
Pokrajina Zapadna Bosna, APZB), centred on Velika Kladuša, and began raising his own private 
army.81  
Such a move shocked Sarajevo but was welcomed by many government forces in the Krajina region. 
Two entire brigades and significant contingents from other units of the ARBiH V Corps mutinied and 
joined Abdić, who immediately came to terms with both the Bosnian Serb and Croat leaderships.82 
By the end of the year, the APZB could muster up to 10,000 men organised in six brigades.83 The VRS 
had even armed their erstwhile foes, equipping them with all the small arms, mortars, and 
ammunition they needed, as well as offering them artillery support. In exchange, the VRS moved 
troops through APZB territory, allowing them to mount an assault on Bihać from RSK territory in 
Croatia, and APZB troops fought alongside VRS in Krajina.84 This significantly boosted the strength of 
the 80,000 troops Mladić had left, and almost won him Bihać.85 Furthermore, although the APZB 
troops were not integrated into the VRS, they did operate alongside them and ultimately deferred to 
VRS command, making them something of a semi-autonomous auxilliary force in a similar manner to 
the HVO units operating within ARBiH Corps.86  
The APZB troops were not the only non-Serb troops fighting with the VRS. A significant number of 
Orthodox mercenaries and volunteers, largely hailing from Russia and Greece, are known to have 
fought in the VRS. Most estimates place their number at a maximum of 1,500 throughout the war, 
however Aziz Tafro argues that ‘the exact number will never be known as a large number of Russians 
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fought under false names.’87 He suggests that ‘more than 10,000 Russian mercenaries’ could have 
served in the VRS during the war in BiH.88 While this number is unlikely, monuments have been 
raised in honour of fallen Russian fighters, including a 5.5-metre high Orthodox Cross in Višegrad, 
highlighting the value placed on their contribution.89 Later in the war, 100 Greeks formed the ‘Greek 
Volunteer Guard,’ which was ‘fully integrated into the [VRS] and led by Serb officers,’ in the Drina 
Corps90 A surprising outcome of the unlikely alliance with APZB and the recruitment of foreign 
volunteers was that for a time (April 1994 – August 1995) it made the troops under Mladić's 
command the most multiethnic armed force (approximately 10 percent non-Serb) in BiH.91  
Stalled Progress and Deepening Divisions: 1994 and 1995 
In the early stages of the conflict, the VRS enjoyed complete supremacy on the battlefield. By 1994 
‘they had achieved virtually all of their territorial objectives at acceptable costs’ and VRS troops 
remained able to hold ground against the increasingly powerful and effective ARBiH.92 Despite the 
strong position their forces were in, the triumvirate became increasingly fractured over control of 
the military and what to do next. In January, General Dušan Kovačević, RS Minister of Defence and 
an officer of the VRS Headquarters, argued that command should be left to Mladić and 
Headquarters, writing in the VRS journal, Srpska vojska (Serb Army), that: ‘We are one nation, one 
state, and we should have a single army under a single commander with the same badge who will 
complete the mission.’93 
At this point, Karadžić and Milošević favoured negotiating the most favourable deal they could and 
declaring the war a triumph, while Mladić still sought ‘a decisive close with a signal military victory 
over the Muslims.’94 Such a prospect was becoming increasingly unlikely. A number of VRS offensives 
at the end of 1993 and beginning of 1994 had initially been successful, but the ARBiH retook the 
ground in every case. Indeed, the ARBiH had grown into the largest armed force in BiH and had 
developed an effective, although costly, doctrine which was beginning to grind the VRS down. 
Furthermore, the March 1994 Washington Agreement ended the conflict between parts of the 
ARBiH and HVO, allowing both to focus their efforts on defeating the VRS. Developments such as this 
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soon translated into a change in the pattern of the war. The hitherto solid VRS lines began to falter, 
and as winter settled in Krajina, ARBiH V Corps managed to punch a hole through VRS defences and 
launch a penetrating offensive, recapturing Kupres and taking more ground for government forces in 
a few weeks than had been achieved throughout the entire war.95 During this crisis, Karadžić 
‘insisted on his role as Supreme Commander and he donned a uniform,’ presenting himself as an 
alternative military leader to Mladić at the first moment when the general appeared strategically 
fallible.96 In response, however, Mladić ordered a counter-attack, which proved remarkably 
successful, retaking all of the lost territory and almost defeating V Corps entirely. Sensing his chance 
for decisive victory, Mladić prepared to take Bihać.  
Both Milošević and Karadžić, however, had other priorities. In August 1994, Milošević had accepted 
a peace plan drawn up by the Contact Group (composed of the USA, UK, Russia, Germany and 
France), which had replaced the previous Owen-Stoltenberg process.97 The plan was generous to the 
Bosnian Serbs, delineating the separation of BiH’s population along ethnic lines and offering the 
fulfilment of almost all of their strategic objectives. Indeed, aside from the continued existence of a 
few Bosnian Muslim exclaves in the Drina Valley, having to share Sarajevo, and not attaining access 
to the sea (a particularly optimistic goal), the plan offered the Serb leadership precisely what it 
wanted. Despite this, Karadžić predicted ‘carnage’ if the Bosnian Serb Assembly voted yes, and after 
considerable debate, he and the SDS rejected the plan.98 In response, Milošević placed political and 
economic sanctions on RS and its leadership, heralding the most significant rift in the triumvirate to 
date.99 The introduction of ‘inter-Serb’ sanctions also reveals the extent to which the VRS was 
separate from the state it was supposedly fighting for, as fuel, ammunition, officers, and logistical 
and maintenance support from Belgrade continued unabated.100 Furthermore, those VRS personnel 
who were working in the institutions of the state, such as Minister of Defence Kovačević, were 
simply withdrawn.101 That the military was totally unaffected by the imposition of severe sanctions 
against the state suggests that, after more than two years of war, the VRS remained very much a 
Yugoslav institution, rather than one of the Serb Republic.  
                                                          
95 Mike Redman. “Joint ABiH-HVO operations 1994: A preliminary analysis of the Battle of Kupres.” The Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies, No.16, Vol.4. (2007) p.10 
96 Filip Švarm. “Civilian-Military Games.” Vreme. (24/04/1995) 
97 The Owen-Stoltenburg process took place in July and August 1993. For most of 1994, the Contact Group took 
the lead, and also failed.  
98 Emma Daly. “Serbs keep answer to peace plan a secret.” The Independent. (20/07/1994)  
99 The SDS dominated every major institution in RS aside from the VRS, including the parliament, the police, 
Ministry of Defence, and industries, so sanctioning RS served to punish the SDS. Balkan Battlegrounds. p.288 
100 Ibid. p.222 
101 Blažanvoić. Generali Vojske Republike Srpske. p.84 
114 
 
The economic sanctions placed on RS, coupled with the concomitant political isolation, severely 
undermined Karadžić’s authority. He could no longer claim to be a conduit of Belgrade’s designs, and 
thanks to the ambiguity of RS’s constitutional status, any attempt to utilise legitimate institutional 
channels to assert his influence could easily flounder. Indeed, his new civilian Minister of Defence, 
Milan Ninković, recalls that:  
Although I was defence minister, my main task was to organise the mobilisation of civilians, I 
had no power to order anything operational... Mladić issued the orders to the troops, he was 
not obliged to inform me. I only received orders to supply rations. It wasn’t like in your 
country, where ministers have power.102  
Karadžić’s position was further weakened by the increasingly divided Bosnian Serb Assembly. Since 
his rejection of the Contact Group Plan, Milošević had gradually been enlisting agreeable ‘rank and 
file’ Bosnian Serb politicians with the goal of eventually ousting the RS President.103 Sensing his 
authority was waning, Karadžić made a bid to assert his dominance. The VRS assault on Bihać was 
well underway, with Serb troops holding about a third of the UN-declared Safe Area around the city 
and fighting taking place near the headquarters of V Corps. One UN report stipulated that there may 
have been only 300 V Corps soldiers left in the city, illustrating just how close Mladić was to 
eliminating an entire enemy corps and striking his decisive blow.104 However, in attacking Bihać, the 
VRS not only violated a UN-declared “Safe Area” but also breached the no-fly zone over BiH by 
conducting numerous bombing runs against the city utilising Serb aircraft operating out of Udbina in 
RSK.105 This led the UN Security Council to authorise NATO airstrikes against Serb forces. Karadžić’s 
first response was to warn the USA of the dangers of ‘another Vietnam,’ however he soon ordered 
the offensive to stop and a few weeks later announced live on television that he had personally 
invited former US President Jimmy Carter to act as an ‘honest broker.’106 
Talks convened by the former US President culminated in a four-month ceasefire across the country, 
leading Brendan O’Shea to note that ‘the peanut farmer from Plains, Georgia, had once again 
succeeded where all the rest had failed.’107 This raised Karadžić’s profile as a leader and arguably 
saved him from being ousted. With few other options, Milošević was forced to accept that he had 
been outmanoeuvred and publicly backed the agreement. Mladić was furious with Karadžić. He had 
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accused the RS President of promoting another Chetnik-Partisan split following the failure of the 
Contact Group Plan (Mladić had tacitly backed Milošević) and had been angered when the Bihać 
offensive was stopped.108 In response, Karadžić called the VRS military command communists. In 
January 1995, Srpska vojska published a thinly veiled attack on Karadžić, stating:  
The development of the RS political system is quite difficult because of the war. Some 
political parties, primarily their leaders, feel that the war is over and are trying to secure the 
most favourable positions possible in the struggle for power. This has resulted in a change of 
behaviour that deserves the attention of the general public to ensure the normalisation of 
the situation, and that the struggle for the freedom of the Serbian people is brought to an 
end soon.109  
The article also proclaimed that ‘the allegations against the officers as "communards" are 
unacceptable.’110 In such a climate, divisions within RS’s political and military leadership were at 
their most severe. Indeed, Milovanović recalls that following the NATO air strikes, Commander of 
the I Krajina Corps, Momir Talić, suggested dividing the VRS in two, ostensibly to improve efficiency. 
Under his proposal:  
The first Army would have a zone of responsibility from the Una River, to Zvornik 
somewhere, and the other from there, to the south, including Herzegovina. The command of 
both armies would be directly linked to the [RS government], which would make the 
Headquarters unnecessary.111 
Although the suggestion was dismissed, the fact that a senior VRS commander was contemplating 
the division of the military along the traditional axis of the Chetnik-Partisan split reveals the extent 
of disharmony within the Bosnian Serb leadership. This is further reflected by the decision of the SDS 
to begin strengthening the police, ‘which they believed was completely loyal to them.’112 Filip Švarm 
attests that it was ‘thoroughly cleansed of anyone who was considered even remotely dangerous’ 
and then recognised (and armed) as a military organisation, leading to the formation of special units 
of 600 – 700 hand-picked men which quickly earned a reputation on the battlefield.113 Such a move 
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indicates that the SDS not only recognised its impotence over the VRS, but also suggests that by the 
end of 1994 they were also threatened by it.  
On the battlefield, the long-overstretched VRS began losing ground to the combined forces of the 
ARBiH, HVO, and Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska, HV) in 1995. Despite the ceasefire, fighting 
continued around Bihać, with ARBiH troops going up against APZB and VRS forces. A key factor in 
these engagements was the decline in fortunes of the SVK in Croatia: if RSK fell, the VRS would be 
left facing the entire HV, as well as its Bosnian adversaries. This no doubt informed the decision to 
leave Bihać, the capture of which would be costly and was essentially untenable without the SVK, to 
government forces until Serb forces could muster more strength. The failure of BiH’s political leaders 
to agree to a more comprehensive peace agreement led to a resumption of fighting across BiH at the 
end of March, triggered when 21,000 troops of the ARBiH VII Corps launched an offensive against 
VRS positions on Mt. Vlašić, inflicting a significant defeat.114 Just two weeks later, the VRS instigated 
its own offensive, which was lauded once again as ‘war winning,’ with the aim of widening the 
Posavina Corridor near Brčko. The attack managed to take some ground from the HVO, but an ARBiH 
counterattack wiped out all VRS gains. The CIA notes that: 
The VRS defeat was the Serbs’ last effort at a war-winning offensive to break the Bosnian 
Government’s will… VRS forces – despite their advantages in armor, artillery, and other 
heavy weapons – were almost completely unable at this point in the war to break through 
ARBiH positional defenses… The VRS was unable to defeat the ARBiH’s fortifications, and 
ARBiH troop reserves allowed the ARBiH to block any penetration the VRS made. The shift in 
the military balance between the ARBiH and the VRS that began in early 1994 was now 
complete.115 
In June, the ARBiH launched its largest offensive of the war. In a desperate bid to break the siege of 
Sarajevo, 80,000 troops from four corps attacked VRS positions across the Sarajevo operational area. 
The assault proved costly and ultimately fruitless, and in drawing troops away from other fronts, left 
some government-held territory exposed. The VRS triumph was lauded by Srpska vojska, which 
published an article at the end of June, titled ‘Grown with the nation,’ which argued that: 
The VRS today commands responsive forces, modern fighting equipment, and highly 
qualified fighters and officers for leading the armed struggle. With the activation of all 
human and material potential for defence, the equal distribution of the war effort on all 
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structures of society and the preservation of the unity of the army, government and citizens, 
the tasks demanded by the Serb people can be fulfilled.116 
Milošević was quick to recognise the opportunity and directed Mladić to move his forces against the 
remaining BiH enclaves in the Drina Valley. The defenders of Goražde, with some assistance from the 
Royal Welch Fusiliers, managed to hold the town, but the VRS's two other targets, Srebrenica and 
Žepa, fell in July. In both cases, the actions of Mladić’s troops against the civilian population they 
captured, including the murder of over 8,000 men and boys at Srebrenica, would later be declared 
acts of genocide.117 In strategic terms, the capture of the towns did little more than fill in some spots 
of non-Serb territory on a map that already covered more than two-thirds of BiH. For the VRS, 
however, the atrocities committed would come to define it in the eyes of the world.  
After taking Srebrenica under the personal command of Mladić, Bosnian Serb and Greek soldiers 
made their way to the ruins of the town’s Orthodox church and raised their respective national flags, 
along with those of Vergina and Byzantium, in victory.118 Although the military contribution of the 
Greek volunteers was minor, their presence, symbolically manifested by the assemblage displayed 
and the location selected for the ceremony, elucidated what united the VRS troops fighting in the 
Drina Valley above all else: the Orthodox faith. Furthermore, the people they massacred were 
portrayed (through a wide range of derogatory terms for Muslims) in religious terms, suggesting 
Serb forces, or parts of them, viewed the entire conflict as a holy war for the “liberation” of Christian 
territory. The extremity and objectives of these beliefs obviously hearken back to the days of the 
crusades; however, a similarity can be identified with the National Liberation War fought against the 
Axis and their local allies by the Partisans.  
That conflict had been portrayed by the socialist leadership of Yugoslavia as a titanic struggle 
between the forces of socialism and fascism in which the Partisans fought to liberate territory from 
an existential threat. Ideological-Political officers in JNA units had lauded the sacrifices and victories 
of the Partisans for decades and had been responsible for ensuring troops were well acquainted with 
socialist ideology and theory. With such structures repurposed for ‘morale, religious, and legal 
affairs’ by the VRS, the leadership, perhaps informed by their experience in such a system, aimed to 
motivate their troops in the same way that they had experienced when in the JNA. The promotion, 
utilisation, and celebration of the Orthodox faith within the VRS indicates that, despite the political 
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divisions that had emerged between Karadžić and Mladić throughout the war, they retained shared 
ideological goals. 
By the end of July, Croatian Serb forces were severely overstretched. The RSK had committed a lot of 
forces to a last-ditch Serb effort to take Bihać by entering from its territory, leaving much of the rest 
of the republic exposed to the gathering HV forces across the frontlines. When the Croatian attack 
came on August 4, it was rapid and effective, sweeping aside SVK defences and quickly capturing 
many strategically significant targets.119 In a response that appears more political than strategic, 
Karadžić utilised the ‘war conditions’ powers which the SDS had invested him with a week previously 
to claim responsibility for the defence of RSK and declare himself Commander of the VRS via a newly 
established Supreme Council.120 Mladić was relieved of his command and reassigned to the civilian 
role of Special Adviser for the Defence of RS and RSK.121 The Serbian daily Politika speculated that 
the move was to prevent a coup d’état by the VRS Headquarters, however such an initiative would 
most likely not have been stopped by these measures.122 
Karadžić’s announcement came the same day that Croatian Serb leader Milan Martić ordered the 
evacuation of all Serbs from RSK territory, making it all-but meaningless.123 Through claiming 
personal authority over RSK and the VRS, however, Karadžić could attempt to present himself as the 
key to peace in both polities. As one diplomatic source told The Independent: ‘There is a power 
struggle going on, Karadžić’s only chance in the struggle with Mladić is to consolidate the RSK and 
the RS as a single entity and present the case to Milošević and the international community.’124 The 
next day, however, Knin fell and Karadžić’s gambit began to unravel. Mladić had been in Belgrade 
negotiating with EU representative Carl Bildt at the time of his dismissal, but upon hearing the news 
he scheduled a meeting of the entire VRS Headquarters in Banja Luka for the next day. The outcome 
of the meeting was a letter to the RS Assembly, signed by the 17 most senior officers of the VRS, 
which declared that Mladić was the commander of the VRS.125 Karadžić publicly blamed Mladić for 
the loss of Knin and stated that:  
There are some commanders who have been interfering with civilian responsibilities or even 
wanted to negotiate with Bildt or Stoltenberg, that has to stop. Something like that is equal 
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to treason. The army cannot negotiate with our enemies or with the international 
community.126 
Nevertheless, the VRS leadership had made its choice, recognising its talismanic and influential 
commander over the constitutional order of RS. The rivalry and divisions that had gradually 
unravelled the unity of the triumvirate had escalated into a public political battle over authority of 
the military, and Mladić had won. Although he and Milošević remained relatively close, and the VRS 
continued to receive support from Belgrade, they did not agree on the war. For Milošević, there was 
little left to gain from the conflict in BiH, and international sanctions and war weariness threatened 
to foment worsening unrest in Serbia. As a result, he lent his support to the ongoing peace process, 
only to be frustrated by his erstwhile allies in BiH. Milošević’s failure to end the fighting and 
Karadžić’s inability to relieve Mladić of his command illustrates how, by August 1995, the VRS was 
unaccountable to any civilian authority. Indeed, the refusal to recognise Mladić’s dismissal 
constituted mutiny. However, a coup d’état remained unlikely, as one Belgrade observer noted: 
‘Don't expect to see the [VRS] chiefs try to destabilize the political leaders. That would be deadly to 
both and would not be pleasing to Belgrade either.’127 
For its part, the VRS was already losing a war of attrition against its increasingly large and capable 
opponents in BiH. It stood no chance whatsoever if the relatively small contingents of HV troops 
already operating alongside HVO forces were reinforced by the experienced and well equipped 
65,000-strong army that had just defeated the SVK, particularly if it had to defend RS’s 300-mile 
frontier with Croatia.128 However, before the HV assault came, the VRS was dealt a crippling blow by 
a much more powerful assailant. In early August, the ‘dual-key arrangement’ which governed 
NATO’s involvement in the Bosnian War was reworked. Previously, one key was held by NATO 
Commander of Allied Forces in South Europe and the other was held by the UN Secretary General’s 
Special Representative in Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi. In the new arrangement, Akashi’s key was 
handed to the UN’s military commander in BiH.129 Following the shelling of a marketplace in Sarajevo 
on August 28, and no doubt emboldened by the events at Srebrenica a month earlier, acting UN 
Commander Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith ‘turned the UN key’ along with his NATO counterpart 
in Naples, and Operation Deliberate Force was launched.130 The Operation entailed a ‘two-week 
campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, in which 3,500 aircraft sorties were flown, nearly 100 cruise 
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missiles fired and almost 400 different Serb targets engaged.’131 These targets included most VRS 
positions near government-held cities, ammunition dumps and transport routes, anti-air batteries, 
and most significantly, the nerve centre of the RS war effort, Han Pijesak, along with a plethora of 
other communications and radar sites across the country. The destruction of many of the facilities at 
Han Pijesak increased the time it took for communications to reach the field from the headquarters 
‘from minutes to 48 hours, or more.’132 This entirely negated one of the VRS’s greatest advantages 
and prevented its corps from coordinating their operations and effectively supporting each other. 
Furthermore, left isolated and with limited information on the course of the fighting, Mladić 
travelled to Belgrade, where he was admitted to a military hospital, supposedly with gallstones.133 
The VRS was impotent against NATO airstrikes and, with its commander away and communications 
down, it quickly lost ground to the combined ARBiH-HV-HVO offensive, which began on 8 
September. 
The offensive, codenamed Mistral – 2, made considerable progress in Bosnian Krajina. The troops of 
the APZB had suffered significantly since Abdić had split from the government of Sarajevo, 
particularly when ARBiH V Corps troops temporarily captured the town of Velika Kladuša in 
December 1994.134 In July 1995, Abdić had ambitiously proclaimed the Republic of Western Bosnia, 
but just two months later his forces, along with their VRS allies, were driven out from the 
territory.135 News of the HV’s ‘stunning victory’ over the SVK and its rapid impact on the conflict in 
BiH caused significant tension in the Bosnian Serb leadership. The ‘improvements made in its force 
structure and doctrine before the operation’ had a ‘profound impact on the VRS leadership’s 
thinking and crystallized their belief that a political-military settlement had to be negotiated as soon 
as possible.’136 This added pressure on Karadžić to allow the formation of a negotiating team and an 
end to the war. Trevor Minter, who was commander of British forces in BiH at the time, observes 
that although the VRS was ‘exhausted and outmanoeuvred’ it ‘did not collapse,’ its ‘chain of 
command was maintained in defeat,’ and it would have ‘fought on desperately had their home areas 
been attacked.’137 
Just weeks later, Milošević announced the formation of a joint Bosnian Serb-Serbian peace 
delegation, which he would lead, preventing Karadžić from sabotaging any negotiations by 
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superseding his position. Holed up in his stronghold of Pale in Eastern Bosnia, however, the RS 
President remained bellicose, declaring that the VRS was ‘holding firm’ and would ‘win in the end,’ 
and saying of Deliberate Force that ‘I think those bombs can destroy the peace process,’ the strikes 
are ‘a moral disaster for the Western World and for the UN.’138 Mladić, meanwhile, returned to BiH 
once the NATO airstrikes stopped and oversaw the stabilisation of the frontlines, even orchestrating 
a number of counter-offensives which, under the circumstances, were remarkably successful, 
particularly when the VRS faced the ARBiH by itself.139 The unexpected reversal was enough to 
convince the Bosnian government to prioritise peace talks, although how much resilience the VRS 
had left at this point is debatable.  
The string of triumphs against the ARBiH signalled that Mladić could still defeat his adversaries on 
the battlefield, but the damage inflicted by NATO was terminal. Without its ability to relay 
information and coordinate the rapid movement of reserves, the VRS was unable to enact the 
effective defensive doctrine that had served it so well, rendering its units isolated and outnumbered. 
Indeed, Gow argues that ‘NATO’s use of air power was, without a doubt and contrary to the 
predominant opinion of Western commentators, the decisive element in ending the war in BiH.’140 
Furthermore, although Mladić initially chose simply to ignore Karadžić and the SDS rather than 
remove them from power, the rift that had developed between them could easily have worsened 
had the war continued, with a military coup, the division of RS between Banja Luka and Pale, or even 
a Serb civil war being perfectly plausible outcomes. Before this could happen, however, the fighting 
stopped. On October 9, under the supervision of Milošević, Mladić and Karadžić signed a ceasefire 
agreement with Izetbegović, who represented both Bosnian Muslims and Croats.141 The following 
month, a permanent peace agreement was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, between Milošević, 
representing the Serbs, Izetbegović, representing Bosnian Muslims, and President Franjo Tuđman of 
Croatia, who represented Bosnian Croats. On 5 December 1995, the three Presidents formally signed 
the General Framework for Peace in BiH in Paris, finally ending the brutal conflict.  
Conclusion 
Throughout the 1992 – 1995 War the VRS shared the goals and ideology of the state it ostensibly 
served. However, while the SDS government dominated every other aspect of the nascent Serb 
republic, it was unable to assert its authority over the military. Its influence within the army was 
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removed by the VRS leadership in the early months of the conflict, and as the war progressed, 
Karadžić consistently failed to establish his control, as President, over Mladić and his troops. This left 
the state and the military as two essentially monolithic, separate entities, exemplified by the 
necessity of having both Karadžić and Mladić sign the October 1995 ceasefire with Izetbegović. 
Furthermore, the VRS’s reliance on locally raised armed forces left it unable to effectively address 
the Chetnik-Partisan divide by acting as a social agent. Instead, most troops raised in Eastern Bosnia, 
for example, remained in that theatre and were led by local officers, most of whom would have 
identified more with the heritage of the Chetniks than the Partisans. Although the rigid structure of 
the chain of command maintained cohesion within the military, the suggestion of a senior officer 
that the VRS should be divided in two, with half serving the ‘Partisan’ leadership in Banja Luka and 
the other serving the ‘Chetnik’ stronghold of Pale in Eastern Bosnia illustrates the pervasiveness of 
this divide.  
Milošević had no constitutional or military authority over the VRS, however it was his VL network 
that went to great lengths to establish the army. The ongoing provision of vital support that the VRS 
was reliant on was also given at his command. In addition, he was the unrivalled leader of the 
project to forge a Greater Serbia from the former Yugoslavia, making him the main ideological 
driving force behind the VRS, and indeed all of the Serb armies that emerged from the JNA. Although 
he was ultimately able to assert his control over both Karadžić and Mladić, proving that he was the 
power behind the VRS, his ambiguous and unlegislated role completely undermined the emergence 
of civil-military relations in RS. Indeed, it would not be until the following year that the VRS was 
subject to oversight by the Bosnian Serb parliament.  
Despite the chaotic nature of the relationship between its triumvirate leadership, however, the VRS 
was able to rapidly and effectively emerge from the JNA. It had clear military objectives, and the 
tools it was furnished with to achieve them were the most potent in the conflict. As a result, it 
quickly secured considerable swathes of territory and allowed for the establishment of RS. 
Furthermore, although the triumvirs disagreed with each other as to how the war should be fought 
and when it should end, their ideological motivations remained the same. By re-purposing the 
ideological dissemination framework of the JNA, Mladić was able to inculcate his troops with a 
shared motivation for fighting: the “liberation” of Serb lands from non-Serb oppressors in the name 
of the Orthodox faith. The contribution of non-Serb forces to these objectives did little to dilute this 
message. There appears to have been very little friction between APZB troops and their VRS allies, 
although their input is also largely ignored by their erstwhile Bosnian Serb allies in commemorations 
of the war, and the presence of Greek and Russian soldiers only served to amplify the religious 
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aspect of the conflict. This message was enough to gloss over divisions within the Serb community 
and maintain the cohesion and unity of the military.    
The VRS was able to achieve almost all of its strategic objectives very quickly. Utilising its superior 
firepower, organisation, communications, logistics, and defensive doctrine it was able to hold the 
territory it had claimed against its numerically superior adversaries. However, after having failed to 
subjugate the BiH government when its advantage was greatest the VRS became increasingly 
overstretched. When NATO initiated Operation Deliberate Force, the damage inflicted left the VRS 
incapacitated. This left it, and RS, in a vulnerable position, particularly considering the entrance of 
significant numbers of HV forces into Bosnian Krajina. Facing an inevitable, although possibly drawn-
out defeat on the battlefield and ever-deepening divisions within its leadership, the VRS and the RS 
were saved by the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ensured a place for both in the future of BiH. 
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Chapter Five: The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Croat Defence Council 
 
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, ARBiH) 
was the military of the nascent Bosnian state that emerged following the republic’s declaration of 
independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Herzegovina, BiH) was soon 
engulfed in conflict, and in the initial months of the war the chances of the Bosnian leadership 
organising an effective defence seemed unlikely: by the end of 1992 the government of BiH retained 
authority over little more than 30 percent of Bosnian territory, while Bosnian Serb forces controlled 
over 60 percent of the country, boasted a near-monopoly on heavy weapons and air support, and 
had already achieved most of their war aims.1 Furthermore, territorial claims of Bosnian Croat 
leaders further complicated any claims of authority the government made. From this unfavourable 
beginning the ARBiH grew into a large military force which ‘developed a war-fighting method 
commensurate with the material and human resources available to it’ and was regarded as an 
effective light infantry fighting force.2 ‘The Bosnian defiance of the odds and formation of an army 
while already largely overrun,’ James Gow argues, ‘was heroic and, on many levels, partly 
successful.’3 Indeed, although the ARBiH failed to obtain an absolute military victory, after almost 
four years of war the once-dominant Bosnian Serb Army, the Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska 
Republike Srpske, VRS), had been manoeuvred into a position where it was forced to negotiate 
peace terms or face increasingly frequent defeats on the battlefield.    
The struggle to make the ARBiH capable of, at the least, forcing the Bosnian Serb leadership (or their 
sponsors in Belgrade) to the negotiating table, was complex. From the outset of the war, much of 
the army was under-equipped, untrained, and lacked the strategic, operational, and tactical 
capabilities to conduct anything other than static-defence. Furthermore, the ARBiH was composed 
of a group of armed forces formed under the auspices of a range of state institutions, ethnic 
identities, and strategic goals. Fusing these groups into an effective military, whilst also maintaining 
legitimacy and an image of inclusivity, only magnified the challenge faced by BiH’s political and 
military leadership.  
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In addition to the conflict on the battlefield, rival visions for the future of BiH competed for control 
and influence within the halls of power in government-held territory during the war. In November 
1995, during the final days of the war, an ARBiH Corps Commander, General Sakib Mahmuljin, stated 
‘we are still not a professional army. We are a people’s army. To be precise, we are a nation in 
uniform.’4 In this statement, Mahmuljin identifies the relationship that had developed between the 
military and society, and highlights how, due to the extent of the conflict, the two became fused. 
However, exactly what this nation constituted or should constitute was open to contention, and due 
to its omnipotent societal presence in government-held territory, the ARBiH was an arena in which 
proponents of rival visions for the future of the nation-elect competed. Were ARBiH soldiers serving 
the state and constitutional order, or were they answering to President Alija Izetbegović and his 
increasingly powerful political party? Was the ARBiH a secular, multiethnic military which regarded 
all loyal Bosnian citizens as equals, or was it a Muslim army fighting to further the interests of 
Bosnian Muslims?  
A key factor that influenced the evolution of the ARBiH was another Bosnian military force, the Croat 
Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, HVO). Formed in 1991 by the leading Croat nationalist 
political party in BiH, the Croat Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ), the HVO 
entered the war as a highly decentralised organisation of Bosnian Croat local defence forces. This led 
to a complicated relationship with the ARBiH. In parts of BiH, the two armies fought side-by-side 
against the VRS throughout the conflict, whilst in others, a costly civil war between them erupted for 
over a year.5 This dynamic was complicated further by divisions within the Bosnian Croat 
community, some of whom envisioned union with Croatia while others advocated a future in BiH.6 
Such divisions, coupled with the challenges that resulted from being the smallest force to fight in the 
Bosnian War, placed a great strain on the HVO throughout the conflict. 
This chapter explores developments in the ARBiH and the HVO both on and off the battlefield 
between 1992 and 1995, taking into account the changing nature of their composition and 
capabilities. The struggles for power within each military and other relevant institutions are 
considered, as is the utilisation of ideology and symbolism by the leaderships in order to motivate 
their troops and consolidate their bases of power. Together, this provides a detailed portrait of the 
evolution of two very different armies in a complex conflict.   
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Origins of the ARBiH 
The origins of the ARBiH can be traced to before its official formation on 15 April 1992. While this 
date signifies the time at which a plethora of armed groups were symbolically unified into a single 
force, numerous military units had been raised, armed, organised, and trained throughout the 
previous year and would form the core of the army. Furthermore, many of the units and much of the 
structure and administration of the ARBiH was inherited from the Territorial Defence (Teritorijalna 
odbrana, TO) of BiH, which had been established as an independent reserve armed force of 
Yugoslavia in 1974.7  
The TO force of BiH had been present in Bosnian society for decades, and although each republic’s 
TO was financed and organised entirely by the republic itself, the TO formations had been a central 
pillar of Yugoslav defence policy: if Yugoslavia was attacked, the professional army would meet the 
invader head-on and aim to inflict heavy losses and slow the advance, giving the TOs time to 
mobilise and present an armed populace impossible to defeat. Most TO forces in Yugoslavia were 
highly decentralised organisations, specifically designed to remain operational even following a 
devastating attack which could, potentially, destroy Yugoslavia’s entire chain of command.8 As a 
result, the structure of the TOs encouraged local commanders to act independently against an 
aggressor. Furthermore, the Yugoslav pursuit of Workers’ Self-Management added an ideological 
and constitutional aspect to the decentralisation and placed the responsibility and duty of defence 
upon workers themselves, rather than the federal or republican governments. This led to a situation 
in which, while the JNA had a relatively regular relationship with the Yugoslav state (demarcated by 
its adherence to the chain of command and respect for the constitutional order of Yugoslavia), the 
TOs were so localised and autonomous that their relationship with the state was distant. Instead 
they were offered leadership by the League of Communists and unified by Yugoslav Socialist 
Patriotism.9 
By 1990, however, the ability of these twin pillars to provide leadership and galvanise public support 
had crumbled and in the elections of November and December 1990, the Party for Democratic 
Action (Stranka za demokratske akcije, SDA) rose to power, attaining the greatest share of seats in 
the Presidency, the Chamber of Citizens, and the Chamber of Municipalities.10 With BiH still a 
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constituent republic of Yugoslavia, the fledgling SDA government found itself ‘at the apex of a state 
apparatus it hardly controlled’ and a TO that was becoming increasingly fragmented.11 In 1991, the 
TO comprised 37,223 Bosnian Muslims, 29,276 Bosnian Serbs, 14,326 Bosnian Croats, and 5,339 
‘Others.’12 In the absence of the League of Communists, little was left to hold the diverse institution 
together, and with no constitutional measures in place for such a development, the legitimacy of 
what remained could be easily questioned. In addition, the state inherited from Yugoslavia had been 
designed, developed, and staffed by communists, many of whom remained loyal to the idea of 
Yugoslavia, or reinvented themselves as nationalist leaders of their respective ethnicities. As a result, 
institutions such as the Ministry of the Interior (Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, MUP) and State 
Security Service (Služba državne bezbednosti, SDB) were ‘riddled with Serb and Croat nationalists’ 
who were willing to help ‘subvert and conquer the Bosnian state from within.’13 The SDA’s position 
was further weakened by its continued acquiescence to the Yugoslav military leadership’s May 1990 
demand that all TOs in Yugoslavia be disarmed, despite BiH’s being the only one to adhere to the 
decision. In total, over 300,000 assorted firearms, light mortars, artillery pieces, and armour were 
surrendered by the TO of BiH prior to April 1992, leaving the state increasingly defenceless.14 
Attempts in September 1991 by the Presidency to demand the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and 
begin the mobilisation of the TO were thwarted by the veto of Biljana Plavšić, a Bosnian Serb 
member of the collective leadership. When the Bosnian parliament began preparing for secession 
from Yugoslavia the following month, Bosnian Serb nationalists, including Plavšić, instigated a 
campaign to undermine the republican government. First, they formed a parallel administration for 
the Serb people of BiH and declared numerous Serb Autonomous Districts, and then, in the first 
months of 1992, proclaimed the formation of the Serb Republic of BiH and adopted a constitution 
which stated that the republic was part of Yugoslavia.15 On 12 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly 
approved the formation of its own army, the Army of the Serb Republic of BiH, which was renamed a 
few months later (as was the proclaimed state), becoming the VRS.16 According to Stjepan Šiber, a 
Bosnian Croat who later served as deputy commander of the ARBiH, prior to the formation of the 
VRS, the ethnic composition of the Republican Staff of the TO was ‘around 60 percent Serb, around 
30 percent Muslim, and around 10 percent Croat. Here [BiH] there was no mention of the national 
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key or equal representation of the peoples.’17 Until many of them left the TO for the VRS, these 
mostly-Serb upper echelons of the TO sought to continue working alongside the JNA (and assist its 
efforts in Croatia) by disarming non-Serb TO units, distributing arms among the Serb population, and 
mobilising some Serb units for deployment in Croatia.18 However, TO units commanded by, or 
composed of, non-Serbs (which constituted a majority of the TO as a whole) became increasingly 
reluctant to cooperate.19 
After the independence referendum, held between 29 February and 1 March 1992, Izetbegović, 
acting as Chairman of the Presidency of BiH, declared independence from Yugoslavia. The first 
months of 1992 had been marked by increasing unrest across BiH, including protests and shootings. 
On 27 March, however, paramilitary units from Serbia began a series of attacks on towns in north-
eastern BiH, first terrorising Bosanski Brod, a small but strategically significant town bordering 
Croatia, and a few days later, harrying the Bosnian Muslims residents of Bijeljina from their homes.20 
In his memoir, Izetbegović unequivocally states that it was the attack on Bijeljina, which began on 1 
April, which marks the beginning of the war in BiH.21 Just days after these events, the two Bosnian 
Serb members of the Presidency (who had both been central actors in the formation of the Serb 
state designed to supersede the Republic of BiH), Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević, tendered their 
the formal resignation on 4 April.22 Over the following days BiH was recognised by numerous states 
and organisations around the world, including the European Community, the USA, and Croatia.23 The 
start of hostilities, coupled with the complete withdrawal of Bosnian Serb nationalists from the 
apparatuses of the Bosnian state meant that the TO of BiH inherited from the socialist period had, 
for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. The Presidency of BiH, now facing a war without an 
army, decided to form a new TO on April 8, the same day the word ‘socialist’ was dropped from the 
name of the republic and a state of “war-danger” was declared.24 Over the course of the following 
week, 40 out of 48 former TO staff members, seven out of nine regional TO staffs, and 73 out of 109 
municipal staffs pledged their loyalty to the new TO of the Republic of BiH (Teritorijalna odbrana 
Republike Bosne i Herzegovine, TORBiH), and 75,000 individuals (of 86,000 registered in the old TO) 
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volunteered to join the new force.25 The TORBiH was administered by the Ministry of Defence of BiH 
and was commanded on an operational level by its own Supreme Command, a dynamic essentially 
unchanged by secession. The only significant institutional development was the re-allocation of 
overall strategic command from the JNA to the TO Supreme Command.26  
Both the military and the state emerged from the apparatus of socialist Yugoslavia. As the TO and 
the Republic of BiH approached the transition from devolved administrations within the framework 
of a federal state to fully sovereign governing institutions of an independent country, the shape of 
their future relationship remained uncertain. The TO was far from a professional military, and 
significant portions of its personnel had rejected the Presidency’s call to mobilise, leaving it partially 
hollow.27 The state apparatus was equally weakened, with many bureaucrats and Party officials 
either leaking intelligence to their former comrades or leaving their posts and offering their services 
to Belgrade, Pale (the Bosnian Serb capital), or Zagreb.28 As a result, in the first months of 
independence not only were both the military and the state untested national institutions, they 
were also weak, undermanned, and subject to external influence.  
With the threat of armed conflict becoming increasingly plausible, the SDA immediately began 
considering the establishment of a national paramilitary force outside the control of compromised 
state institutions, as Marko Attila Hoare observes:  
The SDA as the leading party of government was forced to organise its own clandestine 
resistance movement independently of the Bosnian state institutions, while these same 
institutions in large part collaborated with the external enemy in attempting to suppress this 
resistance.29  
 In March 1991, Izetbegović approved the formation of such a force, and in June 1991, a ‘Council for 
the National Defence of the Muslim Nation’ was established within the SDA, signifying the moment 
when, according to future ARBiH Commander Rasim Delić, the party ‘accepted historical 
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responsibility for preserving BiH and Bosniaks.’30 The military organisation formed by the party 
received the name ‘Patriotic League’ (Patriotska liga, PL), and although its ranks were open to all 
nationalities, Delić concedes that its units ‘were primarily based on the participation of Bosniak 
people.’31 A PL Main Headquarters, which included the PL’s military leadership as well as a range of 
political, public, and cultural figures, was established, with Izetbegović himself overseeing its 
activities.32 The PL’s military commander, Sefer Halilović, offered a summary of the goal of the 
organisation in an interview with the BBC, stating that ‘our objective was the defence of BiH as a 
state and the Bosnian Muslim people from genocide and eradication. So we existed as an armed 
force that protected BiH and Bosnian Muslims.’33 Hasan Čengić (Izetbegović’s closest confidant and 
later the Minister of Defence for BiH) concisely notes why the SDA, as the party of government, 
chose to raise an armed force outside the framework of the state: ‘We decided to form the [PL] 
organisation through the structure of the [SDA] party because that was the only structure we could 
rely on.’34 Speaking to the Second SDA Congress in 1997, Izetbegović reflected on the evolution of 
the PL, offering some important insights into its development:  
In July 1991 the first military experts joined the PL and provided the first directives for the 
defence of BiH. The first truckload of weaponry arrived in August 1991. The first military 
training began in September. The first units were formed in October. In November a long-
range radio transmitter was acquired to cover all of BiH, and the training of communications 
operators began. In December the organising of personnel and the arming of police reserve 
units of the BiH Interior Ministry began at the initiative and under the leadership of the PL. 
In January 1992 the first unit of the PL with military training was created, and the 
distribution of TO arms began at the initiative of the PL, an action that was carried out 
through the highest organs of BiH.35  
Izetbegović’s account of the formation of the PL understandably ignores many of the issues the 
organisation failed to overcome in this period. In Balkan Battlegrounds, an historical overview of the 
break-up of Yugoslavia produced by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the authors note that 
‘the PL failed miserably to acquire and distribute weapons’ and the number of weapons it was able 
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to stockpile ‘fell far short of its requirements.’36 Furthermore, Halilović claims that in March 1992 his 
organisation had 126,000 organised members, 80,000 of whom were armed, however other 
estimates suggest that at this time the PL could only field 40,000 troops.37 Despite these 
shortcomings, the PL boasted a ‘fairly evolved organisational structure’ with eight BiH regional 
commands located in Sarajevo, Doboj, Cazin, Prijedor, Livno, Mostar, Višegrad, and Tuzla, as well as 
one in the predominantly-Muslim region of Serbia, the Sandžak.38 Furthermore, ARBiH General 
Rifata Bilajac would later comment that ‘the foundation of the ARBiH is in the Patriotic League, 
which grew through the TO to become the ARBiH,’ suggesting that the PL was a particularly 
significant, if not the dominant, force within the army, despite being significantly smaller than the 
TO component.39 
While the TORBiH and PL represent two military formations which would play pivotal roles in the 
ARBiH, in the earliest months of the conflict they were poorly equipped and inexperienced. During 
this period, particularly in April and May 1992, the Police, SDB, and other MUP forces played ‘a 
decisive role in the defence of areas with a majority Bosniak population, especially in Sarajevo.’40 On 
4 April, the same day that the Bosnian Serb members left the Presidency, Izetbegović ordered the 
mobilisation of all police units and reservists in Sarajevo in an attempt to bolster the city’s fragile 
defences. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup argue that this decision, which was immediately followed by a 
call from Bosnian Serb nationalists to evacuate Sarajevo, signifies the ‘definitive rupture between 
the Bosnian government and the Serbs.’41 The next day, police stations and MUP buildings were 
attacked by Bosnian Serb units, many of which were also formed from policemen.42 On 5 April, VRS 
troops began firing into Sarajevo, beginning an almost four year siege of the capital. It was at this 
crucial moment that police units provided the Bosnian government with the ability to assert its 
control in the city, capturing, for example, six snipers who fired on a peace demonstration outside 
the BiH parliament and defending the TV tower on Hum hill.43 Of particular note in these actions was 
a 200-strong unit of special police, led by a Croat, Dragan Vikić, suggesting that, much like the TO, 
the MUP was a multiethnic force.44 According to Jovan Divjak, a senior Bosnian Serb commander in 
the ARBiH, the defensive actions of the police in cities ‘of vital strategic importance for the defence 
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of BiH as a whole against the more powerful aggressor forces, bought time for organising and 
planning the defence.’45  
Bosnian police units also contributed significantly to the overall strength and capabilities of the 
Bosnian government, and later to the ARBiH. In total, the MUP mobilised approximately 70,000 men, 
as many as the TORBiH. Furthermore, as Charles Shrader notes, the troops of the MUP were ‘mainly 
armed with small arms and had few vehicles but [were] generally well equipped and well trained.’46 
Hoare argues that at this time, the forces of the MUP were ‘the most powerful armed force under 
Bosnian government command.’47  
The Bosnian government managed to mobilise significant numbers of troops in this initial period and 
was successful in establishing a framework for the organisation and operational control of its forces. 
However, as the Head of the European Community’s Monitor Mission in Sarajevo, Colonel Colm 
Doyle, observes, ‘at this early stage, the fledgling Bosnian army was little more than a name.’48 
Origins of the HVO 
In 1991, the Croats of BiH were broadly divided into two camps. Laura Silber and Allan Little note 
that ‘one-third of the Bosnian Croats lived in western Herzegovina, a notorious hot-bed of extreme 
right-wing nationalism, where Croats formed close to a hundred percent of the population.’49 This 
community provided many volunteers to fight in the war in Croatia, largely favoured joining Croatia, 
and was represented by Franjo Boras of the HDZ in the Bosnian Presidency.50 The majority of 
Bosnian Croats, however, lived in central and northern Bosnia in mixed towns and cities, and were 
‘much more inclined to live in a multiethnic Bosnian state than to seek its partition into ethnically 
pure units.’51 Stjepan Kljuić, the other Bosnian Croat member of the Presidency and HDZ leader in 
BiH, preferred to work within the framework of a united BiH and supported Izetbegović, 
representing this more inclusive outlook despite hailing from the same party.52 His views were 
shared by significant Bosnian Croat leaders. A HDZ leader from Herzegovina, Miro Lasić, stressed 
that the ‘optimum solution is to “retain Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, not altering its borders,” 
for such a future would be favourable to Croatia.’53 Furthermore, Sarajevo Archbishop Vinko Puljić 
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stated: ‘The unified message, and I stand by this, is that an integral, sovereign Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is the best solution for the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.’54 The HVO’s main 
political rival, the Croat Peasants’ Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka, HSS), also opposed the more 
extreme politics attributed to Herzegovina. The party’s leader from 1993 - 1995, Ivo Komšić, reflects 
that the HSS feared that the majority of Bosnian Croats (those living outside of Herzegovina) were 
left ‘unprotected’ by the policies discussed by the HDZ and sought to build an alternative platform:  
We wanted to become an independent political subject in BiH, one that would make its own 
decisions, and not be instructed what to do... Of course, we knew we would be faced with 
fierce reactions. The very establishment of the Party was fiercely attacted by Grude and 
Zagreb. Even by the HSS in Zagreb.55 
The influence of such figures, however, was eclipsed by that of Croatian President Franjo Tuđman. 
His command over the Croatian state and military, combined with the influence he had as leader of 
the HDZ in Croatia, placed him, more than anyone else, in control of the future of the Bosnian Croat 
community.   
While offering some support to Boras in the Presidency, for the most part Tuđman chose to 
circumvent the Bosnian state in order to influence events in BiH. An emerging leader from 
Herzegovina, Mate Boban, was chosen to lead efforts to form an independent Croat ‘political, 
cultural, economic and territorial whole’ and, upon its declaration on 18 November 1991, he became 
its first president.56 According to Article 2 of the Decision on the Establishment of the Croat 
Community of Herceg-Bosna, Herceg-Bosna (HB) consisted of the following municipalities: Jajce, 
Kreševo, Busovača, Vitez, Novi Travnik, Travnik, Kiseljak, Fojnica, Kakanj, Vareš, Kotor Varoš, 
Tomislavgrad, Livno, Kupres, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Prozor, Konjic, Jablanica, Posušje, Mostar, Široki 
Brijeg, Grude, Ljubuški, Čitluk, Čapljina, Neum, Stolac and parts of Skender Vakuf (Dobretići), 
Trebinje (Ravno), and, added a year later, Žepče.57 This encompassed approximately 30 percent of 
the territory of BiH, and included many areas which were not majority Croat. A month later, the 
most prominent Croat critic of the HB, Kljuić, had his authority to represent Bosnian Croats in any 
negotiations revoked by the HB leadership.58 On 8 April 1992, as conflict was erupting in Sarajevo, 
the HB leadership declared the formation of the HVO, which it described as ‘Herceg-Bosna’s 
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supreme executive, administrative and defence body.’59 Boban contended that this was necessary 
because ‘thirteen Croatian villages in the municipality of Trebinje – including Ravno – were 
destroyed and the Bosnian government did nothing thereafter.’60  
A series of crisis staffs established in predominantly Bosnian Croat areas served as nuclei for HVO 
military units to muster. With the ARBiH using the structures of the TO, and Serbs dominating the 
JNA, the HB leadership was forced to build the organisational structures of the HVO from scratch. 
The framework of the TO was copied, linking Bosnian Croat reservists and volunteers across BiH 
through the municipal administrations controlled by the HDZ. As many units had been covertly 
organised for the war in Croatia, fully formed HVO units surfaced ‘within days of the Bosnian war’s 
beginning, complete with officers, staffs, organisations, and weapons.’61 On 16 April, Tuđman 
ordered the Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska, HV) to set up a forward position in Grude, a 
municipality in Herzegovina. Milivoj Petković, a former JNA lieutenant-colonel from Croatia, was 
placed in command of the position in his capacity as an HV officer and was subsequently appointed 
Chief of the HVO Main Staff. He was assisted in his duties by Slobodan Praljak, a Bosnian Croat who 
served as an HV Major-General, Assistant Minister of Defence of Croatia, and senior representative 
of the Croatian Ministry of Defence to HB.62 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), in its initial indictment of Praljak, noted that:  
He served as a conduit for orders, communications and instructions from President Franjo 
Tuđman, [Croatian Minister of Defence] Gojko Šušak and other senior officials of the 
Republic of Croatia to the HB/HVO government and armed forces, and reported to and kept 
Croatia's senior officials informed of developments in [BiH].63 
With Petković and Praljak in control, the level of direct influence exercised by Zagreb over the HVO 
was absolute at the highest levels. The CIA observed: ‘Organized and directed from Zagreb, the HVO 
in 1992 was for all practical purposes a subordinate command of the Croatian Army.’64 Up to 20,000 
Bosnian Croats mobilised under the HVO’s banner before April 1992, and by the end of the year, this 
figure had grown to approximately 45,000, including contingents of HV troops.65 Although they had 
seized considerable quantities of arms from TO stockpiles in HDZ-controlled municipalities, they 
were entirely dependent on Croatia for leadership, logistical support, heavy weapons, and additional 
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arms. Tuđman was forthcoming in these regards. The HV commanders deployed to BiH raised a 
brigade-sized formation, the Ante Bruno Bušić Regiment, over the spring of 1992. It was composed 
entirely of volunteers organised in four battalions, and was well-equipped and manoeuvrable, 
making it the HVO’s most effective unit.  
Additional support from Zagreb came in the form of considerable financial backing, the supply of 
approximately 50 tanks, up to 500 artillery pieces, and a ‘very important’ small fleet of helicopters, 
as well as small arms and ammunition.66 As a result, despite being the smallest army in BiH (by a 
significant margin), the HVO was in ‘organizational second place at the war’s outbreak in April 1992 
— lacking the fully formed military infrastructure of the VRS but far ahead of the virtually non-
existent Bosnian Army.’67 This led many Bosnian Muslims to join up, particularly in local defence 
units in majority-Croat areas. Klejda Mulaj argues that, in 1992, up to 30 percent of the HVO was 
composed of Bosnian Muslims ‘whose preference for joining this formation rather than local Muslim 
militias was informed by the HVO’s ability to provide weapons.’68   
In addition to the HV/HVO, there was another Bosnian Croat army which emerged in the months 
prior to the outbreak of war. The Croat Defence Forces (Hrvatske obrambene snage, HOS) were 
formed by the Croat Party of Rights (Hrvatske stranke prava, HSP), an extreme right-wing Croatian 
political party. Indeed, the abbreviation “HOS” itself invoked the identity of the military of the 
Independent State of Croatia, the fascist puppet-state established by Axis powers on the territory of 
Croatia and BiH during the Second World War, the Croat Armed Forces (Hrvatske oružane snage). On 
3 January 1992, Blaz Krajlević and Mile Dedaković were appointed to establish a headquarters in 
Ljubuški, a municipality in Herzegovina, and lead the HOS.69 Burg and Shoup note that the HSP and 
HOS favoured ‘an alliance of Croats and Muslims against the Serbs, and the creation of a republic 
made up of Croats and Muslims that would eventually be absorbed into a greater Croatia.’70 The 
HOS raised approximately 5,000 troops, many of whom hailed from the diaspora or were hired as 
mercenaries.71 They wore a black uniform, openly sported fascist insignia, and found significant 
support from both Bosnian Croats and Muslims.72   
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Despite the apparent separatism displayed by the establishment of HB, its relationship with the 
Bosnian state was ambiguous. Jure Krišto contends that for Tuđman ‘it was in the interest of the 
Croatian people at that time for there to be a “demarcation” inside [emphasis in orginal] Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,’ rather than to make a bid for full independence.73 Thus, initially at least, both the HVO 
and HOS shared the goals of the Bosnian government and fought alongside the forces it had 
gathered against the VRS.  
Formation of the ARBiH 
The emergence of the PL, coupled with the institutional separation of the TORBiH and MUP and the 
establishment of the HVO and the HOS, led to a situation in which five separate armies (in addition 
to numerous paramilitary groups) fought alongside each other for the first weeks of the war. Each 
was administered and received orders from different institutions, only two of which, the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ministry of Interior, represented the Bosnian state. In a bid to assert its authority 
and bring both organisation and legitimacy to the array of armies fighting for BiH, the Presidency 
declared the unification of all armed forces on the territory of BiH under the banner of the Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Oružane snage Republike Bosne i Herzegovine, 
OSRBiH) on 9 April 1992, and gave a deadline of 15 April for all units to accept the decision.74 This 
largely symbolic gesture was accepted by each armed force, including the HVO and HOS, and was 
followed by the absorption of the PL into the structures of the TORBiH on 12 April. An appeal on 13 
April by Hasan Efendić, a former JNA officer and the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the TORBiH, 
for Bosnians in the JNA to desert and join the OSRBiH.75 
Upon being offered the position of Chief of Staff on 8 April, Efendić reportedly asked the Minister of 
Defence: ‘Will our army be multi-national or mono-national? If it is mono-national I would not want 
to be commander.’76 The promise of a Bosnian Croat and a Bosnian Serb deputy, Stjepan Šiber and 
Jovan Divjak respectively, convinced Efendić to take the role. Thirty-six out of 109 municipal TO 
commands (almost representative of the proportion of Bosnian Serbs in the population) refused the 
Presidency’s request to join the newly formed TORBiH, suggesting that the force would be heavily 
dominated by Bosnian Muslims.77 However, despite this apparent division along ethnic lines, in the 
initial months of the conflict the TORBiH successfully retained much of the character of its Yugoslav 
predecessor. Efendić suggets that ‘Bosniaks, Croats, and a small number of Serbs responded to the 
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mobilisation,’ while Divjak reports that in 1992 the proportion of Croats in the army was ‘higher than 
their proportion of the overall population,’ which was 17.3 percent in 1991, and the proportion of 
Serbs ‘stood at about half their percentage proportion of the population,’ which was 31.21 
percent.78 He also notes that the ARBiH Supreme Command was composed of 18 percent Croats and 
12 percent Serbs, which reflected the proportions of overall troop numbers.79 Thus, in 1992 the 
ARBiH was approximately 65 percent Bosnian Muslim (and “Other”), 20 percent Croat, and 15 
percent Serb, a composition which was reflected in the leadership to the highest levels. Such a 
balance in composition and distribution of power suggests that, as Delić argues, the ARBiH at this 
time was indeed:  
An organised armed force of BiH and its peoples and citizens defending not only their own 
country and citizens, but also the values of democracy and civilisation and a thousand-year 
long history, as well as the multiethnic, multiconfessional, and multicultural character of 
BiH.80  
The Presidency’s decision to create the OSRBiH went some way in establishing a framework for the 
coordinated management of the separate armed groups on paper, but few practical changes were 
made. The integration of the TO and PL under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence (rather than 
the SDA) and the establishment of the TORBiH on 12 April had represented a more significant 
development toward a democratic model of civil-military relations, but it was not until the following 
month that the legal status of the OSRBiH was clarified. The Law of the Armed Forces of RBiH, 
introduced on 20 May 1992, enshrined the OSRBiH as the ‘common armed forces of all citizens and 
nations of the Republic,’ while the Law on the ARBiH of 1 August 1992, stated:  
Service in the Army is carried out by the citizens of RBiH. Citizens of the Republic have the 
right, under the conditions determined by this Law, to serve in the Army, to perform military 
and other duties, to acquire the rank of military officers and other professional titles and to 
advance in the service.’81  
The promulgation of such laws, at a time when prospects on the battlefield were bleak, illustrate the 
extent to which the leadership of BiH were committed to establishing at least the appearance of an 
inclusive and legitimate armed force, in which all citizens of BiH could serve and fight to preserve the 
constitutional order of BiH. It was this image that Izetbegović iterated to the world at the 
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International Conference on Former Yugoslavia in August 1992, when he declared some 
‘fundamental principles’ upon which he hoped the future constitution of BiH would be based. The 
first was: ‘BiH will be a democratic, secular state, based on the sovereignty of its citizens and 
equality before the law of its nations.’82 
However, even while drafting inclusive laws and presenting democratic visions for the future, 
Izetbegović and the SDA began a series of political manoeuvres which bypassed the nascent 
institutions of state and ignored the legal framework that was being established, immediately 
undermining the emergence of democratic civil-military relations in BiH. Divjak contends that after 
the PL was officially incorporated into the TORBiH, ‘there was still a dual command structure in 
place’ in which Colonel Hasan Efendić, a former JNA officer, led the TORBiH while Halilović retained 
command of the PL.83  
Halilović, a former JNA officer originating from the Sandžak, a majority-Muslim region of Serbia, had 
deserted in September 1991 because he felt that ‘my place was with my people’ and had travelled to 
Sarajevo in order to put himself ‘at the disposal of the SDA and Bosnian Muslims.’84 On 25 May, the 
impractical dual command structure was abolished; however rather than the PL becoming fully 
incorporated into the TORBiH, Efendić was replaced by Halilović, signifying something of a coup 
within the military, and the ascension of the armed wing of the SDA to the height of military power 
within the OSRBiH.85 Just over a week later, Rasim Delić, another former JNA officer (and SDA 
supporter) who had defected a few months earlier, was placed in command of the newly established 
Operational Command in Visoko, near Sarajevo. His tasks included forming new military units and 
and serving as a conduit through which weapons smuggled into BiH could be distributed, arguably 
making him the most significant figure in the formation and development of the armed forces loyal 
to the BiH government. In direct contravention of the established chain of command, Delić answered 
directly to Izetbegović, rather than through the TO Supreme Command and Chief of Staff Halilović, 
who (despite his own irregular selection process) protested that such an arrangement was a 
violation of military protocol.86 Following the formal declaration of war on 20 June 1992, the 
Presidency assumed direct control over the OSRBiH from the Ministry of Defence, in part due to 
alleged obstructionism on the part of the ‘Croat-oriented’ Jerko Doko, who led the ministry.87 
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Although such a transfer of authority was constitutional in a time of war, by July 1992 many of the 
original members of the Presidency had left the institution, leaving it firmly in the hands of the SDA, 
although a Bosnian Croat, Mile Akmadžić, remained Prime Minister.  
The efforts of the Bosnian government in the spring and summer of 1992 to establish the necessary 
legal, administrative, and organisational frameworks to send the ARBiH into battle ran alongside the 
struggle to arm and equip the thousands of soldiers it now had under its command. During this 
period, the JNA was still deployed across BiH, and held their own stockpiles and confiscated TO arms 
in warehouses and barracks across the country. With an international arms embargo placed on 
Yugoslavia and its seceding republics, these weapons became a jealously guarded resource.88 In mid-
April, PL troops stormed the Pretis factory in Vogošća, on the outskirts of Sarajevo, and seized 800 
anti-tank rockets. However, no compatible rocket launchers could be found in Sarajevo, so Colonel 
Sulejman Vranj flew a helicopter at great risk from Sarajevo to the town of Visoko, picked up a single 
rocket launcher, and flew back, providing the city’s defenders with a vital capability that was driven 
around the city to face subsequent attacks.89 One such attack by the JNA on 2-3 May was 
successfully defeated, however, hundreds of JNA troops remained trapped inside their barracks in 
the city. Some within the OSRBiH, such as PL Commander Halilović, advocated seizing all confiscated 
TO weaponry at the JNA's warehouse in Faletići, in Sarajevo. Izetbegović preferred to allow the JNA 
to leave the city, with the weapons, unhindered.90 As a result, the defence of Sarajevo was, initially 
at least, bereft of even the most basic weaponry. According to Divjak, in 1992 the defenders of 
Sarajevo possessed only six snipers (in contrast with the besiegers' 285), one tank (opposed to 91), 
and no heavy artillery.91 OSRBiH forces in some areas of BiH were more successful in acquiring arms 
and, sometimes, heavy weaponry. On 15 May, a JNA convoy was captured in Brčkanska Malta, near 
Tuzla, an event which had a ‘crucial impact in raising morale among our troops and strengthening 
their resolve to defend the area.’92 An additional 9,000 infantry weapons were seized from the JNA 
barracks at Kozlovac, just outside Tuzla, providing the defenders of the city with a veritable arsenal 
in comparison to the rest of the OSRBiH.93 In Zenica, TO units even managed to acquire heavy 
weaponry, including 20 tanks and 19 anti-aircraft guns.94 Although Bosnian government forces 
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remained significantly outmatched, particularly in terms of heavy weaponry, artillery, and air power, 
enough arms and ammunition were acquired in this crucial period to prevent a complete rout.   
On 22 May, the TORBiH was given the order to fully mobilise, and on 27 May, the creation of twelve 
brigades of the OSRBiH was formally announced.95 Although most of the army remained in scattered 
TO units, the OSRBiH now had soldiers organised in sizeable units, a much clearer chain of 
command, and was beginning to look less like a collection of militias and more like a military. 
However, despite these developments, the OSRBiH remained limited in both its capabilities and 
effectiveness. Defensive lines established in the first months of the war would, in many cases, 
remain unchanged for the duration of the conflict. In Sarajevo, for example, two thirds of the 
defence lines were left unaltered from June 1992 until the Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end 
to the fighting in December 1995.96 The story was similar across most of the country, with OSRBiH 
troops able to halt enemy advances, but unable to mount any offensive actions, plan coordinated 
manoeuvres, or increase its operational capability. For many OSRBiH soldiers, their experience of the 
conflict was limited to participating in “shifts” on static frontlines, such as those around Sarajevo. 
Shrader describes this process thus:  
The available military weapons were kept on the frontline position and transferred to the 
relieving shift. The men participating in the shifts were only skimpily supplied with uniforms 
and other equipment and were considered soldiers only during the time they were actually 
on shift.97 
Divjak offers a further insight into the problems the OSRBiH faced in the first phase of the war, many 
of which, he argues, remained unresolved until the end of the conflict. He notes that in addition to 
the lack of weapons and munitions, the OSRBiH also severely lacked signalling and engineering 
equipment, lamenting that ‘we did not even have shovels to dig simple trenches, to say nothing of 
mechanical diggers, especially in the cities which had been surrounded since day one.’98 He 
estimates that approximately 75 percent of the OSRBiH spent the first year of the war fighting ‘in 
jeans and trainers’ and did not even possess a single, unifying insignia. Instead, OSRBiH troops wore 
the badges of the TO, PL, Yugoslav-era civil defence and youth workers’ brigades, or simply the 
emblem of their respective city.99 The most significant shortcoming Divjak identifies is the lack of 
professional personnel and the limited training that could be offered to recruits. He illustrates the 
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extent to which the OSRBiH was an amateur force by discussing the case of one particularly large 
brigade (with more than 5,000 men) which boasted that they did not have a single officer or non-
commissioned officer (NCO) from the former JNA. He also notes that in some places, such as 
Sarajevo, there was essentially no opportunity to conduct training exercises due to uninterrupted 
military activity and the lack of space.100  
During the summer of 1992, following the declaration of a state of war by the Presidency on 20 June, 
the OSRBiH underwent a comprehensive reorganisation. On 4 July, the TORBiH (which already 
included the PL) was renamed the ARBiH, and the MUP and most Bosnian Muslim paramilitary units 
were incorporated into the new force. The ARBiH was to be structured in much the same way as a 
conventional army. However, a Supreme Command (rather than a General Staff) would preside over 
regional and municipal level commands. The predominantly Croat elements of the OSRBiH, the HVO 
and HOS, remained independent of the new army, although a largely symbolic link through the 
framework of the OSRBiH was retained. This link was strengthened, for a time, following an 
agreement signed between Izetbegović and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman on 21 July, which 
recognised the HVO and the ARBiH as distinct elements of the OSRBiH and called for the creation of 
a joint staff.101 Despite the challenges faced in the period between April and July 1992, forces loyal 
to the BiH government managed to mobilise enough manpower, acquire enough weaponry, and 
mount a strong enough defence to prevent themselves from being completely overrun. Amidst this 
often-chaotic struggle, the myriad armed groups which had mobilised and fought for the 
government of BiH were slowly merged into a single, relatively cohesive army: the ARBiH.  
A Giant Rises: 1992 
Following its formation, the ARBiH was divided into seven military districts (Sarajevo, Doboj, Tuzla, 
Banja Luka, Zenica, Mostar, and Bihać), a system which reflected the structure of TORBiH.102 The 
commanders for these districts were selected by Chief of Staff Halilović, although the ability to 
communicate and exert command and control over all units remained limited.103 These districts, 
originally designed to coordinate the defensive operations of TO militias in their respective areas, 
began a transformation to a more conventional military structure on 18 August, 1992, when they 
officially became ARBiH Corps Areas. The Sarajevo Military District became ARBiH I Corps, Doboj and 
Tuzla became II Corps, Banja Luka and Zenica became III Corps, Mostar became IV Corps, and Bihać 
became V Corps. Two additional corps were added in 1993, VI Corps located in Konjic, and VII Corps, 
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headquarted in Travnik.104 The reorganisation took months to complete, but by the beginning of 
December 1992, the ARBiH possessed five corps, each with its own headquarters and staff, which 
commanded a number of Operational Groups, a collection of brigades gathered ‘to facilitate the 
conduct of operations and command and control in combat,’ in addition to a varying amount of 
independent and tactical brigades, and supporting artillery, signals, engineering, and logistical 
troops.105 Due to the nature of the fighting in BiH, each corps was essentially isolated from the 
others, and, for the most part, did not coordinate operations with other corps until the final year of 
the war.  
At the time the corps were established, the ARBiH commanded, according to Halilović, 
approximately 170,000 troops organised in 28 brigades, sixteen independent battalions, one 
armoured battalion, and two artillery divisions, in addition to 138 other units.106 These figures had 
rapidly increased following the influx of refugees (mostly to central BiH) from places such as Jajce, 
which was captured by the end of October 1992. Many combat-age people driven from their homes 
formed mobile units capable of operating across BiH and conducting offensive operations, offering 
the ARBiH a capability it had, for the most part, lacked.107 By the end of 1992, the ARBiH had grown 
both in terms of its size and its capabilities. This was reflected by a number of successes on the 
battlefield. At the end of October 1992, troops from II Corps repulsed VRS forces near Gradačac and 
managed to capture an entire JNA armoured train, acquiring significant quantities of arms and 
equipment.108 The journal of II Corps, Armija Ljiljana (Army of the Bosnian Lily), later reported that 
captured JNA artillery had been formed into a unit nicknamed “The Division of Earthly Thunders” 
which ‘had led the enemy to despair’ during the fighting around Brčko and could be used in 
operations in Banovići and Gradačac.109 In an interview with Armija Ljiljana, the commander of the 
unit, Feriz Šehanović, noted that: 
We have excellent gun crews, and the composition of the unit is multinational. But I still urge 
our fellow citizens, Orthodox Bosnians, to report to our unit, according to their knowledge 
and abilities, so that tomorrow our city can walk with its head raised up.’110  
Šehanović is evidently implying that Tuzla, the city in which II Corps was based, found pride in its 
diversity, even during the conflict. Interviews conducted by Anna Calori corroborate this suggestion, 
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with interviewees (former ARBiH soldiers) commenting that there were more Serbs in II Corps ‘than 
in any other part of Bosnia,’ ‘most of my Serb colleagues remained here during the war, and we 
went together to the front-line to fight against nationalists,’ and ‘I wasn’t protecting Serbs or Croats 
or Muslims, I was protecting people.’111 Calori suggests that this can be attributed to the city’s 
unique heritage, but also highlights the role of the local leadership:  
The Tuzla government’s measures were aimed for the collective defence of the city rather 
than the protection of a singular ethnic group. This was perhaps due to the leadership’s anti-
nationalist stance, derived from their ideological, cultural and political background.’112  
The election of a reformist candidate, Selim Bešlagić, as mayor in the 1990 municipal elections and 
the formation of a multiethnic cabinet not only contributed to the II Corps’ diversity, but also led to a 
situation in which, according to a former II Corps soldier, ‘you left your weapons outside the city’ as 
the police maintained internal security. 113 This denotes a clear separation between the civil and 
military aspects of security, as well as the development of an armed force which was not only 
effective on the battlefield but was also evolving in a democratic manner in terms of its composition 
and deference to civilian institutions. 
Over the course of the first six months of the conflict, relations between the HVO and the HOS 
worsened. The HOS had proved valuable due to the supposed enthusiasm of its troops for combat, 
however their autonomy soon came to be viewed as a liability by the HVO leadership. On 9 August 
1992, HOS Commander Kraljević and seven staff officers were killed at an HVO checkpoint, and two 
weeks later the majority of the HOS was incorporated into the HVO, with a small component joining 
the ARBiH.114 Combined with a gradual expansion, the incorporation of the HOS brought the 
strength of the HVO to over 30,000 troops, who could rely on the support of up to 15,000 HV 
soldiers when necessary.115 A December 1992 instruction by the Commander of HVO forces in 
Mostar, Ivan Primorac, reveals the concerns of the leadership regarding the incorporation of former 
HOS units. It ordered all commanders ‘to ensure that unit members wear only HVO insignia and 
removal other emblems’ which could ‘compromise the reputation of HVO and HV members by 
implying ideas which the world media may interpret as fascistic.’116 Furthermore, HV troops were 
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deployed to HB were required to ‘wear HVO insignia during their deployment’ in HB.117 Such actions 
indicate a gradual process in which a degree of uniformity was brought to the various units under 
HVO command. However, while the ARBiH grew considerably, both in terms of size and organisation, 
throughout 1992, the HVO ‘had in large measure failed to evolve since the war’s beginning.’118 
Advances and Setbacks: 1993 
The ARBiH which survived 1992 served the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the state, 
and was inclusive of all components of the population, making it both a uniquely Bosnian and 
democratic institution. However, Divjak argues that, even by the end of 1992, the percentage of 
serving Bosnian Croats and Serbs declined as the SDA ‘radicalised its position’ and ‘started saying 
that the Bosniaks were the “central nation” in Bosnia and appropriated the name Bosniak, which 
historically refers to all inhabitants of Bosnia, thus relegating local Serbs and Croats to their “reserve 
homelands.”’119 He also notes that, beginning in 1993, the clergy became involved in the ARBiH and 
religion was introduced, which, he argues, when coupled with the appropriation of Bosniak identity, 
‘led to the genesis of a mono-national structure and politics that contradicted the presidential 
platform for the defence of multi-national, multi-religious, multicultural BiH.’120 Developments such 
as this were reflected in the upper echelons of the ARBiH, where Šiber, the highest ranking Croat in 
the ARBiH, was ‘promoted’ to a diplomatic posting in Switzerland at the start of the year, effectively 
removing him from the inner circle of the army.121 However, although the numbers of Bosnian 
Croats and Serbs in the ARBiH were dwindling, the overall strength of the ARBiH was rising steeply.  
By January 1993, Halilović suggests that the ARBiH had grown to ‘an impressive figure’ of 261,500 
troops, which he states is ‘the time when the Armija reached its peak’ and controlled the most free 
territory.122 Divjak claims that in 1993 the ARBiH ‘had as many as 200,000 people on our list,’ while 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) Military Balance, widely lauded for its 
precision, puts the total at 180,000, although it does concede that there was a ‘lack of accurate 
information’ and it should be noted that only ‘regular’ troops are included in IISS estimates.123 
Nonetheless, even at the lowest estimate, 180,000 troops made the ARBiH considerably larger than 
any other force operating in BiH, and gave it an edge over its opponents in one aspect of the conflict.  
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Most of the advantages that could be gained from the ARBiH’s numerical dominance were, however, 
mitigated by two key factors. On 14 January 1993, open conflict broke out between the ARBiH and 
its erstwhile allies, the HVO. Although Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in many parts of BiH 
continued fighting alongside each other, in central Bosnia and Mostar vicious fighting over the 
control of territory and supply routes drew considerable resources and manpower away from both 
armies’ frontlines facing the VRS. In central Bosnia, for example, ARBiH III Corps’ approximately 
26,000 troops fought over 8,000 HVO Operative Zone Central Bosnia soldiers, gaining some ground 
at great cost, but having little impact on the overall course of the war.124 In addition to having to 
supply and conduct operations on a second front, the ARBiH’s manpower advantage was also 
blunted by the pervasive difficulty it faced in sourcing weaponry. Izetbegović estimates that by mid-
1993 the BiH government had successfully acquired 30,000 rifles and machine guns, 20,000,000 
bullets, 37,000 grenades, 46,000 anti-tank missiles, 20,000 uniforms, and 120,000 pairs of boots.125 
However, although considerable (particularly considering the arms embargo and the difficulties 
transporting supplies across the country), such figures remained far lower than was necessary to 
properly arm the ARBiH. By the end of the year, the ARBiH ‘still showed serious deficiencies in 
equipment and skills, lacking both armour and artillery and, in some units, even basic infantry 
weapons and ammunition.’126   
The conflict between the ARBiH and the HVO began just two days after the Vance-Owen Plan was 
announced, and was welcomed by VRS Commander Ratko Mladić, who declared ‘I will watch them 
destroy each other and then I will push them both into the sea.’127 The conflict had a considerable 
impact on the HVO and exposed many of its organisational and operational limitations. While many 
units in Herzegovina were well-equipped and had gained considerable combat experience, most 
forces raised in central Bosnia and western Herzegovina ‘had little to do in their hometowns other 
than keep a watchful eye on their Muslim neighbours.’128 The Croats of northern Bosnia had 
witnessed the most fighting, but were largely contained to a small pocket around Orašje, and were 
considered loyal to the Bosnian government. As a result, when the conflict with the ARBiH 
intensified, the considerable variations in the capability of HVO units soon became apparent. 
Furthermore, many were found to be understrength and the army as a whole suffered from a severe 
lack of reserves. Additional problems stemmed from the HVO’s formation as both a governmental 
and military body. Shrader notes instances of local HVO commanders ignoring the orders of their 
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military superiors and argues that ‘without the assent of the local civilian authorities, even the major 
regional commander might find it difficult to relieve a subordinate commander’ who might be a 
‘local favourite.’129   
The HVO leadership began addressing these issues on 10 February 1993, when all municipalities in 
HB were ordered to raise a Home Guard unit for the protection of military facilities and the manning 
of checkpoints. This would free HVO troops for frontline operations. However, before such measures 
could be implemented, the ARBiH’s overwhelming numbers soon translated into victories on the 
battlefield, leading to the capture of both Travnik and Kakanj from the HVO in June 1993.130 This led 
Jadranko Prlić, the HVO’s political leader, to order all Bosnian Croats between 18 and 60 to report 
for military service, indicating how vulnerable the HB had become.131 By the end of July, HB had lost 
about a quarter of its territory to the ARBiH, and was on the verge of disaster.132 Praljak, reflecting 
on the fall of Bugojno, contends that the town’s defenders were defeated ‘in spite of being the best 
armed brigade of the [HVO]’ because ‘there were no clear political ideas about what to defend.’133 
He also blamed the civilian leadership for losses in Travnik and Vareš, labelling them ‘a group of 
thieves… getting rich.’134 In some areas, such as Konjic and Žepče, HVO forces were so desperate that 
an unprecedented and highly utilitarian alliance with local VRS forces was formed against the 
ARBiH.135 Further south, the HV took responsibility for the defence of much of Herzegovina, freeing 
up additional HVO units to stem the tide in central Bosnia.136 The most significant change, however, 
came at the end of 1993 when Ante Roso, a former French legionnaire from Croatia, was appointed 
as Commander of the HVO. He was responsible for establishing the Zrinski Battalion of the HV 
(centred around his fellow ex-legionnaires), which saw extensive combat in Croatia and was 
regarded as one of the best units of the HV.137 His task in BiH was to bring the organisational 
methods used by the HVO in line with the HV and create a Bosnian Croat force which could operate 
alongside its Croatian counterpart in sophisticated and demanding manoeuvres.  
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In 1993, the SDA began subordinating the military to its political goals. Hoare observes that this was 
initially manifested by ‘the sidelining or dismissal of commanders who did not follow the SDA line.’138 
On 8 June 1993, this process was escalated by the appointment of Delić, a close ally of Izetbegović, 
to the newly created post of Commander of the ARBiH. Delić assumed complete operational control 
of the army, with Divjak and Šiber remaining as deputies, although, as both were not Bosnian 
Muslims, their strategic input was mostly ignored.139 Halilović, the erstwhile leader of the ARBiH, 
claimed his demotion was unconstitutional as it had not been approved by a majority of the 
Presidency, and allegedly attempted to incite a coup d’état which was only just averted. However, 
he was technically not demoted, as he retained the position of Chief of Staff, despite it being made 
largely defunct by the new position of Commander. In October 1993, the SDA also began increasing 
its grip on the Bosnian state, replacing Prime Minister Mile Akmadžić, a Bosnian Croat, with Haris 
Silajdžić of the SDA. Although this served to bring an end to crippling divisions between Muslim and 
Croat ministers within the government, it left Izetbegović and the SDA with a near-monopoly on the 
institutions of governance. 
Many ARBiH units were, in 1993, still largely autonomous formations that had answered the call to 
defend their towns and cities in 1992, but were yet to be brought under the effective command and 
control of the Supreme Command and the Presidency. The IX and X Brigades, which had both made 
vital contributions to the defence of Sarajevo, came under scrutiny following a direct appeal from 
Divjak to Izetbegović regarding their mistreatment of Serbs. The Commanders of the brigades, 
Mušan “Cace” Topalović and Ramiz “Ćelo” Delalić, were widely known to have been criminals prior 
to the war, but had become charismatic leaders with significant followings after their early military 
successes, and Izetbegović speculated that it had been Halilović’s ‘insufficient personal courage’ and 
‘insufficient authority among the troops’ that had allowed them to ignore orders and persecute 
civilians.140 Following the rise of Delić, plans were made to bring the rogue units to heel. However, 
Izetbegović chose to circumvent both military and state institutions and instead use the SDA and its 
affiliates to achieve this. On 23 October 1993, the SDA issued a statement condemning certain units 
in the I Corps for their ‘unlawful behaviour’ and ‘arbitrary conduct,’ precipitating military 
intervention.141 The planning of the intervention, which was given the name Operation Trebević, was 
confined to an inner cabal of Izetbegović, Delić, and the MUP Commander, Bakir Alispahić. It 
involved moving the elite (and personally loyal to Izetbegović) Crni labudovi (Black Swans) 
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paramilitary unit from Kakanj into Sarajevo in order to, in the words of Izetbegović, ‘take action 
against our own units.’142 The Presidency was consulted just a few hours before the operation 
began, but endorsed the use of violence anyway, and on 26 October Delalić was apprehended and 
Topalović was killed.  
Alongside efforts to consolidate their control over the ARBiH, Izetbegović and Delić also targeted 
numerous units composed mostly of Bosnian Croats which had been formed under the auspices of 
the HVO but, in practice, fought as integral parts of the ARBiH, even as the Muslim-Croat civil war 
evolved in other parts of the country. The Kralj Tvrtko Brigade in Sarajevo, for example, was formally 
part of the HVO and operated under its banner, but in practice coordinated its efforts with the 
ARBiH and contributed 1,500 troops to a 2km front along the north bank of the Miljacka.143 In the 
Bihać area, the relatively small Croat community formed the 101st HVO Brigade, which in practice 
operated as a battalion-sized, semi-autonomous formation within the ARBiH V Corps, while in Tuzla, 
the 107th, 108th, and 115th HVO Brigades had minimal links to the rest of the HVO, and served as 
key units within the ARBiH II Corps.144 Despite this history of relatively successful cooperation, 
immediately following the success of Operation Trebević, in November 1993 Operation Trebević 2 
was launched, leading to the capture and detainment of HVO military leaders in Sarajevo. What 
remained of the Kralj Tvrtko Brigade was then forcibly incorporated into the I Corps, resulting in the 
loss of more than half of its troops, who refused to join the ARBiH. Similar operations were 
attempted, to varying degrees of success, against HVO units which had participated in the defence of 
majority-Muslim areas such as Bihać, Tuzla, and the Posavina region.145  
Consolidation and Offensive Operations: 1994 
The Washington Agreement, signed on 18 March 1994, brought an end to the fighting between the 
ARBiH and the HVO, and coincided with the removal of Boban as HB President, and his replacement 
with a more moderate candidate by Tuđman.146 Described by Izetbegović as ‘the result of force, not 
conviction and political will,’ the Agreement contained provisions to not only end the conflict, but 
also lay the framework for a lasting alliance between the two.147  This put an end to the practice of 
incorporating HVO units into ARBiH formations in majority-Muslim areas, and vice versa. The conflict 
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in central Bosnia had already stimulated the ethnic homogenisation of both the ARBiH and the HVO, 
but the Washington Agreement formalised this process by establishing ethnic identity as the basis 
for the division of power in the new alliance and encouraging separation, leaving little reason or 
incentive for Bosnian Croats to remain in the ARBiH and Bosnian Muslims to remain in the HVO.148 
The proportion of Serbs in the ARBiH (15 percent in April 1992), had steadily fallen as the war 
progressed due to attrition and the mobilisation of the much larger Bosnian Muslim population in 
government-held territory. As a result, from 1994 onwards both the ARBiH and the HVO were 
virtually monoethnic armies, with examples such as Divjak, who remained in a senior position in the 
ARBiH throughout the war, representing a symbolic vestige of diversity.    
 During 1992 and 1993, the efforts of both the ARBiH and the HVO were invested in holding as much 
ground as possible, arming their soldiers, and providing them with whatever training and 
organisation they could. With the renewed alliance, significant quantities of troops and materiel 
from both armies could be redeployed, offering a significant boost to the operational capacity of 
forces facing the VRS. Furthermore, support and logistics were able to reach pockets of resistance 
that had been isolated for over a year, while the respite which the Washington Agreement offered 
heralded another reorganisation of the ARBiH. Operational Groups gathered with the purpose of 
conducting the ARBiH's first major offensives of the war, and fully-equipped mobile battalions were 
established within brigades, greatly improving their individual manoeuvring capacity and 
effectiveness.149 Additional ‘manoeuvre’ and ‘liberation’ brigades, capable of operating across BiH, 
were also formed, providing a capability which had, for the most part, been limited to small units 
such as the Crni labudovi, Živiničke ose (Zinc Axes), and Kalesijski vukovi (Calvary Wolves), all of 
which were essentially paramilitary formations serving as special forces.150  
The cessation of hostilities also offered the HVO the time it needed to fully implement the ambitious 
reforms being implemented by Roso. The new HVO was a two-tier force. The top cadre was 
composed of four newly formed Guards Brigades, in which only professional soldiers served, and 
most of the HVO’s heavy weaponry was concentrated. These brigades were designed to be able to 
operate independently throughout BiH and were in every way copies of the Guards Brigades of the 
HV. Their creation, however, led the rest of the HVO to be devoid of its best soldiers, officers, and 
equipment. These units were remodelled as well, and became the second-tier Home Defence 
Regiments (domobranska pukovnija) that had originally been envisioned to supplement the HVO. 
These reforms left the Bosnian Croats with a very small but capable offensive component, and an 
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excess of operationally useless militias, most of which were soon dismissed. As a result, the CIA 
observes, ‘though it could manage some local attacks on its own, during the offensive operations of 
the year, it would function as a mere supporting auxiliary of the HV.’151 
Until 1994, most of the ARBiH was so under-resourced and inexperienced that coordinating its 
efforts on a national level was all-but impossible. At the beginning of the year, however, the ARBiH 
had increased its troop capacity to 228,000 and was becoming increasingly capable.152 As a result, it 
began providing the BiH leadership with:  
An overall offensive strategy, a doctrine and tactics that fit this strategy but could be carried 
out with the Army's limited resources, and a training programme which would produce a 
force disciplined and proficient enough to execute the manoeuvres required by the 
strategy.153 
Put simply, the new strategy, formulated by newly appointed Commander Delić, aimed to grind the 
VRS down in a war of attrition that, given its numerical superiority, the ARBiH would inevitably win. 
This was translated into a doctrine in which the ARBiH would ‘seek to achieve a continual series of 
limited gains sustainable without artillery support or motorised transport and roll the frontline back 
a kilometre at a time.’154 A more sophisticated doctrine was reflected in the evolution of battlefield 
tactics employed by the ARBiH. During 1994, elite units, designed specifically to facilitate such a style 
of combat, began to emerge. One such example are the “recon-sabotage” units which scouted the 
battlefield prior to an offensive, identifying weak points in the opposing lines, which were then 
targeted with sabotage operations aimed at disrupting command and control links and artillery 
observation posts, isolating enemy frontline units prior to an infantry attack spearheaded by elite 
assault units.155 Strategies, doctrine, and tactics such as these allowed the ARBiH to maximise its 
strengths, while doing as much as possible to negate the extent to which it was hindered by 
shortcomings such as the lack of artillery, armour, and mechanised transport. The result was a 
limited but significant change in the nature of the conflict. The ARBiH conducted a range of 
offensives across the country, and although many failed in their objectives, some ground was taken 
(almost 100 square kilometres around Konjic, for example). Furthermore, in some battles, such as at 
Vozuća in the Ozren Mountains during the summer of 1994, the ARBiH came close to defeating the 
Bosnian Serb I Krajina Corps, proving to the VRS that ‘winning battles against the Muslims was 
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becoming a near-run thing.’156 An article published in the ARBiH journal, Prva linija (First line), the 
following year reflected on the progress made:  
The new mode of warfare required the introduction of several manoeuvring brigades and 
the coordinated activities of two or more corps. This implies the extraordinary operational 
coordination of units involved in the operations, a high level of discipline and responsibility 
for the execution of plans, providing connections, communications, logistical provisions, and 
all of the other components of organisation and planning.157 
Such an analysis suggests that the ARBiH leadership was fully aware of the scale of the challenge 
they were facing but was also becoming increasingly confident in the capabilities of the army they 
were building. 
Away from the frontlines, Izetbegović continued publicly to proclaim the inclusivity of the ARBiH 
throughout 1994. On 4 August, he stated:  
Our army in which both Serbs and Croats are serving, is not an avenging army. It is not an 
anti-Serb army. It is the golden fleur-de-lis that flutters on its flag, not death’s head. Our 
common homeland of Bosnia and Herzegovina meets all the conditions to become, finally, a 
state in which the rights of all will be respected and protected.158 
A few weeks later, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, he reiterated that ‘for many of us, 
Bosnia is an idea. It is the belief that people of different religions, nations and cultural traditions can 
live together.’159 On the anniversary of Bosnian Independence on 1 March 1995, he proclaimed:  
Our aim is a Bosnia of free people, a Bosnia in which the human being and human rights will 
be respected. We oppose the concept of mono-national, mono-religious, one-party 
parastates – in the plural – with our concept of a free and democratic Bosnia.160 
However, the image presented by Izetbegović and the SDA was becoming increasingly distant from 
reality and continued to be undermined by the decisions they made, as Sabrina Ramet observes: 
‘Izetbegović tried to be all things to all men, presenting himself as a devout Muslim to some 
audiences and as a champion of tolerance and secular liberal democracy to other audiences.’161 On 
19 November 1994, the commander of II Corps, General Hazim Sadić, was replaced by the SDA-
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approved Sead Delić, and sent to Turkey to serve as a military attaché to BiH’s diplomatic delegation 
there.162 Sadić had been a successful leader who, with the cooperation of Tuzla’s Reformist Mayor, 
had advocated for the ARBiH to be as multinational and inclusive as possible, and had even formed 
Bosnian Serb ‘Liberation’ units, inspired by the Partisans, within II Corps. Hoare contends that Sadić 
may have been suspected of harbouring autonomist designs for the Tuzla region, offering a pretext 
for his removal. However at the time, Sadić’s lack of SDA membership was unusual in the upper 
echelons of the ARBiH, and may have been reason enough.163 The substitution of ARBiH officers with 
SDA-backed replacements, coupled with the elevation of Rasim Delić above the established chain of 
command in 1993 illustrates the extent to which the army was, despite the assertions of Izetbegović, 
increasingly becoming the armed wing of the SDA, rather than the military of the state. 
Exclusivity and Endgame: 1995 
The SDA’s attempts to consolidate its control over the Bosnian state and the ARBiH in 1993 and 1994 
led to a clash between Izetbegović and the other members of the Presidency in January 1995. At a 
ceremony in Zenica on 20 October 1994, Izetbegović had been made the honorary commander of 
the VII Muslim Brigade, one of the ARBiH’s elite units, infamous for its Islamic character, Mujahidin 
volunteers, and combat effectiveness. During the ceremony he received a certificate written in 
Bosnian and Arabic, which stated:  
We fighters of the VII Muslim Illustrious Brigade, by the Lord Allah the Almighty in whose 
name we fight, proclaim our immense honour in awarding this certificate to the hadji Alija 
Izetbegović, the worthiest son of Bosnia, most beloved brother of the Bosniak-Muslim 
nation, proclaiming you first honorary commander of the VII Muslim Illustrious Brigade. It is 
our principle: May the mercy of Allah, and His protection from the crime committed against 
the Bosniak-Muslim nation, always be with you.164  
In response, at the beginning of 1995 the non-SDA members of the Bosnian Presidency, one of the 
‘last feeble bastions of multi-ethnicity in the state,’ condemned the politicisation of the ARBiH as 
manifested at Zenica, and its transformation into an Islamic, Bosniak, and SDA army.165 Izetbegović 
responded by demanding full authority over the military be invested in him as President of the 
Presidency, rather than the Presidency as a whole, as the case had been since June 1992. This 
coincided with the establishment of Dan šehida (Day of Martyrs) on 23 January by the Islamska 
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Vjerska Zajednica (The Islamic Religious Community, the organisation of BiH's Muslim clergy), which 
was to be celebrated annually on the second day of Ramadan, and would entail the faithful visiting 
the local šehidsko mezarje (Martyr’s cemetery) for prayers.166  
The term šehid, derived from the Arabic for witness or martyr, increasingly became applied to fallen 
Bosnian Muslim soldiers of the ARBiH as the war progressed. Although it was often used alongside a 
more inclusive term (šehidi i poginuli borci, martyrs and fallen warriors), the widespread use of such 
a term, its institutionalisation as a public holiday, and the creation of cemeteries specifically to inter 
fallen Muslim ARBiH soldiers illustrates the extent to which the ARBiH had become increasingly 
Islamic in its identity, at the expense of its former inclusivity. Indeed, the Commander of British UN 
(and later NATO) forces in Bosnia from August 1995, Lieutenant Colonel Trevor Minter, observes 
that ‘in my time the ARBiH was entirely Muslim.’167 The concerns of the non-SDA members of the 
Presidency were validated by Izetbegović's response, yet their intervention came at the expense of 
the little power they had left. Following such events, the carefully maintained image of the equality 
of BiH’s constituent nations within government-held territory began to slip. In an interview with The 
Times in February 1995, for example, Izetbegović commented that his aim was ‘to preserve Bosnia 
and to ensure that the Muslim people have their own place there,’ while in a speech to the Bosnian 
parliament at the end of the year, he proclaimed that ‘the Bosniak people were the backbone of the 
state.’168 
Despite the political turmoil, on the battlefield the ARBiH continued to develop into an organised, 
experienced, and increasingly confident force. The ceasefire orchestrated by former US President 
Jimmy Carter put the fighting on hold for the first four months of 1995, offering Delić an opportunity 
to make ‘organisational and formation changes’ and bolster the logistical support and training ARBiH 
troops received.169 In addition, the Staff of the Supreme Command, the highest body in the ARBiH, 
was reorganised along more conventional lines and renamed, becoming the General Staff of the 
Army. Prva linija reports that the reorganisation ‘aimed at strengthening the defence capabilities of 
the Army and increasing its efficiency,’ as well as improving leadership and command.170 Although 
strengthened, the ARBiH remained very limited in its operational capabilities due to shortages in 
arms and equipment. It still had ‘fewer weapons than people’ and, as an army with approximately 
250,000 troops, the ARBiH had only 31 tanks, 35 APCs, and a total of around 100 artillery pieces of 
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all sizes, compared to the VRS’s 370 tanks, 295 APCs, and 700 heavy artillery pieces.171 Furthermore, 
‘this haphazard collection of captured vehicles and weapons was a hodgepodge of varying calibres 
and types, and each gun crew knew its ammunition reserves had to last for the remainder of the 
war.’172  
The extent to which the ARBiH had evolved, in terms of its organisation and ambition, yet remained 
hindered in terms of its capabilities, is best illustrated by the attempt, in June 1995, to break the 
siege of Sarajevo. Misha Glenny suggests that in the months leading up to the operation, ‘a carefully 
planned campaign of disinformation’ was promulgated by the Bosnian government, in which many 
potential scenarios were disseminated into the public discourse to ensure the real campaign was a 
surprise.173 Furthermore, he notes that Sarajevo TV punctuated ‘lengthy explanations of passages 
from the Koran’ with ‘sequences romanticizing the preparations of the [ARBiH] for the spring 
offensive,’ further illustrating the growing fusion between the Islamic elements of the SDA’s ideology 
and the ARBiH itself.174 When the operation was finally launched, it was unprecedented in size, 
involving the coordination of 80,000 troops from four separate ARBiH Corps. Although it did achieve 
some successes, the effective defensive doctrine and well-prepared troops of the VRS stalled the 
attack with artillery and the rapid redeployment of mechanised units, followed by ‘the judicious 
commitment of elite infantry units at key moments to eliminate ARBiH territorial gains.’175 Even with 
its well-developed organisation and strategic planning, the ARBiH was unable to deal a significant 
blow to the VRS. 
It was not until September 1995, following the defeat of Republika Srpska Krajina by Croatia and the 
subsequent capture of a wealth of military equipment and supplies that ARBiH forces were able to 
pose a significant threat to the VRS. The deployment of significant firepower on the battlefield 
allowed the ARBiH V Corps to conduct manoeuvres unimaginable just months previously, resulting in 
considerable gains on the ground, as well as the capture of further substantial quantities of 
equipment and supplies. The II Corps was also able to widen the scope of its operations, organising 
its own captured artillery into division-level reserves, allowing for more coordination and offensive 
manouevres, and introducing “pursuit detachments” (Composed of tanks, APCs, light vehicles, and 
elite mobile infantry units) in order to allow operations ‘against the enemy’s rear in a manner never 
before possible and [afford] the II Corps a new degree of offensive depth.’176 Delić argues that by the 
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end of 1994 and throughout 1995, the military supremacy of the VRS had been reduced to the 
extent that the Bosnian Serb leadership and their sponsors in Belgrade had to consider negotiating 
peace. This was compounded, he notes, by the establishment of a military alliance between the 
ARBiH, the HVO, and the HV, the decline in morale of the VRS and the Bosnian Serb people, and the 
damage inflicted upon VRS logistical and communications infrastructure by NATO in August and 
September 1995.177 On 12 October 1995, another ceasefire was signed, heralding negotiations held 
in Dayton, Ohio, in November, and the formal signing of the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in BiH in Paris in December.178  
Conclusion 
The ARBiH became an effective army only in the last months of the war. From April 1992 until the 
end of 1993, the priority on the battlefield was simply to hold ground, as the political and military 
leadership of the Republic of BiH attempted to mobilise, arm, train, and supply an army. In 1994, 
with considerable numbers of troops organised, an appropriate doctrine introduced, and parts of 
the army developing the capability to conduct offensive operations, the ARBiH was no longer a rag-
tag militia of volunteers fighting in ‘jeans and trainers,’ but still significantly lagged behind both the 
VRS and the HVO in terms of operational capability. However, by 1995 the ARBiH was able to 
coordinate manoeuvres involving units from across the country, utilise more complex offensive 
tactics, and ultimately move beyond the static-defence operations that it had largely been limited to 
for most of the war. By the time the peace agreement was signed, the ARBiH was an organised army, 
with relatively high levels of discipline, experience, and morale. Furthermore, it had developed a 
strategy, a doctrine, and tactics which allowed it to attain victory on the battlefield. It had evolved 
from a loose organisation of disparate armed groups into a force recognisable as a military. Despite 
these developments, throughout the course of the war it was unable to properly equip, train, and 
provide professional officers to its soldiers, and many of its victories on the battlefield owed much to 
the efforts of the HV, NATO airstrikes, and the subsequent decline of VRS morale. The extent to 
which the ARBiH remained limited in the final months of the war is illustrated by Minter, who notes 
that even in the final months of 1995, ARBiH units were ‘very local forces and [were] dependent on 
local personalities and leadership.’179 Its troops were ‘not soldiers at all but people given a uniform 
and a gun. I was not aware of any training, certainly not above individual level.’180 Delić concludes his 
account of the conflict with a frank assessment of the ARBiH's capabilities at the end of the war: 
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The ARBiH was in a condition to continue waging the war of liberation of BiH, if it had been 
supported by the international community and if it continued with joint operations with the 
Croatian Army and the HVO. Without such support, the ARBiH could not continue the war.181  
As Delić concedes, although the ARBiH had grown and matured as a military, the support of the 
HVO, and more importantly, the HV, was vital. At the beginning of the conflict, the HVO was 
relatively well-organised and armed, and as a result was successful in its defence of the territory 
claimed by HB. Despite ostensibly being a Bosnian Croat organisation, it was financed by Zagreb and 
‘during the entire Bosnian war — but especially during the first several months — the HVO’s chain of 
command, both political and military, [ran] all the way back to Tudjman’s desk in Zagreb.’182 
Furthermore, for many of their most significant engagements, HVO units were deployed alongside 
HV troops, and were subject to command by HV officers. By 1995, the HVO had developed into a 
force designed specifically to augment the HV, to the extent that it was entirely reliant on Croatia to 
safeguard the territorial claims of the HB. Under the framework of the Washington Agreement, the 
HVO was formally allied with the ARBiH, however it remained to all intents and purposes an 
expeditionary force of the HV stationed in BiH. This ambiguity would be the cause of much 
consternation in future. For the months either side of Dayton, it allowed the HVO to serve as the 
crux of the ARBiH-HVO-HV alliance which threatened the VRS with defeat.  
This alliance survived and recovered from countless VRS offensives and, by doing so, successfully 
removed the possibility of Mladić attaining a military victory and ending the conflict on his terms. 
Combined with mounting international pressure on the architects of the Greater Serbia project, 
manifested most significantly by NATO’s bombing campaigns, this forced Milošević to the 
negotiating table. Given the position of the ARBiH and HVO in 1992, this was a considerable 
achievement. However, while this did constitute a victory of sorts, the democratic aspirations that 
the Bosnian government had established as its aims at the beginning of the war had not triumphed. 
Although efforts were initially made to create the constitutional and institutional framework for an 
inclusive and democratically accountable military to develop, particularly in Tuzla, all progress in this 
direction was subverted by the SDA's gradual consolidation of control over both the civil and military 
facets of the Bosnian state. The SDA succeeded in removing any meaningful opposition, either 
through moving the portfolios of obstructionist ministers to the Presidency, or by replacing them 
outright with SDA members. Furthermore, Izetbegović slowly gathered more and more authority 
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over military affairs, first through bypassing the conventional chain of command, then by replacing 
non-SDA approved officers, and finally by investing full authority over the ARBiH in himself.  
Thus, by the time the Dayton Agreement was signed in December 1995, power in all areas held by 
the ARBiH was in the hands of the SDA. As a result, the relationship between the state and the 
military (although both were diminished in size and diversity) had essentially reverted to what it had 
been during the socialist period: both were dominated by the same political party, making any 
formal separation between them purely symbolic. Indeed, as Hoare argues, ‘the Bosniak national 
interest was identified solely with the president, the ruling party and the army, in consequence of 
which these three institutions became increasingly fused.’183 In a speech to a large crowd in the 
Bilino Polje Stadium in Zenica in April 1996, Izetbegović stated: ‘Without the SDA Bosnia would 
either be a province of Greater Serbia today, or it would have been destroyed.’184 This statement 
underlines the extent to which the ARBiH and the remaining structures of the Bosnian state had 
become subordinated to the SDA, which for all intents and purposes had simply replaced the 
Communist Party as the source of authority within both the government and the military, and across 
government-held territory as a whole.   
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Chapter Six: The Entity Armies, 1995 – 2002 
 
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), formally signed on 14 December 1995, brought peace to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Bosne i Hercegovine, BiH) after more than three and a half years of brutal conflict. 
Approximately one hundred thousand people died as a result of the war, more than half of the 
population were forced from their homes, and much of the country’s infrastructure was destroyed. 
In addition, well over 200,000 troops (some estimates suggest as many as 400,000 – 430,000 
including reservists) remained armed and ready to continue fighting.1 Furthermore, the institutions 
and structures of the young state which would have to build and maintain the peace were largely 
untested, their only experience of state-wide multiethnic governance being the months leading up 
to the outbreak of war. 
Faced with the herculean task of trying to establish a lasting peace from such an unpromising 
situation, in addition to ending the conflict, the DPA also laid the institutional foundations of the 
Bosnian state. Annexes were included on elections, refugees and displaced persons, the preservation 
of national monuments, policing, and the constitution.2 Furthermore, the integral role that the 
international community would play in BiH was enshrined, and 60,000 NATO troops were mandated 
to enter the country to ‘assist in the implementation of the territorial and other militarily related 
provisions of the agreement.’3 However, despite the considerable detail given to certain aspects of 
the future of BiH in the DPA, the fate of the armies that had fought in the war was almost entirely 
unaddressed and remained uncertain. Indeed, Richard Holbrooke, a US diplomat who was the 
driving force behind the negotiations at Dayton, later lamented that ‘the most serious flaw in the 
DPA was that it left two opposing armies in one country, one for the Serbs and one for the Croat-
Muslim Federation.’4 
On the ground, the military commanders of all three sides faced myriad challenges. Initially, they 
had to ensure the armies they commanded abided by the terms of the peace agreement, begin 
demobilising the considerable numbers of troops they led, and find the means to financially and 
logistically support whatever size force they deemed necessary in case of a return to war. Although 
such tasks were to some extent completed within a few years, they remained pervasive and 
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contentious issues throughout the period. Furthermore, the Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska 
Republike Srpske, VRS) continued to be a vital tool for the Bosnian Serb political leadership to 
consolidate their authority in peacetime, and the Bosnian Muslim and Croat components of the 
Army of the Federation (Vojska federacije, VF) proved equally valuable to their respective ethnic 
leaders. This led to increased tension in the already problematic civil-military relationships which the 
armies, all of which had never experienced peace, had with their civilian commanders. The VF was 
also issued with the complex task of undergoing a transformation from the model and doctrine it 
had inherited from the Territorial Defence (Teritorijalna odbrana, TO) force of the socialist era to a 
method of structure and organisation favoured in democratic countries. The presence of 
international observers, external efforts to strengthen the Bosnian state, and the hunt to capture 
indicted war crimes suspects, many of whom were prominent military commanders, all served to 
add additional layers of complexity to the security sector in post-Dayton BiH. 
This chapter outlines the key constitutional, diplomatic, and regional developments relevant to 
military affairs in the period 1995 – 2002 and offers an assessment of how the two armies which 
formally existed in BiH after the war, the VF and VRS, navigated this complex political environment. 
Reforms in the security sector of both entities are analysed alongside those in other state 
institutions, illustrating a process which often ran counter to efforts to consolidate the Bosnian 
state. The instability caused by the presence of multiple armed forces within a single state, 
particularly one so mired by conflict, is evaluated, as are the efforts of political elites to utilise the 
military to consolidate their own bases of power. Considerable attention is also given to the role and 
influence of regional developments and the international community. Together, this forms a detailed 
account of the military situation in post-Dayton BiH, and illustrates how the VF and VRS, already 
divided by the legacy of war, diverged even further and posed a consistent threat to the stability of 
BiH.   
Three Armies in One State: The Dayton Peace Agreement 
The DPA divided BiH into two entities, the term given to the semi-autonomous devolved 
administrations which each governed approximately half of the country. Republika Srpska (RS) 
covers 49 percent of the territory of BiH. Its population is almost wholly Serb, and the entity is 
governed by a centralised government. Constituting 51 percent of the territory of BiH, the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, FBiH) is composed of ten 
cantons, to which many powers are devolved. Six are majority Bosnian Muslim, two are majority 
Bosnian Croat, and two are mixed. Although many people eventually returned to homes outside 
their respective ethnic enclaves, governance of the entities remains the preserve of the dominant 
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ethnic group. In addition, there is one small ‘shared’ district, Brčko.5 Brčko owes its unique status to 
its strategically vital location. It is the sole non-FBiH link between the two halves of RS, and also 
provides access to the rest of the FBiH for the Posavina Canton, which otherwise is encircled by RS 
and Croatia. 
At the national level, BiH is governed by a bicameral Parliament composed of a House of 
Representatives (comprised of 28 members from the Federation and 14 from Republika Srpska) and 
a House of Peoples (comprised of five Bosnian Muslims, five Croats and five Serbs). Executive power 
is held by a three-member Presidency, composed of a Bosnian Muslim, a Croat, and a Serb.6 
Overseeing all elements of political activity is the Office of the High Representative (OHR), an 
organisation which represents the international community, in the form of the Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC).7 The High Representative leads the OHR and has the responsibility to 
monitor the implementation of the peace settlement, coordinate with the signatories of the DPA, 
and report back to the PIC.8 In 1997, at a PIC conference in Bonn, the powers of the High 
Representative were extended, giving them the authority ‘to remove from office public officials who 
violate legal commitments and the Dayton Peace Agreement, and to impose laws as he sees fit if 
[BiH]’s legislative bodies fail to do so.’9 These responsibilities have since been referred to as the 
“Bonn Powers.” 
Governance in BiH has, for the most part, remained restricted to the collection of nationalist parties 
which came to prominence in the 1990 elections and retained their positions throughout the war. 
The Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA), which positioned itself as the 
protector of Bosnian Muslims, generally favoured strengthening the central state at the expense of 
the entities, not least because they would likely form the largest party in parliament. The Croatian 
Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) remained close to its sister party in 
Croatia, and sought to maximise Bosnian Croat autonomy, with little regard for the FBiH or BiH itself. 
The Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS), which had led RS through the war, 
managed to retain its position initially, but lost ground to other parties from 1997.10 All parties which 
governed RS in the period, however, remained firmly committed to their entity’s autonomy and 
were willing to threaten secession from BiH. Together, these parties filled seats on power-sharing 
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councils and formed uneasy coalitions, which generally achieved little, for most of the 1995 – 2002 
period.  
The establishment of such structures of governance and the arrival of the largest peacetime 
deployment of military force since post-Second World War Germany led to the rapid de-escalation 
of the military situation in BiH. According to the World Bank, within four months of the DPA, 100,000 
soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i 
Hercegovine, ARBiH, the predominantly Bosnian Muslim army), 45,000 Croatian Defence Council 
(Hrvatsko vijeće odbrane, HVO) troops, and an additional 150,000 from the VRS had left their units.11 
Tobias Pietz notes that ‘it is not accurate to talk of demobilisation or controlled reduction but rather 
of the disintegration of the armed forces of all groups.’12  
Greatly reduced in size, and in many cases less professional, what remained of the armies in BiH 
were composed of the core staff of each military and a fraction of the operational forces they 
commanded during the war. The practice of conscription, a legacy of the socialist period as well as of 
the war, continued in all three armies, providing a ready supply of cheap troops to fill the ranks and 
allowed reserve numbers to be kept high. Furthermore, military service offered civilian and military 
leaders the opportunity to use their militaries as a school with which they could attempt to embed 
approved values and beliefs in the youth of their respective ethnic groups.13 Rohan Maxwell, the  
Senior Political-Military nalyst at NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, notes that conscription was regarded 
as a ‘rite of passage,’ which ‘remained important – to the leadership and politicians, if not the 
increasingly disenchanted, unpaid, and maltreated conscripts – and each ethnic group of soldiers 
saw itself, and was generally seen, as protectors of its constituent people.’14 
The continued presence of multiple opposing armies in post-Dayton BiH was not a product of design. 
Holbrooke notes that ‘since NATO would not disarm the parties as an obligated task, creating a 
single army or disarming [BiH] was not possible.’15 Carl Bildt, the EU’s wartime negotiator, contends 
that rather than NATO’s timidity, it was the desire of Washington to be able to exert influence on 
and offer assistance to the armies in BiH that resulted in the DPA’s vagueness concerning the 
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military.16 While there was clearly plenty of political manoeuvring at Dayton, the constitution that 
was eventually negotiated recognised, but did not enshrine, the presence of entity armies:   
Neither Entity shall threaten or use force against the other Entity, and under no 
circumstances shall any armed forces of either Entity enter into or stay within the 
territory of the other Entity without the consent of the government of the latter and 
of the Presidency of [BiH]. All armed forces in [BiH] shall operate consistently with the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of [BiH].17  
The armed forces were obliged to defend and preserve the territorial integrity of BiH but were also 
restricted to their respective entities. The omission of any further detail regarding the status of the 
militaries in the constitution put them, by default, under the control of the entities, as ‘all 
governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned in this Constitution to the institutions of 
[BiH] shall be those of the Entities.’18 Additional negotiations regarding the finalisation of two 
military articles of the DPA were held in 1996 in Florence and Vienna, but concerned arms control, 
de-escalation, and the promotion of cooperation between the entity armies.19 Such initiatives were 
largely successful, but did little to address many underlying problems, as the commander of the US 
contingent of the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR), Major General William Nash, observes: 
All four armies have done their job pretty well in achieving the objectives set out in Annex 1-
A of the Dayton Accord. But I don’t know if the military aspects bring peace as much as bring 
the absence of war.20 
As a result, the FBiH formed its own Ministry of Defence and General Staff, and the RS retained the 
military institutions it had built during the war. Furthermore, the RS constitution was amended in 
order to reserve the right of the Bosnian Serb national assembly to declare war.21 Coordination at 
the national level with regard to defence was limited to the Standing Committee on Military Matters 
(SCMM), which held no power and merely served to provide what has been described as a ‘tenuous 
link between the three militaries.’22 Indeed, the SCMM failed to meet until 1998, and even then was 
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periodically boycotted by all parties involved.23 NATO, burdened as it was with enforcing the 
ceasefire, controlling BiH’s airspace, and supervising the boundaries between the entities, was 
reluctant to disarm the armies in the years immediately after conflict. The recent US experience in 
Somalia no doubt informed the decision to prioritise caution and avoid the ubiquitous “mission 
creep.” As a result, even paramilitary units were left armed until August 1997.24 The absolute priority 
of the peacekeepers was to stop the war from restarting. In the first years after Dayton, this entailed 
practical measures rather than reforming policy, as a US IFOR Engineer explains: ‘We’ve blown up 
two thousand bunkers, that’s a lot of bunkers. . . We’re going to make it so it’s hard for these guys to 
go back to war.’25 When coupled with the ambiguity of the DPA with regard to the armies in Bosnia, 
this situation offered each entity plenty of scope to possess and develop its own armed force. 
The Army of the Federation 
The VF constitutes one of the two entity armies that existed in Bosnia after Dayton. It was the 
product of the March 1994 Washington Agreement, which brought an end to the conflict between 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats in parts of BiH, forged a military alliance between them, and laid the 
foundations for what, upon the signing of the DPA, became the FBiH.26 While this served to 
strengthen both the ARBiH and the HVO in their struggle against the VRS, it also led to the ethnic 
homogenisation of each force. Due to the localised nature of much of the fighting, in many cases 
whichever ethnicity was dominant in an area led the defence against the VRS and the minority 
ethnicity would serve under the other’s banner. As a result, many HVO units were up to 50 percent 
Bosnian Muslim, and a significant proportion of the ARBiH was Bosnian Croat and Serb.27 When 
conflict broke out between the ARBiH and HVO in Herzegovina and Central Bosnia in October 1992, 
this practice quickly stopped in those areas, although in some places, such as Sarajevo, the instability 
led to the forced incorporation of semi-autonomous Bosnian Croat units into the ARBiH. 28 After the 
Washington Agreement, however, both armed forces became increasingly mono-ethnic as troops 
were ushered into formations representing their ethnic identity. By the end of the war, although 
they were officially unified by Article 6 of the Washington Agreement, which stated that ‘both sides 
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agree to the establishment of a unified military command of the military of the Federation,’ the 
ARBiH and HVO existed as separate, mono-ethnic institutions. 29 
The rhetoric of political and military leaders in the years after Dayton illustrates the extent to which 
they disregarded the VF, and instead focused on consolidating their ethnically demarcated political 
constituencies. Indeed, Herceg-Bosna, the Bosnian Croat state, was not formally dissolved until 
August 1996, and was replaced with a political association the following year.30 At an SDA 
convention in 1997, Alija Izetbegović, the Bosnian Muslim member of the Presidency, stated that 
there was:  
No turning back to a colourless, non-national Bosnia. After becoming aware of itself and its 
name and after the unmeasurable sufferings it has gone through, the Bosniaks will never 
again give up their nationality and Islam as its component.31  
Speaking at another convention in March 2000, he proclaimed that the SDA had been the organiser 
and leading power of the resistance to Serb aggression, and had fought ‘for the political and spiritual 
survival of Bosnia and the Bosniak people.’32 Such statements contrast with many speeches he gave 
during the conflict itself, when he often emphasised inclusiveness, but were echoed by ARBiH 
military commanders. At a ceremony held in Zenica on [ARBiH] Army Day (April 15) in 1996, 
Brigadier-General Vahid Karavelić reminded the gathered troops and civilians that: ‘We defended 
the Bosniak people… The ARBiH grew from our people, and remember, from now, as long as this 
world exists, we are the Army of our people. Our foundations are our faith, our fallen heroes, and 
our injured.’33 At another Army Day event the following year, Rasim Delić, the wartime commander 
of the ARBiH, asked the audience to ‘be firm in the commitment to the survival of the whole of 
Bosnia and... the Bosniak people, our culture, traditions and faith in this region. . . we all have to be 
the army.’34 From such statements it is clear that for most Bosnian Muslim political and military 
leaders, the ARBiH, the SDA, and the Bosniak people were institutions that had been intertwined 
during the war, and continued to be so after Dayton, even though the ARBiH did not formally exist in 
post-Dayton BiH.35   
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The legacy of conflict between the two component parts of the VF was reflected in its structure and 
development. Most prominent was the continued segregation of the lower ranks on the basis of 
ethnic identity. As a result, the approximately 18,000 Bosnian Muslims and 6,000 Bosnian Croats 
who made up the army only served together for ceremonial purposes, at VF Headquarters, or in the 
Rapid Reaction Force, which was composed of a battalion from each ethnicity.36 A 2005 NATO report 
reflected on the presence of parallelism in the VF, and illuminates the extent to which it was, in 
practice, two separate armies. It notes that property and equipment seized by the ARBiH and HVO 
during the war was held separately, each component maintained their own separate logistics and 
support processes, and despite a Federation Intelligence Service being established in 1997, work 
within it was divided. Furthermore, veterans' affairs and wartime archives were not consolidated, 
and both the ARBiH and HVO kept their own bank accounts, with the joint Federation account being 
all but empty.37 Further division can be identified from the sources of VF funding. A 1998 report from 
the International Crisis Group concluded that the Bosnian Muslim element was largely financed 
domestically, although 40% of funds came from Arab states in the Gulf. The Bosnian Croat element, 
however, was financed entirely from abroad, with 83% of its funds coming from Croatia and much of 
the rest coming from the diaspora.38 This situation led some observers to claim that the Croat forces 
constituted a ‘foreign force,’ and thus were in contravention of the DPA.39  
The extent to which the VF remained a deeply divided institution is illustrated by events that took 
place in 2001. The November 2000 elections, in which the HDZ lost ground to a ten party coalition, 
initiated a tumultuous year in Bosnian Croat politics which culminated with the withdrawal of the 
HDZ from the institutions of the FBiH and an attempt to establish Croat self-rule in Herzegovina.40 
HDZ leaders requested that Croats in the VF refuse orders from non-Croats, meetings were held 
between Croat officers and the wartime HVO leadership to discuss forming a new army, and 
numerous Croat soldiers removed the Federation insignia from their uniforms. This campaign was 
mostly financed by funds held by the Hercegovačka Bank (subject to one of the largest corruption 
scandals in post-Dayton BiH), some of which were used to pay Croat VF officers if they left their 
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posts.41 Crisis was only averted following an international investigation into the dealings of 
Hercegovačka Bank, the intervention of the Croatian Foreign Ministry, which pledged its support for 
the state and entity institutions of Bosnia, and the appointment of a new Defence Minister. Despite 
this, General Dragan Ćurčić, Deputy Commander of the VF (and the highest-ranking Croat), resigned, 
citing his desire to remain loyal to the Croat people.42 Whilst the VF remained intact until the 
creation of a unified Bosnian military, it is apparent that it was an army only in name.   
Whilst structurally the VF can be considered fragile, it had significant resources at its disposal. A 
combined 1998 budget of over 400 million Deutschmarks dwarfed the 70 million the VRS received. 
Much of this was spent on maintaining an army more than twice the size of its former adversary, as 
well as a considerable pool of reservists. However, a significant focus was placed on modernisation.43 
An American Military Consulting Firm, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), had 
earned itself a reputation in the region after it had helped professionalise the Croatian Army 
(Hrvatska vojska, HV) prior to Operation Storm. While MPRI was nominally in Croatia to train 
Croatian officers in democratic civil-military relations and managing the transition from socialism, 
the HV rapidly became a highly capable force, and was soon able to launch complex military 
offensives. When Operation Storm was launched in August 1995, the offensive defeated the Serb 
state in Croatia, Republika Srpska Krajina, in a week and brought HV, HVO, and ARBiH troops to 
within 16 miles of the largest Bosnian Serb-held city, Banja Luka. Paul Williams, who served as a legal 
counsel to the Bosnian delegation at Dayton, reported that at the accords his clients sought similar 
assistance, hoping to make it a precondition to the signing of the treaty.44 British and French 
concerns that arming the Bosnian Muslims could lead to a return to war prevented such provisions 
being included, but the Bosnian Muslim delegation received verbal assurances from their US 
counterparts that assistance would be provided in future.45 These assurances were quick to manifest 
themselves, and in May 1996 MPRI officially began working with the VF under the Train and Equip 
Programme.46 The US State Department established the Joint Interagency Taskforce for Military 
Stabilisation of the Balkans to administer the programme, and US Ambassador James Pardew led the 
initiative.47 He described its aims frankly:  
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We do not seek an offensive force, but in the future if somebody wants a fight it will 
be more than fair. This war had an aggressor, and it had a victim. The program [seeks] 
to ensure that there will be no future victims and no easy prey for partisans of war.48  
The journal of the VF, Prva linija (Frontline), heralded Train and Equip with the headline ‘The 
Professionals Come!’49 It explained that the Programme ‘creates conditions to enhance the 
combat power and efficiency of our units, and in this way modern weapons, professionalism 
and expertise compensate for the significantly reduced and limited numerical strength of our 
units.’50  
Through Train and Equip, the VF acquired an array of small arms, hundreds of artillery pieces, 
armoured vehicles, tanks, and even a squadron of helicopters, with almost all of the new 
equipment being of American or French origin.51 MPRI oversaw the establishment of the 
Federation Ministry of Defence and Joint Command, which were respectively completed in 
1997 and 2001. They also introduced the US Army concept of a Training and Doctrine 
Command, and began using modern training methods used in the US military, including a 
computer simulation centre and a field combat training centre.52 Such was the transformation 
of the VF that conscripts are said to have translated and learnt US Army chants for use on 
exercises.53 Chris Lamb, of the US Department of Defense, regarded the Train and Equip 
Programme as successful, and noted that it ‘rectified the military imbalance between Bosnian 
Serb and Federation forces, reassuring the Federation and sobering the Serbs.’54 Recognising 
the advantages Train and Equip offered, RS President Biljana Plavšić requested the 
programme be extended to the VRS. However, her unwillingness to hand over all remaining 
persons indicted for war crimes to international authorities led the US to dismiss her 
request.55 As a result, Bosnian Serb commentators such as former VRS General Vinko 
Pandurević argued that as ‘RS is unable to allocate more extensive financial resources for the 
development and modernisation of its military’ the Train and Equip Programme could 
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‘significantly disturb the balance of military forces and encourage the FBiH to launch a new 
offensive against RS.’56 
In 2002, 10,000 VF soldiers were demobilised, completing a series of troop reductions that began 
with Dayton, leaving the VF with a standing force of 14,000 men. However, the quantitative shortfall 
was more than offset by modern equipment and a greater quality of training and education, most of 
which was offered by friendly states and brought the troops up to NATO standard.57 By January 
1998, 1,500 VF personnel had received education and training abroad, most significantly in Turkey, 
and another 500 were being trained as far afield as the USA, Malaysia, Qatar, and Pakistan.58 Schools 
were established for personnel to learn foreign languages, predominantly English, German and 
Turkish, and new accommodation was also built, with the aim of creating ‘quality living and work 
conditions.’59 The rapid transformation of the VF, with the assistance of MPRI and friendly states, 
established a modern professional army in the FBiH, and represented a significant shift from the 
armed forces that had fought in the war. The developments were welcomed by Prva linija as they 
promised ‘training to world standards’ and the creation of ‘armed forces for the 21st Century.’60 
However, despite professionalisation and modernisation, the VF failed to integrate its Bosnian Croat 
and Bosnian Muslim composite elements at any level below that of the most senior leadership 
throughout the period. 
The Army of Republika Srpska 
Just weeks after the DPA was signed, the talismanic leader of the Bosnian Serb military, General 
Ratko Mladić, published a Christmas and New Year’s message in Srpska vojska, the journal of the 
VRS. In it he lauded the exploits of his army, stating: ‘The VRS, in the defensive and liberation war 
that was imposed on us, in exceptionally difficult conditions, unrivalled in the history of warfare, 
against a many times stronger and more powerful enemy and the most powerful part of the 
international community, defended the Serb people and most of the territory.’61 He remained 
bellicose as well, reminding his readers that ‘the signing of the [DPA] created the conditions. . . for 
the ongoing struggle of the Serb people for their own sovereignty, statehood, and cultural, spiritual, 
and general development to continue in the diplomatic, political, economic, and other spheres of life 
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in peace.’62 Foreseeing ‘numerous and complex tasks in the coming years,’ he also outlined his vision 
for the VRS after the war, declaring that ‘the entire Serb people will be the builders of a happier 
future, but also a strong and invincible army to guarantee their survival in this region.’63 His message 
ended with a stern reflection on the sacrifices that had been made: ‘We must never forget that our 
freedom was paid for with the lives of the best sons of the Serb people. Their sacrifice permanently 
obliges us to preserve the freedom and peace of the Serb people and all citizens in [RS].’64 Through 
such statements, Mladić clearly conveys a simple message: That although the war had stopped, the 
fight continued, and the VRS remained central to success.  
Despite Mladić's sabre-rattling rhetoric, however, the VRS faced an array of monumentous 
challenges in the years following the war, the most pressing of which was addressing the dismal 
relationship it had with the entity it served. In August 1995, the entire high command had rubuked 
the orders of their constitutional leader, RS President Radovan Karadžić, in favour of Mladić. This 
amounted to mutiny and provided President of Serbia Slobodan Milošević the pretext he needed to 
act on behalf of the divided Bosnian Serb leaders in the final months of the war. By bringing peace to 
BiH, the DPA reduced Milošević's authority over the Bosnian Serb leadership, but did little to narrow 
the gulf between the civilian and military commanders of RS. The extent to which the VRS remained 
independent of civilian control is best illustrated by the words of the RS Minister of Defence (1994 – 
1998), Milan Ninković: ‘At the time of Dayton I piloted a law through the assembly to increase 
civilian control of the military, and Mladić didn't like that. He arrested me. I thought I was going to 
be executed. I was released because Patriarch Pavle, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
intervened.’65 While it is possible to speculate that Patriarch Pavle’s intervention may have taken 
place at the behest of Milošević, indicating his ongoing influence in BiH, the arrest of the Minister of 
Defence by the military was the second clear act of mutiny which the VRS committed in the interest 
of strengthening Mladić’s authority at the expense of their civilian commanders and the 
constitutional integrity of RS.  
Before tensions could escalate much further, however, the hunt for Mladić on behalf of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which had indicted both him and 
Karadžić after the massacre of c.8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica in July 1995, 
began to have an impact on the Bosnian Serb leadership. Although he technically remained in 
command of the VRS until the end of 1996, Mladić largely retired from public life to the shelter of a 
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bunker disguised as a hunting lodge near Han Pijesak, his wartime headquarters.66 He is believed to 
have remained in the bunker until the summer of 1997, when he moved to Serbia.67 In July 1996, 
Karadžić was ordered to step down as RS President and head of the ruling SDS by Milošević, who 
feared renewed sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Savezna Republika Jugoslavia, 
SRJ).68 While both men remained influential, Mladić from his bunker and Karadžić in his East Bosnian 
stronghold of Pale, their future as the leaders of the military and civil facets of RS was over. 
Holbrooke, who negotiated Karadžić’s removal, made this clear: ‘He [Karadžić] will not appear in 
public, or on radio or television or other media or participate in any way in the elections,’ which 
were scheduled for September.69   
Karadžić’s chosen successor was one of his wartime deputies, Biljana Plavšić. She served as interim 
leader until elections were held, and successfully secured a two-year term as RS President. Plavšić 
was known for her extreme views, having been an active supporter of the ethnic cleansing 
campaigns of Serb paramilitaries and having stated during the war that 5 million dead Serbs was a 
price worth paying if it secured ‘the survival and freedom of the other 5 million.’70 Indeed, even 
Vojslav Šešelj, a notorious war criminal, described how she ‘held very extremist positions during the 
war, insufferably extremist, even for me, and they bothered me as a declared Serb nationalist.’ He 
noted that she refused to shake hands with Milošević after he agreed to the Vance-Owen Plan in 
1993.71 In November, she moved to do what Karadžić had failed to do 14 months previously, and 
asserted constitutional authority over the military. Manojlo Milovanović, Mladić’s deputy 
throughout the war, recalls that on 7 November 1996:  
The complete Headquarters [of the VRS] was removed by the order of the President of RS, 
Ms. Biljana Plavšić, after 1,697 days of existence. Some senior officers were reassigned to 
other duties, part of them retired, and several generals were made available to the VRS or 
the [SRJ] military. The Headquarters, as an institution, was renamed the General Staff, and 
was led by retired colonel Pero Čolić.72 
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Whereas Mladić had been unanimously supported by the military leadership in August 1995, this 
time around he was not even present to protest. Plavšić and Čolić would remain in their positions 
until the following elections in 1998. Although they achieved little else, their actions lessened the 
divide between the VRS and the other state institutions of RS. 
Throughout the Bosnian War, the VRS was dependent on the significant support of the SRJ. This link 
with Belgrade would remain central to the VRS as an entity army, with observers describing it as ‘an 
integral part of the Yugoslav Army.’73 In 1998, 40 percent of VRS funding came directly from the SRJ, 
and until 2002 its officers’ wages were still being paid from Belgrade.74 The continued reliance on 
Yugoslav support following Dayton can be explained as much by necessity as by fraternal bonds. By 
the end of the war the VRS was on the verge of defeat, with some estimates suggesting its 
operational force was as small as 30,000 troops.75 Much of the equipment it had inherited from the 
JNA had served its purpose in a war against armies without heavy weapons but had since become 
obsolete. For example, the main tank used by the VRS in the war, the T-55, was originally designed in 
1945 and stood little chance against the M60 Pattons received by the VF through Train and Equip: 
the Pattons were a modernised model of a tank specifically built to destroy T-55s. Problems with 
outmoded equipment were compounded by a chronic shortage of spare parts, which meant that 
almost all of the VRS's equipment was difficult to maintain. Moreover, it had reportedly depleted 
most of its ammunition reserves in the war.76 RS was, however, able to retain a small air force, 
including 30 fixed-wing light attack jets and 12 helicopters which were kept stored in hangars near 
Banja Luka and Zalužani.77 Although the equipment was dated, the VF had no fixed-wing capability 
whatsoever, offering the VRS a noteworthy advantage in that field.  
The total budget of the VRS in 1998 was 70 million Deutschmarks, half of what the Bosnian Croats 
received, and a fraction of the total VF budget.78 As a result, the VRS was limited to a comparatively 
small force of 10,000 men, although the Total Defence system inherited from Yugoslavia was 
maintained, allowing for the rapid mobilisation of reserve troops.79 Little was done to improve the 
quality of training offered to VRS personnel, although senior officers began to attend training 
seminars in Oberammergau, Germany, alongside their VF counterparts, in 1998.80 The food and 
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accommodation offered to VRS conscripts deteriorated in quality over time, and no official arms 
imports were made by RS between Dayton and military unification.81 Whilst equipment may have 
been sourced covertly from the SRJ, this material would have been compromised by the same 
problems as the VRS's existing reserves. As Rohan Maxwell, the Senior Political-Military Analyst at 
NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, explained: ‘The RS Army had not moved, they were still on the old 
system, and quite proud of it . . . although maybe the VRS would have recognised that they were 
probably outgunned by the stuff that had been given to the Federation.’82 An interview conducted 
by Srpska vojska with Plavšić offers insight into the condition of the VRS. Discussing the reduction of 
personnel, she observed:  
Of course, the reorganisation should have been followed with a much stronger 
material base than was the case… As far as I know, people in the General Staff and in 
the Army in general are performing to the level of their capabilities. However, much of 
it depends on material assets.83  
In 2003, the VRS demobilised an additional 3,500 soldiers, leaving them with a standing force of only 
6,500 men, less than half the strength of the VF.84 By the time the reform process began, a 
significant discrepancy in the relative military capability of each entity had developed, with the VF 
being twice the size of the VRS, possessing superior equipment, and receiving better training.    
The VRS did, however, retain significant symbolic value, offering RS considerable power and ‘one of 
the trappings of national sovereignty.’85 A 1996 article in Srpska vojska underlined its importance, 
stating: ‘All those on whom further building of the Army depends must know that it still remains the 
only guarantee to the Serb people, for a peaceful life and development of RS.’86 Plavšić emphasised 
the link between the VRS and RS’s aspirations for statehood: ‘A Yugoslav soldier did not know what 
he was fighting for, whereas a Serb soldier knows that he is fighting for his Serb state. By keeping 
such an attitude, we will have both our state and our future.’87  
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May 12 is celebrated as VRS Day, and commemorations have focused on the role of the army in the 
founding of RS.88 In May 1997, the editors of Srpska vojska remarked: ‘In a little over four years of 
war thousands of fighters fell, giving their lives for what we have today - and that is Republika 
Srpska.’89 The following year, the publication ran the headline: ‘The Army is the pillar of unity of RS.’ 
This invoked the words of Plavšić at a ceremony held in Banja Luka: ‘May remembering the victims 
be a measure of our love for RS.’ She continued:  
In peacetime, it is the VRS’ task, as well as its obligation as the creator of this Serb 
country, to use its authority, professionalism and proven patriotism, to be a pillar of 
our society inside, and a barrier to the outside, if needed.90  
In comparison with the VF, the VRS developed very little as an entity army. Whilst this can be 
explained in part because of its formation, originating as it did from the well-equipped and 
professional Yugoslav army, much of this stagnation can be attributed to a severe lack of funds and 
resources. However, where the VF symbolised little more than an alliance of necessity between its 
composite elements, the VRS was heralded as the founder, unifying focus, and guarantor of the Serb 
entity in BiH. RS gave the VRS a state to serve as Yugoslavia collapsed. In return, the VRS fought to 
establish RS. For many Bosnian Serbs, the survival of one was intertwined with the other.  
Military Integration: An unlikely prospect? 
An examination of the development of the entity armies has revealed the complexity of the security 
environment in post-Dayton BiH. The divergent paths of development not only symbolised the 
ongoing division within BiH, but also raised extensive practical challenges to integration. Concerns 
regarding the development of the entity armies were raised by the PIC in 1998:  
The Council is concerned at the increasing divergence in doctrine and training 
between the Entity Armed Forces, and urges the development during 1999 of plans 
for a training and development programme common to all the armed forces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.91 
The inability of the VF to address the legacy of conflict between its composite elements and 
integrate them at a meaningful level offered an indication of the difficulties that would face any 
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efforts to unify the armed forces in BiH. The PIC described the integration efforts in the VF as 
‘superficial and inadequate’ and further noted that efforts to implement confidence and security 
building measures had been delayed, resulting in ‘a lack of real progress towards improving the level 
of co-operation and confidence between the Entity Armed Forces (and within the Federation 
army).’92 David Lightburn, a NATO analyst, observes that ‘de facto, however, there were, and remain 
(in 2000), three armies, since the Croat and Bosniac forces have not been integrated either in 
structure or in practice, and cooperation between the two is minimal and superficial.’93 
The extent of external sponsorship of all armed forces in BiH following Dayton exacerbated the 
practical difficulties facing integration efforts, raised concerns regarding legitimacy and jurisdiction, 
and presented a direct threat to the viability of the Bosnian state. The PIC also voiced its concern 
regarding this matter: ‘The Council requires immediate and full transparency in all aspects of 
external support to military forces . . . all such external support should promote integration and 
cooperation among and between all elements of the armed forces.’94 The problems in the defence 
sector were apparent to international observers, and the PIC itself identified ‘the instability that is 
inherent in having two – and in practice three – armies present in one country.’ 95 However little 
progress was made in addressing this. This can in part be explained by the omission of many 
specifics regarding defence in the DPA, and the initial focus on de-escalation and reconstruction 
following the war. However, reform across almost every sector of post-Dayton BiH society was 
difficult.  
A report to the US House of Representatives illustrates the frustration faced by those wishing to 
establish a functioning state: ‘Bosnian leaders from all three ethnic groups have not made a 
concerted effort to curb corruption and have often acted to obstruct the reform process in 
general.’96 It was in the face of such corruption and obstructionism that the Bonn Powers were 
introduced. Initially, the powers were used to establish basic aspects of the state, such as 
promulgating a Law on Citizenship, and introducing a passport, flag, currency, national anthem, coat 
of arms, and a common licence plate for vehicles, none of which could be agreed upon by BiH 
politicians.97 The continued failure to build a political consensus within the country over time, 
however, led to powers being increasingly utilised to force through reforms, including the creation 
of a state-wide public broadcasting system, judicial reform, constitutional amendments, and the 
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formation of a state-wide tax system.98 Throughout the period, however, the entity armies remained 
relatively untouched due to their ambiguous legal and constitutional positions and the significant 
symbolic value of the VRS.  
In December 1999, Croatian President Franjo Tuđman died. He had been key in facilitating financial 
and political support for the HDZ in BiH and the Bosnian Croat component of the VF, and although 
he ‘repeatedly proclaimed his public support for the [DPA], he never abandoned hopes of creating a 
Greater Croatia.’99 In elections held following his death, the HDZ was ousted from power in Croatia, 
severely weakening their allies in BiH and shifting priorities domestically. The Social Democrat-
Liberal coalition government prioritised integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, reforming the 
constitution and, in May 2000, joining NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), a bilateral programme 
that promotes multilateral military cooperation and the modernisation and democratisation of 
armed forces. In 2002, the Croatian Ministry of Defence published a revised National Security 
Strategy, which ‘sees Croatia’s military as a smaller, more professional force, able to participate in 
peace support operations in cooperation with NATO countries and to fulfil Croatia’s obligations as 
part of the PfP.’100 In doing so, the Croatian state made clear its ambition to reform its military to 
conform with the conventions and practices of NATO member-states, making the potential for a 
return to the illicit support of Bosnian Croats particularly difficult.  
Croatia’s PfP membership coincided with renewed calls from the PIC for the creation of a ‘state 
defence establishment’ in BiH, a reduction in the size of armed forces, and a military configuration 
that could be ‘balanced against projected budgets.’101 An audit of the defence budgets of 2000, 
sponsored by the US, UK, Switzerland, and Germany, concluded that the entity armies were 
spending far more than they were allocated, and warned that by 2002 the VF would only be able to 
pay one in three of its soldiers, and the VRS two in three.102 In addition, it was found that both 
armies often failed to pay salaries and bills, and almost nothing was spent on purchasing equipment, 
providing quality training within BiH, maintaining infrastructure, investing in research and 
development, or adequately funding the SCMM, the only state-level military institution.103 Sergeant 
Peter Fitzgerald, a peacekeeper deployed to BiH with the Stabilisation Force (SFOR, the successor to 
IFOR), noted the fiscal impact of BiH's bloated defence sector: 
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The primary purpose of any armed force is to defend a country's territorial integrity 
and sovereignty. The situation in BiH is unique, however, with two distinct armed 
forces in defence of one country. Such a defence structure has led to armed forces 
that have become an economic burden on the country.104 
He points out that steady personnel reductions had greatly reduced the number of troops, from an 
end-of-war estimate of 430,000 to 34,000 in 2001. However, at this number the BiH defence budget 
was still consuming approximately six percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
quadruple that of the European average.105 Even following a programme of troop reduction in both 
entities, in 2003 there remained 20,000 soldiers in Bosnian armies, in addition to a combined total of 
250,000 reserves. Compared with total population figures, this amounted to one soldier for every 21 
citizens: In the US the ratio is 1:200.106 Having three armies in one state, regardless of the political or 
symbolic value, was an expensive luxury that BiH could not sustain. 
In December 2000, elections held in Serbia resulted in Zoran Đinđić becoming Prime Minister, after 
he led the Democratic Opposition of Serbia to victory and formed a coalition government. Widely 
favoured by many Western leaders for his role in the September presidential elections which 
toppled Milošević, the victory of Đinđić represented a sharp change in outlook for the Serbian state. 
Furthermore, it dealt a significant blow to the aspirations of the RS leadership to join the SRJ, as two 
of the new government’s first moves were to establish diplomatic ties with BiH (symbolising its 
formal recognition of the sovereignty of BiH) and express interest in PfP membership.107 This led to a 
reconsideration of priorities in BiH, particularly after January 2001, when a coalition of ten parties 
convinced to cooperate by the American and British ambassadors formed a government. Known as 
the Democratic Alliance for Change (Demokratska alijansa za promjene, DAP), the new government 
ousted the incumbent nationalists, whose ‘stewardship since Dayton had left Bosnia poor, 
dysfunctional, divided, corrupted, unreconstructed and hopeless’ in the eyes of many, for the first 
time since 1990.108 The arrest of Milošević in April 2001, followed by his extradition to The Hague in 
June, offered a definitive end to an era which began to recede with the election of Đinđić. In March 
of the following year, Mladić was formally retired from the military (by the SRJ) and in April a 
warrant was issued for his arrest.109 This was immediately followed by the announcement that 
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Serbia formally aspired to join the PfP.110 The recognition of BiH, the arrest of Milošević, the 
forsaking of Mladić by Serbia, and the declared intention to join a NATO programme represented a 
seismic shift in the political environment in Serbia. This, combined with the formation of DAP in BiH, 
left RS’s SDS leadership isolated. With hopes of secession reducing, it was left with few options but 
to try and obstruct the state-building process in BiH on its own.111  
The accession of Croatia to PfP, coupled with the interest signalled by Serbia, inevitably led to the 
consideration of PfP in BiH, and in July 2001 the Presidency of BiH expressed its desire to join the 
programme. Whilst such declarations were welcomed by the NATO Council, many conditions would 
have to be met before BiH could join. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson outlined the 
requirements at a press conference in Sarajevo:   
A common security policy, democratic parliamentary oversight and control of the 
armed forces, the provision at a state level of command and control of the armed 
forces, including a state level ministry responsible for defence matters, full 
transparency for plans and budgets, and a development of a common doctrine and 
common standards to train and equip the armed forces of this country.112  
The conditionality offered by NATO demanded significant reforms in order for progress towards PfP 
membership to be made. However, whilst the creation of state-level oversight was required, the 
integration of the armed forces in BiH was not.  
On 27 May 2002, Paddy Ashdown, the former leader of the British Liberal Democrats, became High 
Representative. He brought with him new ideas, a new approach, and a willingness to intervene in 
BiH domestic politics on an unprecedented level, to the extent that his critics gave him the moniker 
“the Viceroy of Bosnia.”113 In his inaugural speech to the Bosnian parliament, Ashdown highlighted 
the burden that the entity armies were placing on BiH’s finances, noting that ‘BiH spends twice as 
much on defence as the United States, and four times more than the European average . . . there is 
no alternative to reform.’114 Later, reflecting on his time as High Representative, Ashdown offered an 
interesting insight into his aims for BiH:  
I felt that the process of creating the peace was over, the job was now to put BiH 
irreversibly onto the path to a sustainable peace as a member of the European 
institutions. Note the word European institutions, it doesn’t just mean the EU, it 
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means Brussels-based institutions which includes NATO. In making that the aim of my 
mandate I was clear that in order to become a member of NATO they’d have to create 
a united army, a single army. It was contained within the framework of what I thought 
the aim of my mandate was.115 
Ashdown’s interpretation of his mandate did not correlate exactly with the official NATO position, 
which allowed for multiple armies if they had state-level oversight. He explained this discrepancy, 
stating: ‘Mostly I decided I was a better judge of what was possible in Bosnia than they were sitting 
in Brussels.’116 When asked where the idea for military integration originated from, Ashdown 
explained: ‘It started with me. I saw my job as to build in BiH the framework for a light level state. 
One of the parts of that framework was a single army under the control of the Presidency.’117 
The events of 2000 - 2002 constituted a seismic shift in the political discourse and strategic 
environment of the region. The divergence of the entity armies and associated instability had been 
highlighted by the international community, along with the economic unsustainability of the post-
Dayton defence sector in BiH. Regional interest in NATO, coupled with the formation of the ‘least 
obstructive’ BiH government since the war ended, initiated serious discussion about long-term 
military ambitions.118 With the goal of joining the PfP agreed, NATO's conditions outlined, and the 
arrival of an ambitious High Representative, the climate for reform was as conducive as it had ever 
been.  
Before any significant progress could be made towards reforming the entity armies, however, a 
number of prominent Bosnian Serb leaders moved to sabotage the process. The Bosnian Serb 
member of the Presidency, Živko Radišić, vetoed legislation that aimed to reorganise military 
organisation at the state level just weeks prior to Ashdown’s arrival, and, on Ashdown’s first day as 
High Representative, RS Prime Minister Mladen Ivanić ‘flatly refused, with threats’ to enact the last 
act of Ashdown’s predecessor, Wolfgang Petritsch.119 In September 2002, Glas srpski, a newspaper 
from RS, reported that the NATO Director for the Balkans, Robert Serry, did not deem unification a 
necessary step to NATO integration, reporting that ‘officials of [RS] and NATO confirmed that the 
abolition of the [VRS] and the [VF] is not a condition for BiH to join the Partnership for Peace.’120 
Serry is quoted as saying, ‘according to the Dayton Agreement BiH is entitled to two armies, but it is 
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required to provide guarantees to the [SCMM].’121 The statement was leapt on by Bosnian Serb 
leaders, who could argue that any attempt to disband or merge the VRS was a violation of the DPA.  
This contrasted with Ashdown’s interpretation. He recalls that in October 2002 he hoped to 
introduce another reform: ‘the disbandment of Bosnia's two entity based armies and the creation of 
a single army, under the control of the state. This was an essential requirement for membership of 
NATO.’122 These contrasting statements illustrate the pervasive ambiguity of the constitutional 
position of the armed forces in BiH. According to some international observers, the armies were 
entitled to exist separately as a result of the DPA. However to others, the entity armies represented a 
barrier to integration into international institutions and were not protected by the Agreement 
whatsoever.  
The delays caused by such tactics lasted until the October elections, when the main nationalist 
parties returned to power and were able to protect their military interests more effectively. In 2003, 
five Bosnian Serb parties agreed to harmonise parliamentary activities in order to block any talks 
regarding defence reform.123 Ashdown notes that he was aware that any attempt to reform the VRS 
‘would be furiously resisted by the RS, who regarded their army as a mark of “statehood.”’124 
Military integration, it seemed, remained an unlikely prospect.      
Conclusion 
The DPA established a lasting peace, however it did little to address a broad range of issues which 
together created an extremely complex and unstable security environment in post-war BiH. In 
practical terms, the three armies that had fought each other in an extremely divisive and polarising 
conflict were left to navigate this environment by themselves, with the stipulations of the DPA and 
the efforts of the international community for the most part being restricted to demobilisation and 
de-escalation. This led both entities, fearful of a return to conflict, to retain considerable armed 
forces, to establish prerogatives and structures of military administration and organisation usually 
the preserve of sovereign states, and to maintain doctrine and training focused on the potential 
resumption of the 1992 – 1995 War.  
The consociational nature of BiH's governing structures allowed politicians who identified as leaders 
of the Serb, Croat, or Muslim communities of BiH (rather than of the citizenry as a whole) to 
dominate the administration of the country. By extolling the glories and sacrifices that their 
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respective armies had made, such leaders utilised a powerful tool which helped them maintain the 
focus of BiH politics on the divisions brought about by the conflict and consolidate their positions, as 
Berg explains: ‘Across all areas, ties between ethnic-nationalist networks and security forces 
remained strong. Many political leaders in all three ethnic groups had been military leaders, and 
used military ofﬁcers and veterans' groups to mobilize public support.’125 This made it politically 
prescient to keep the militaries as separate as possible and resulted in the VF being essentially bereft 
of any identity or cohesion. Furthermore, although the international community recognised the 
‘inherent danger’ of having three armies in one state, particularly one as unstable as BiH, the various 
intergovernmental agencies and state-led initiatives that called for significant defence reform were 
unable to incentivise (or demand) such action. Lightburn reflects that:  
The main obstacle remains the lack of political will in the area of defence, at both state and 
entity levels. A radical change in the attitude of members of the joint presidency and of 
other state and entity leaders is required.126 
An array of measures and reforms were gradually implemented throughout the period with the 
explicit goal of strengthening the state-level governance of BiH. Meanwhile, Croatia progressed 
towards Euro-Atlantic integration, the era Milošević was brought to an end in Serbia, and 
international observers increasingly came to recognise that the instability from the presence of 
multiple armies in BiH was the greatest threat to peace in the region. Rather than developing in line 
with these trends and moving towards co-existence or integration, however, the entity armies 
maintained and promoted distinct ethnic identities, remained ideologically and doctrinally prepared 
to resume fighting each other, and ultimately evolved into two very differently organised 
institutions.  
The lens offered by peace and conflict scholars Johan Galtung, Anders Themnér, and Thomas Ohlson 
illustrates how these developments ‘limited’ the peace in post-Dayton BiH. Galtung identifies two 
types of peace: negative, which he defined as ‘the absence of violence’; and positive, which he 
characterises as the ‘integration’ of human society.127 Themnér and Ohlson contribute an additional 
category, ‘legitimate peace,’ which they place midway between positive and negative peace. 
Legitimate peace, they contend, is when ‘loyalty to the idea(s) of the state’ are strengthened and 
‘the attitudes and practices of individuals and groups within the state toward each other’ are 
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improved.128 Viewed in this way, it is apparent that throughout the 1995 – 2002 period, the peace in 
BiH did not advance beyond negative. Central to this lack of progress was the institutionalisation of 
the separation of the formerly warring armies, manifested by the entity armed forces: As long as 
they stood ready to fight each other, peace in BiH was limited to the absence of violence. As a result, 
by 2002, the prospect of military integration or the creation of a multiethnic Bosnian Army seemed 
almost as unlikely as at Dayton, as VF Commander Atif Dudaković reiterated in 2003:   
So far, some cosmetic changes have occurred, but it has, so to speak, kept the dynamic from 
the war, which is the HVO, the [ARBiH], and the VRS. So, this is what has been done so far on 
the issue of the military: the reduction of personnel, weapons, and bases, which are mainly 
cosmetic transformations. There aren’t divisions anymore but brigades, not corps but 
development groups, not 100s but 30s, but the structure, and even the thinking remains the 
same.129     
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Chapter Seven: The Orao Affair and Military Unification 
 
Between December 1995 and 2002, the military situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i 
Hercegovina, BiH) remained largely unchanged. Security was provided by an international 
peacekeeping force, which from 1996 until 2004 was operated by NATO and was known as the 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Despite the cessation of hostilities, their continued presence was required 
as in practical terms three armies remained in place from the war, ready to fight each other. Raffi 
Gregorian, a US State Department official who later led defence reform efforts in BiH, notes efforts 
to reconcile the militaries in the years following the war:  
The military leaders of the international community (various commanders of SFOR, and the 
deputy commanders) were all trying to get the entity armed forces to work together, to get 
into the habit of doing that. They’d have exercises: civilian emergency response; build a 
bridge with engineers; they’d put them on retreats and workshops. Across the board they’d 
really do whatever. And they got nowhere. That’s because, and I think this is something 
Paddy [Ashdown] appreciated, these were not military technical problems, they were 
political problems.1 
While there were no practical barriers to addressing what was recognised as the ‘inherent instability’ 
of having three armies in one state, particularly in military terms, the only progress that had been 
made was the isolation of the armies from each other and the gradual demobilisation of some of 
their soldiers.2 Most power in BiH was entrenched below state level, in the hands of two devolved 
political administrations referred to as entities: Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, FBiH). RS was predominantly Bosnian Serb, and 
commanded the Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike Srpske, VRS), and the FBiH was mostly 
divided between Bosnian Croats and Muslims. The FBiH possessed a military, the Army of the 
Federation (Vojska Federacija, VF), but in practice it was a very divided institution, with its two 
components, descended from the Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće odbrane, HVO) and the 
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, ARBiH), 
remaining wholly separate except at the highest levels of command. The political leaders of the 
Bosnian Croat, Muslim, and Serb communities generally failed to reach a consensus in parliament 
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and would often obstruct or veto legislation for fear of losing their autonomy.3 As a result, the 
international community, represented by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and embodied by 
the High Representative to BiH, intervened in Bosnia’s domestic politics in order to ensure there was 
not a return to conflict, exercising a mandate that they had been issued at a conference in Bonn in 
1997.4 While a number of High Representatives forced legislation into place, dictating the future of 
the three armies was assessed as being too destabilising, and potentially unconstitutional. However, 
in 2002 and 2003, BiH was rocked by its most severe crisis since the war.  
The revelation that a business in the Bosnian Serb entity had been selling weapons to Iraq, while the 
country was under a UN-mandated arms embargo raised the possibility of international 
condemnation and damaging sanctions. This crisis, known as the “Orao Affair,” caused a seismic shift 
in the political discourse in BiH, upended RS’s defence establishment, and drove powerful and 
cohesive calls, hailing from international and Bosnian political figures, for significant changes to be 
made. The result was an intensive period of comprehensive defence reform, which culminated in the 
military unification of the armies in BiH and the creation of the largest multiethnic institution in the 
country. Furthermore, such was the extent of the changes that BiH qualified to join NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), its first noteworthy step on the road to integration into Euro-Atlantic 
institutions.5     
This chapter charts the events of the Orao Affair, offering insights into the circumstances which 
inspired the greatest step in stabilising BiH since the war ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement 
(DPA). Its impact will be assessed, with a particular focus on the work of the Defence Reform 
Commission (DRC), which provided the structural, practical, and legislative plans for reforming, and 
ultimately unifying, the armies in BiH. A detailed analysis of the structures and methods of 
organisation that were utilised successfully to integrate and establish the new Armed Forces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Oružane snage Bosne i Hercegovine, OSBiH) is offered, alongside due 
consideration of the influence of regional and international developments. Together, this will 
provide an account of how, 26 years after socialism was rejected at the ballot box, a multiethnic 
military was created in BiH. 
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The Orao Affair 
Links between socialist Yugoslavia and Iraq had been established following Saddam Hussein’s rise to 
power, and manifested themselves through the construction of numerous airports, infrastructure 
projects, and bunkers by Jugoimport and Aeroinženjering, two Yugoslav companies. Furthermore, 
prior to the break-up of Yugoslavia, repair and maintenance services at a facility in Zagreb had been 
used by the Iraqi Air Force. However, following the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia, 19 Iraqi 
MIGs that were being serviced were transported to Serbia, where they remained.6 The relationship 
continued into the 1990s, despite UN sanctions on both states remaining in place, with contractors 
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia constructing the new Ba’ath Party headquarters and several 
bunkers in Baghdad.7  
On September 9, 2002, the US embassy in Sarajevo voiced concerns that a business in BiH was 
engaged in trade with Iraq, and demanded an investigation as it was believed that arms were 
involved, in contravention of a UN embargo. The business in question was the Orao (Eagle) Aviation 
Institute, a former Yugoslav military manufacturer with a large facility in Bijeljina, RS, which 
developed, built, and maintained parts for a range of fighter jets. The embassy told the press that 
they had ‘information which raises the question of whether violations of the UN resolution regarding 
Iraq had taken place, which is why the issue is raised with Bosnian governments, both at state and 
entity level.’8 The following day the Investigative Commission of the RS Ministry of Defence reported 
that ‘there is no evidence that the “Orao” Aviation Institute from Bijeljina delivered weapons, 
military equipment or spare parts, nor provided any services to any country under UN embargo, 
especially not Iraq.’9 For its part, Orao announced that it would file charges ‘against those who gave 
statements and the alleged information about this (the delivery of weapons to Iraq), as well as 
against the media that reported this without checking the information.’10 The same press release 
emphasised that ‘the “Orao” Aviation Institute, in its long tradition, never produced weapons or any 
type of ordnance, and jet engines are not weapons.’11 
The RS Commission presented its findings to the BiH Presidency a few days later, which accepted the 
conclusion that Orao did not arm Iraq and that BiH had not violated the UN embargo.12 However, a 
number of ambiguities in the report left the issue unresolved. It stated that ‘the commission could 
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not confirm whether one of Orao's partners hadn't misused business arrangements and 
commitments to divert weapons to Iraq,’ and that it had been unable to complete ‘the verification of 
the residence of people employed at Orao, to determine whether any of them were living in Iraq.’13 
On October 8, 2002, the Sarajevo daily Oslobođenje published allegations from ‘well informed 
Western officials, who requested anonymity,’ that ‘in the last two years engineers and other 
employees of the “Orao” Aviation Institute regularly travelled  to Iraq and worked on maintaining 
Iraqi aircraft, and received nine times more pay.’14 Oslobođenje elaborated that ‘Orao has allegedly 
worked on the overhaul of jet engines for MiG-21 "Fishbed" and MiG-29 "Fulcrum" fighters in Iraq.’15 
The Western source revealed that the US embassy had privately discussed the matter with RS 
officials prior to going public, but had been dissatisfied with the response:  
Representatives of the United States deliberately did not make a fuss in the media, because 
they want to give the RS authorities the opportunity to clear this up. Also, they did not want 
the affair to influence the current election. BiH needs to choose the path to Europe, rather 
than to Iraq. Cooperation with Iraq prevents BiH's integration with international institutions. 
This is an opportunity for the military and civilian officials of RS to show that they are not 
part of the problem, but that they are able to investigate the matter and solve the problem. 
The response of the US government will depend on how serious and genuine their 
investigation and its results are.16 
On October 11, after Orao had closed for the weekend, SFOR troops began an inspection at its 
factories and warehouses in Bijeljina. Major Sean Mel of SFOR informed reporters in Bijeljina that it 
was a ‘regular check and that these inspections cannot be connected with the affair concerning the 
involvement of “Orao” in the sale of weapons to Iraq.’17 The search continued throughout the 
weekend as, supposedly, the keys for a number of safes could not be found by Orao staff. However, 
SFOR soldiers remained at the complex until they were located.18 Before SFOR publicly announced 
the results of its search, representatives of the US embassy met with the RS Investigative Committee 
in Banja Luka. Deputy Minister Lieutenant General Nikola Delić, who had chaired the committee, 
gave assurances that ‘trade with Iraq halted from mid-September, and that no official of Ministry of 
Defense or an official at a higher level in the RS has approved such a trade.’19 Despite his assurances, 
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however, the results of the inspection revealed that Orao had indeed been supplying aircraft spare 
parts and technical assistance to the Iraqi Air Force, and was continuing to do so. A letter was found 
pertaining to multiple shipments of materials for the maintenance and repair of MiG jet engines for 
Iraq. Furthermore, at least five experts were said to still be in Iraq, and the Iraqi Air Force had been 
asked to remove the Orao emblem from all documents and equipment and hide the Serbian-
language technical manuals. The most damning evidence revealed by the letter, however, was that it 
was dated September 25, two weeks after the first warnings from the US embassy.20  
In a statement published by Oslobođenje, US officials made clear how they viewed the situation and 
what response they expected from those authorities accountable for the trade: 
In fact, work with Iraq is not suspended, trade with the material and the movement of 
people into and out of Iraq is not interrupted. Investigations so far have not been adequately 
extensive, and the United States expects it to continue, and to show fully and in detail how 
the trade was actually conducted, who was included, in particular who was in charge, how 
many people travelled to Iraq, when and how many times. They expect to be provided with 
the details of the material which was sold to Iraq, as well as details on the payment of such 
activities. The US also expects to be told what measures will be taken against those 
responsible for these actions.21 
The statement also made clear that the repercussions of the escalating scandal had the potential to 
be severe for BiH. Antonio Prlenda, an Oslobođenje columnist, reflected that: ‘BiH could be facing 
international sanctions because of the slow and insufficiently serious investigation by the Ministry of 
Defence of the Republika Srpska.’22 Just days later, the newspaper ran the headline ‘BiH has 24 hours 
to avoid sanctions.’23 At the time, the Bosnian economy remained in a fragile state, with high 
unemployment, low wages, and Gross Domestic Product standing at approximately half of its pre-
war total. Furthermore, both the state and entity governments were reliant on foreign aid to meet 
their respective expenditures.24 Depending on what shape the sanctions took, financial assistance 
could cease, goods could be embargoed, or individuals and institutions targeted. Such a response 
was guaranteed to destabilise the fragile Bosnian state and ran the risk of inviting a return to 
conflict.  
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The High Representative of BiH, Paddy Ashdown, understood that ‘in the worst case, this breach of 
international law by the RS could have opened up Bosnia to the possibility of UN action.’25 He was, 
however, also the first to see the opportunity which the crisis presented, recording in his memoir: 
‘We knew at once that this would give us the opportunity I had been looking for to try to push 
through defence reform in order to abolish the two opposing entity armies and create a single 
Bosnian army under state control.’26 Moving quickly to take the lead in the international response to 
what was being dubbed the “Orao Affair,” he outlined the ‘required action’ that was needed to avert 
a crisis on October 28:  
In the short term there must be a full and public enquiry. This will need to involve the State 
authorities as the State ultimately has responsibility for ensuring BiH respects UN 
resolutions. Those politically responsible for bringing BiH to the brink of international 
condemnation and pariah status must face the consequences.27  
In addition, he called for new standards and regulations regarding trade to be implemented, 
including the provision that state (rather than entity) institutions had to approve weapons exports.28 
Ashdown also ordered reviews of BiH’s border control and the entity defence structures, arguing 
that the systems of democratic civilian control needed to be strengthened, and stating that ‘it is 
clear that the current system appears to allow parts of the defence industry to operate outside of 
transparent political control.’29 Furthermore, he added that oversight of the defence sector needed 
to be properly established at the state level, demanding that ‘clear lines of responsibility must be 
established through a strengthened Standing Committee on Military Matters.’30 All of these 
measures were directed towards the strengthening of the BiH state at the expense of the entities, a 
process that the leadership of RS had vehemently fought since Dayton. 
In the Serb Republic, opinion was divided over who should be held accountable. Most parties agreed 
that the President of RS, Mirko Šarović, and the Prime Minister, Mladen Ivanić, were ultimately 
accountable. Whether or not they, or indeed anyone else, should be removed from their positions, 
however, was the cause of much debate.31 Eventually, at the request of the BiH Presidency ‘to 
dismiss all officials responsible for the cooperation between Bijeljina and Baghdad within 24 hours,’ 
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RS took action.32 The Director of the Orao Aviation Institute, Milan Priča, the Commander of the RS 
Air Force, Colonel Miljan Vlačić, and the Director of the Department for Military Logistics, Spasoje 
Orašanin, were all quickly dismissed.33 Although Prica continued to protest, reiterating that ‘Orao 
has never sold weapons,’ the Bosnian Serb leadership considered the matter dealt with.34 Following 
the dismissals, the Serb member of the BiH Presidency, Mirko Šarović, announced that: ‘The 
government and the relevant authorities of RS took concrete measures to sanction any institution 
which violated the embargo on exports of arms and equipment to Iraq.’35 
The US administration, however, was unsatisfied. A press release issued by the US embassy the next 
day stated that: 
The United States government welcomes the first steps which have punished a violation of 
UN Security Council resolutions, the Dayton Agreement and BiH export control regulations, 
but we expect new steps from those responsible in the state and entity to stop cooperation 
with Iraq and carry out a full investigation. We expect that the officials who bear political, 
military and business responsibility are not only dismissed, but are also criminally 
sanctioned.36 
The Bosnian Muslim member of the BiH Presidency, Beriz Belkić, also called for more punishment. 
He told Oslobođenje: 
The dismissals that have occurred in the RS itself are a signal that we have started to 
understand the situation. But, those dismissed were in the military structure, and now we 
need to establish the responsibility of the civilian structures, which command the army.37 
Ashdown was also critical of RS's response and, after returning from a meeting with the UN Security 
Council regarding the affair, commented that ‘it is worrying that the measures taken by the RS in 
September to clarify this issue were very tepid and unconvincing,’ although he did concede that ‘the 
latest measures by the RS are encouraging.’38 A more ominous warning came from US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, who wrote to Ivanić and told him that his government faced serious 
consequences because of the scandal and informed him that ‘this topic has now gained attention at 
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the highest level in the Government of the United States.’39 He described the RS investigation as a 
‘mockery,’ and said that ‘you were warned about these activities and did not do anything to prevent 
them.’40 Further pressure was applied as Powell reminded Ivanić that ‘the United States also has 
access to numerous sanctions and penalties that can be applied to your government and to all 
individuals who are involved.’41 Powell made it clear that RS was facing diplomatic isolation if it did 
not go further, and that the US could act unilaterally and punish the Serb entity if it was deemed 
appropriate.  
As the leadership of RS assessed its options, others began to see the opportunity the events 
presented. Belkić, speaking for the Bosnian state, declared that ‘we must learn from this and reform 
defence.’42 In the media, Aldijana Omeragić argued that ‘the US threat of sanctions has become a 
great opportunity for BiH, more than seven years after the war, to reorganize and eventually curb all 
legal and secret weapons and armaments,’ and recognised how the Orao Affair had raised a 
discussion ‘about creating a single BiH Army. Or maybe even a new, state-level Ministry of 
Defence.’43 Zira Dizdarević contended that ‘to punish the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina because 
of Orao would be meaningless because the central government does not have a mechanism for 
control over the military industry,’ and contended that ‘the most important question is what lesson 
can be brought from this case on a system level. The Orao affair and the behaviour of the authorities 
on this occasion favours the strengthening of the powers of the central authorities and giving more 
responsibilities to them.’44     
Meanwhile, more details of Orao's dealings were emerging. On October 27, 2002, Oslobođenje 
reported that SFOR had found a link between Orao, a Belgrade firm called “Jugoimport”, and an 
importer in Iraq called “Al-Bashair Trade Companies.” The findings confirmed the role of Orao in the 
provision of parts, maintenance, and mechanical training for two series of engines for MiG fighters in 
a contract worth 8.5 million US Dollars. The Oslobođenje article concluded that Orao ‘has enabled 
Iraq, with highly specialised Yugoslav help, to get the damaged fleet of MiGs back to the heavens.’45 
This came just two weeks after US President George W. Bush told the UN that Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in Iraq posed a ‘grave and gathering danger’ and issued an ultimatum that unless weapons 
inspectors were allowed into Iraq, action would be taken.46 Bush’s declaration coincided with an 
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escalation in the bombing of Iraq (a regular occurrence between the First Gulf War and the Second) 
by US and British aircraft, which used the UN-mandated no-fly zone to ‘destroy the country's air 
defence systems in anticipation of an all-out attack.’47 By helping the Iraqi Air Force increase its 
capability in such a political climate, Orao was not only contravening a UN arms embargo, but was 
also posing a threat to US and British military assets. Indeed, in the final weeks of 2002, an Iraqi MiG 
was able to down a US Predator Drone, although it is not possible to verify if it was one included in 
the Orao deal.48  
In response to the mounting severity of the case, the Commander of SFOR, US General William 
Ward, called on the RS authorities to conduct: 
A thorough inspection of the Orao complex at the Ministry of Defence level, as well as to 
make an overall inspection of RS Ministry of Defence and all other institutions and 
companies engaged in the production of military equipment or weapons.49 
Ward’s approach can be seen to have offered RS multiple opportunities to conduct its own 
investigations and present its findings to the Bosnian public and the international community. 
However, the evidence suggesting that the RS administration had not only been involved in the deal 
but had also attempted to hide evidence and continued to trade with Iraq after the investigation 
began, severely undermined its authority and legitimacy. As a result, Ward warned that ‘only strict 
control of the Ministry of Defence of the RS, the RS Government and the Government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina can ensure that in future there is no serious violation of the trade embargo.’50 In 
response to this increased pressure, two further high ranking RS officials resigned their positions: 
Defence Minister Slobodan Bilić and the army Chief of Staff, General Novica Simić. The RS 
government stated that ‘this act helps to improve the international position of the Republika 
Srpska,’ however it remained unclear whether this would be enough to satisfy the international 
community.51 
With the Bosnian Serb leadership firmly implicated in the Orao Affair, Ashdown presented his case 
for using the unfolding crisis to fundamentally reform the security sector to the international 
community. On October 29, he flew to Brussels to brief the NATO Secretary General, George 
Robertson. Ashdown told the ambassadors of the North Atlantic Council that BiH was facing its ‘most 
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severe crisis since the war.’52 He warned that when the full enquiry which he had instituted was 
complete, it would be likely to show some high-level political culpability for the Orao Affair. He also 
used this meeting to gauge the response to his planned reforms, noting that he ‘intended to use this 
scandal to initiate a complete reform of the defence structures in BiH.’53 Robertson agreed that 
NATO would supervise the defence reform process, giving some strong credibility to any proposals 
that would follow.54 Ashdown also received the endorsement of the UN Security Council for the 
‘priority reform measures.’55 In the following days, General Ward told Oslobođenje that the only 
solution to the problems arising from the Orao Affair was the creation of a BiH State Ministry of 
Defence, and US Ambassador Clifford Bond spoke of the need for a unified Bosnian army.56 Ashdown 
was able to quickly establish a consensus among the international community and, crucially, a range 
of Bosnian political figures, on the appropriate response to the actions of Orao and RS by 
highlighting the danger that sanctions posed and advocating assessment and reform rather than 
punishment. Furthermore, the involvement of the RS government and military, coupled with the 
attempts to orchestrate a cover-up, left them discredited, isolated, and unable to challenge 
Ashdown’s manoeuvres.  
Before the extent and degree of the reforms to be made could be planned, however, the RS 
Investigative Committee was given a final opportunity to meaningfully participate in the response to 
the Orao Affair. In accordance with parliamentary procedure, the Bosnian parliament and the 
international community waited until the committee had completed its (second) investigation and 
reported its findings. This took over two months, and when, on January 7, 2003, Ashdown was 
offered a ‘first, private sight of the latest RS government report’ he found the 1,600-page document 
to be an ‘attempt to provide a snowstorm of paper which would obscure the issue of political 
culpability.’57 Indeed, the report placed the burden of responsibility on former RS President Biljana 
Plavsić, a ‘sworn enemy of the current administration, who was, very conveniently, already in jail, 
having been convicted by the Hague Tribunal.’58 
The incumbent Bosnian Serb member of the Presidency, Mirko Šarović, was also implicated in the 
report. He had been elected to his position as news of the Orao Affair was first breaking just months 
earlier, with 70 percent of the Bosnian Serb vote, but prior to that he had served as RS President and 
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the Chairman of the RS Supreme Defence Council, its highest military body and the one responsible 
for overseeing the deal with Iraq.59 However, the report was absent of any concrete evidence linking 
him to Orao. Frustrated again by what was deemed to be an attempt to obscure the truth, Ashdown 
ordered a fresh investigation by intelligence officers from NATO countries, who presented their 
findings, which named Šarović as the key culprit, in March.60 Just days after the investigation proved 
his links to Orao, Ashdown publicly accused him of being engaged in ‘aggressive intelligence 
operations against [BiH] institutions and citizens, and international organisations working in BiH,’ 
which ‘compounded the damage done by the Orao Affair.’61 Evidence to back these allegations had 
been gathered in a raid conducted by British troops many weeks earlier, on 7 March, and proved 
that VRS intelligence, with the cooperation of Serbia, had been intercepting phone-calls and bugging 
briefing rooms.62  
The position of the Bosnian Serb member of the Presidency was increasingly untenable, and by the 
beginning of April it seemed likely he would either have to resign or be removed by the High 
Representative. However, Ashdown records that on April 1, ‘to my huge surprise, Bosnian Muslim 
President Sulejman Tihić, backed by his Croat colleague, warned that I should not remove the Serb 
president as this would destabilise the whole country.’63 He notes that ‘my big fear is not riots or 
instability as predicted by the French and the Germans yesterday, but a Serb withdrawal from the 
whole process.’64 In response, he privately asked Šarović to step down, which the member of the 
Presidency eventually acquiesced to do on April 2, although his aides indicated that it was a ‘tactical 
resignation, forced on him by Lord Ashdown, and that he would make a political comeback.’65 
Ashdown later reflected that this was ‘a very dangerous moment,’ but contends that he was left 
with few options: ‘He had broken a UN Security Council sanction, he continued to provide weapons 
and weapons assistance to Iraq, and you just can't ignore that. It was not something which I enjoyed 
doing or something I particularly wanted to do.’66  
Šarović joined a multitude of other Bosnian Serb government officials and military officers who were 
removed from their positions, including the VRS’s military and civilian leadership. Seventeen of those 
dismissed were later charged with illegal trading, either for being involved in the trade or helping to 
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cover it up.67 The following day Glas srpski reported that: ‘Yesterday BiH Presidency Chairman Mirko 
Šarović tendered his resignation from his duties, which was accepted by the High Representative 
Paddy Ashdown, who consequently explained that it put an end to the “Orao affair.”’68 Dragan 
Mitrović, the new RS Prime Minister (Ivanić had moved to foreign affairs), reflected that ‘I regard his 
resignation as a personal and moral act with the aim to establish new standards of behaviour by 
those holding public positions.’69  
Ashdown's public response was clear. He declared that ‘the Orao Arms-to-Iraq affair has done more 
damage to BiH’s international reputation than any other event since the end of the war,’ and noted 
that ‘it is no exaggeration to say that these activities could have placed this country’s stability in 
jeopardy.’70 He targeted RS specifically, stating that ‘too many in the RS think the RS is a state not an 
Entity. Signing arms deals with foreign governments are the actions of a state,’ and observed that ‘if 
the RS had truly accepted its role as part of BiH, [the arms deals] would not have happened.’71 
Commenting on Šarović’s resignation, he emphasised that: 
 Mr Šarović was President of the RS when [Orao] signed arms contracts with Iraq in direct 
 contravention of UN Security Council Resolutions. With war now underway in Iraq, possibly 
 involving weaponry exported from this country, I cannot overstate the seriousness of this 
 affair.72 
Following the resignation of Šarović, Ashdown announced a package of preliminary reform 
measures, which were approved by both the FBiH and RS. The RS Supreme Council was abolished, 
entity legislation and constitutions were amended to remove all inference of statehood, 
independence, and sovereignty, and plans and legislation were requested of both the state and the 
entity governments for bringing arms industries and international trade under proper control. 
Furthermore, all Bosnian senior military officers would have to submit details of travel abroad to the 
state-level Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and measures were to be taken in future to reduce dual 
structures in the VF. In addition, a commission was established to ‘identify constitutional and legal 
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barriers to effective state-level command and control’ of the military.73 Announcing his plans, 
Ashdown stated:  
With the resignation of Mirko Šarović from the BiH Presidency, to take responsibility for the 
Orao Affair, and the reform package which I announced today, I am satisfied that the Arms-
to-Iraq affair and the VRS espionage scandal have been effectively addressed.74 
The Orao Affair triggered a momentous shift in political discourse and activity in BiH. It exposed 
numerous flaws in the structures and laws which governed post-Dayton BiH, particularly with regard 
to the management of borders and oversight of the military. Furthermore, the RS leadership was 
proven to have broken a UN arms embargo, continued business with Iraq after the initial 
investigations began, endeavoured to hide evidence, and had repeatedly attempted to obstruct or 
obscure investigations. The revelation that the military autonomy of the VRS had been utilised to spy 
on international and domestic institutions during the entire investigation served to further illustrate 
the disregard with which RS leaders held both the Bosnian state and the international community. 
Furthermore, RS’s only significant ally and a crucial benefactor of the VRS, Serbia, was proven to 
have been the ‘mastermind’ of the trade and a co-conspirator in the spying scandal, and as a result 
the Orao Affair had a ‘huge impact’ in Serbia.75 The coordination between the defence institutions of 
Serbia and RS in conducting such illicit operations highlighted many unresolved security issues 
inherent in post-Dayton BiH. As a result of Orao, all financial and logistical support that the VRS 
received from Belgrade, and all military collaboration between the RS and Serbia, would be 
scrutinised and approved at the state-level in BiH. The Orao Affair also led to the Serbian 
government handing over all records and information concerning Belgrade’s cooperation with Iraq 
over previous decades, including details of a host of military infrastructure projects which Yugoslav 
engineers had constructed for the Iraqi armed forces, just as US and British forces were preparing to 
invade the country.76 Discredited and isolated, and with most of its political and military leadership 
removed, the RS administration was unable to prevent comprehensive reform from becoming a 
political priority, nor could it offer an alternative. For the first time since the DPA was signed, the 
future of the armies that had fought the war and the place they had in society was to be scrutinised, 
debated, and reformed.   
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Root and branch reform: The response to the Orao Affair 
The most significant impact that the Orao Affair had on BiH was the Defence Reform Commission 
(DRC) established by Ashdown. It had a broad remit to examine and analyse the complex security 
environment in post-Dayton BiH and was ultimately tasked with suggesting reforms which could be 
implemented by the Bosnian parliament if a consensus could be found. If it could not, the Bonn 
Powers offered a route for Ashdown to force the reforms through. However, such action was 
considered extremely risky. Ashdown announced the main aims of the DRC in May 2003: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to establish transparency and proper civilian control of its 
armed forces, in the interests of BiH and its people, but this process will also help BiH 
achieve its stated desire of joining Euro-Atlantic structures, and in particular, NATO’s PfP 
Programme.77  
Key to the success of the commission was establishing its legitimacy. Given time to regroup, the 
leadership of RS had the potential to sabotage any future reforms it deemed to be overreaching. As 
a result, the commission was composed of representatives from a broad range of institutions and 
interests, and was overseen by observers from across the international community. Leading the 
commission was James Locher III, a veteran US policymaker and military expert with experience of 
reforming the US military. The commissioners included: the Secretary General of the Standing 
Committee on Military Matters (SCMM), the Bosnian state-level military administration; the OSCE’s 
Head of Mission to BiH; a representative of the FBiH President; the FBiH Minister of Defence; the 
two Deputy Secretary Generals of the SCMM; a representative of the RS President; the RS Minister 
of Defence; the Commander of SFOR; a representative of NATO; and a representative of the EU. 
Observers included representatives of the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the EU 
Presidency, as well as both the Russian and US ambassadors to BiH.78 Thus, the work of the DRC was 
done by Bosnian and foreign delegates working together, with representatives from each relevant 
institution forming working groups, each of which focused on a particular area marked for reform. In 
some cases, former belligerents were now designing reforms alongside each other, such as in the 
Policy Working Group, where the former Commander of the ARBiH during the war, Rasim Delić, 
worked alongside the former Chief of Staff of the HVO, Slavko Marin, and a leading member of RS’s 
wartime civilian leadership, Dragan Kapetina.79  
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Despite the potential for discord to hinder the work of the DRC, its progress was rapid. An Executive 
Order issued by Bush on 29 May undoubtedly offered some impetus, as it imposed unilateral 
sanctions on 150 individuals in the former Yugoslavia, most of whom were either war crimes 
suspects, or people believed to be helping them.80 The response from the leading political parties in 
BiH (all of whom had members on the list) was unanimously one of outrage: a former SDA minister 
described the list as ‘the greatest post-war evil to be committed against the Bosniaks’ while the HDZ 
published a statement labelling it ‘humiliating.’ 81 However, it served as a prominent reminder of the 
fragile position the Bosnian political leadership was in and encouraged cooperation with priority 
measures such as the DRC. The commission submitted a comprehensive report on 25 September 
2003, just five months after it had been formed.82 It identified a number of key problems which 
undermined the emergence of democratic civil-military relations and BiH’s integration into the 
security apparatus of the PfP programme. These were:   
[The] lack of adequate State-level command and control of the armed forces of [BiH]; 
ambiguity and inconsistency in the law regarding the competencies of the State and entities 
for defence matters; insufficient democratic oversight and control of the armed forces, 
especially by parliaments; lack of transparency at all levels for defence matters; non-
compliance with international obligations, primarily OSCE politicomilitary accords; an 
unjustifiable number of reserves and the small arms and light weapons to arm them; 
excessive, deteriorating arms at too many locations; waste of human and financial resources 
in the defence sector; forces sized and equipped for missions no longer appropriate for the 
security situation.83 
In response, the DRC recommended the implementation of a range of legislation which would 
fundamentally restructure the security sector in BiH. These reforms would centralise almost all 
authority over military matters to the Bosnian parliament and established accountable civilian 
oversight at the state-level by establishing a Bosnian Ministry of Defence. This was justified as it was 
within the parameters of the DPA and articulated ‘a fundamental principle of Statehood: a State 
must have the capacity to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. To have this capacity, a 
State must control its armed forces.’84 The commission also recommended considerable reductions 
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in arsenals, military property, and troop numbers. The 19,090 professional soldiers serving in the 
entity armies were to be reduced to 12,000, and the majority of the 240,000 troops kept as reserves 
were to be dismissed, leaving just 60,000. In addition, ‘the intake of conscripts would be reduced by 
50 percent, and the conscript training period shortened from six to four months. The headquarters 
and field staffs of the entity Ministries of Defence would also be reduced by 25 percent.’85 Although 
much reduced in size and capability, the entity armies would remain in place, and the entity 
governments would be responsible for most administrative aspects of their maintenance, including 
pay, logistics, and training.  
Following the publication of the report, significant diplomatic pressure was placed on Bosnian 
politicians to accept and implement the findings. The OHR issued a statement informing the Bosnian 
public that ‘the eyes of Europe and the world are on BiH as its leaders decide whether to seize the 
opportunity to take the first historic steps into NATO and European security structures.’86 The 
following day, the ambassadors of EU member-states lobbied the BiH Presidency to support the 
reforms.87 Within months, most had passed through the relevant legislatures, and by the end of 
2003, BiH was informed that enough progress had been made for NATO ministers to consider its 
membership of PfP at a summit scheduled for the following June.88 The state-level Ministry of 
Defence was established in March 2004, and the entity armies conducted their first joint exercise in 
May. Six months later, an ‘honorary unit’ was formed from soldiers of all three ethnicities.89 
Although the reforms were extensive and brought the entity armies under a single command and 
administration, making them eligible for international integration, they did little to address the 
underlying issues which continued to threaten to destabilise BiH. Below senior ranks and outside of 
ceremonial units, the bulk of the soldiers remained segregated from other ethnicities and were still, 
to an extent, autonomous of the state. Indeed, although the three armies which had fought the war 
in BiH were now governed by a single administration, they remained for all practical purposes 
separate forces that were maintained primarily to fight each other. The lack of significant change is 
best illustrated by the revelation that in 2004, after many reforms had been implemented, the VRS 
was still using its autonomy to help Ratko Mladić evade international authorities.90 These concerns 
led the discussion at the NATO Summit in Istanbul to conclude that BiH was not ready for PfP 
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membership and should instead make ‘continuous progress towards the establishment of a single 
military force.’91  
In response, at the end of 2004 Ashdown extended the mandate of the DRC for another year and 
appointed Bosnian Minister of Defence Nikola Radovanović and Dr. Raffi Gregorian of NATO 
Headquarters Sarajevo to replace Locher as Co-Chairmen of the commission. They were instructed 
to use this time to ‘examine and propose the legal and institutional measures necessary to transfer 
the competencies of the Entity [Ministries of Defence] to the State level, to enhance State level 
command and control, and to promote co-ordination with the ICTY.’92 These were the key areas in 
which BiH fell short of qualifying for PfP membership, and, in order to ensure the commission 
formulated policy which would achieve this goal, the new commission was co-chaired by Gregorian, 
who served as a representative of NATO, along with the Minister of Defence of BiH, Nikola 
Radovanović. The rest of the commission was, like its predecessor, composed of delegates from 
across state and entity security institutions and the international community.93 Gregorian recalls that 
Ashdown was determined to implement whatever reforms were needed to ensure PfP membership, 
even if it meant using the Bonn Powers to ‘come down like Zeus’ and overrule the Bosnian Serbs, 
who were ‘furious’ about the mandate of the DRC and said that ‘they could never cooperate with 
NATO, or me. They weren’t going to engage in any talks.’94 However, the PIC legal team judged that 
using the Bonn Powers in this instance would be unlawful. Gregorian also notes that this demanded 
thorough negotiations, and an understanding of what Bosnian political leaders needed, rather than 
wanted. Describing his understanding, he states that: 
The Bosniaks really wanted a central army, a state army. The Serbs were definitely afraid of 
this large conscript-based reserve force the Bosniaks had, hundreds of thousands of 
supposedly trained people. The Croats felt overwhelmed by everybody and didn’t feel they 
were getting a good deal in the Federation Army. If you moved it up to the state level then 
the Croats would have a third of the assistant ministers and one of the three power 
positions, both in the Ministry and the Joint Staff.95 
Even with these needs under consideration, negotiations concerning the DRC’s report were fraught. 
Progress was marred by the upcoming tenth anniversary of Dayton, which caused public discourse to 
focus on the war. This was exacerbated by the emergence of video footage, just two weeks prior to 
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when the commission was supposed to sign off the final agreement, of a Serbian paramilitary unit, 
the Škorpioni (Scorpions), executing a group of bound Bosnian Muslim boys during the war. 
Gregorian notes that this almost led the Bosnian Muslim leadership to back out of the process as it 
gave weight to concerns regarding the termination of conscription, but recalls an emotional meeting 
with Tihić in which he reminded the Bosnian Muslim member of the Presidency that ‘here I have a 
single army for BiH. This is what your people fought for, and died for. And over here, you have 
conscription and more of the same.’96 Gregorian’s point was reinforced by military analysis 
conducted by the defence reform commission which concluded that the conscript-based reserve 
force ‘had shown to be a paper tiger, not ready for anything. Thus, it was a dangerous deceit to think 
the reserves offered real protection to anyone.’97 
As a result, consensus was eventually found on the commission, and its findings were presented to 
Ashdown in September 2005. The report noted that the commission ‘bases its recommendations on 
the continuing endeavour to secure credible [PfP] candidacy for [BiH]’ but was ‘sensitive to the 
unique circumstances of [BiH] as a state with three constituent peoples and others and the needs for 
its armed forces to belong to and protect all its peoples.’98 As a result, the reforms suggested in the 
report were very much the product of compromise between the various interests represented on 
the commission. However, while lengthy negotiations were held over some of the finer points of the 
reform, a surprising unanimity was found between the participants of the DRC, including the Bosnian 
Serb representatives, that any reform package they produced should in fact go beyond their original 
mandate, as Gregorian explains:  
The terms of reference of the second DRC didn’t require the ending of the entity armed 
forces, they just said that they have to have a single personnel system, a single pay system, 
and so on. So administratively they’d be completely linked, but still be separate armies in 
terms of combat power. The process we led and the way we did it, and the leadership in 
place at the time, created that political moment to go beyond [the terms of reference].99 
He elaborates that it was the RS leadership who requested that the reforms being implemented 
were comprehensive enough to meet the requirements to join NATO, not as a partner, but as a 
member, as each reform process cost them a significant amount of political capital and was regarded 
as being ‘incredibly painful.’100 As a result, the final report of the DRC not only strengthened the 
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state-level Ministry of Defence, but also proposed a complete restructuring of the security 
institutions in BiH in order to create ‘a single defence establishment and single military force in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina under fully functioning state-level command and control.’101  
The major obstacle to creating a unified military was the challenge of how best to integrate soldiers 
(or units) from ‘three essentially mono-ethnic brigades’ which carried the heritage of opposing 
wartime armies.102 This task was complicated further as the entities were ardent that some degree 
of ethnic identification be retained in the new structure.103 Such demands, however, were consistent 
with the DPA, which structured BiH as a consociational state composed of three constituent peoples: 
it was only reasonable that the military reflect the state. Furthermore, numerous militaries in NATO 
offered some form of ethnic identification, validating it as a method of organising armed forces.104 
Indeed, a strong contingent of former and serving British Army officers were delegates on the 
commission, and had extensive experience with such methods. Retired Major-General John 
Drewienkiewicz represented the OSCE as Vice-Chairman of the DRC; John Colston, a senior British 
Ministry of Defence civil servant, represented NATO; and Major-General David Leakey represented 
the EU Peacekeeping Force (the successor to SFOR, EUFOR). 105 Furthermore, the commission’s Co-
Chair, Gregorian, had earned his PhD researching Gurkhas in the British Army.106 A logical conclusion 
of the demands of the entities and the expertise on the panel, therefore, was the decision to adapt 
the regimental system developed by the British Army to the needs of BiH. 107 Gregorian elucidates 
that the inspiration for applying the model to BiH came from his knowledge of how the British Indian 
Army arranged brigades of three battalions, each from a different regiment, one of which had to be 
British. This concept was developed into a practical model by Rohan Maxwell and Gregorian’s 
Canadian military attache, Colonel MacGillivray, who ‘were the real experts who advised on the finer 
points of the regimental system as they knew it from Canada.’108 
It can be argued that endorsing ethnic separation within the military served to further entrench 
divisions within a very polarised and fragile state. The alternative, complete integration, had 
considerable precedent in the region and there was evidence to suggest that it could help stabilise 
states recovering from conflict. In the case of Lebanon, soldiers and militiamen of all 18 official 
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religions were enlisted into a unified, fully integrated Lebanese Army following a long civil war. 
While the post-war state was structured in a manner similar to BiH, with ethnic representation 
guaranteed in government, the military emerged from the conflict as a truly Lebanese institution 
and is widely viewed as being pivotal in preventing a return to war.109 The unique heritage of the 
Lebanese Army, however, prevented it from serving as a template for BiH. Owing to the influential 
legacy of its first commander, Fuad Chehab, the military remained aloof of the conflict fought 
between various ideological and sectarian militias. In doing so, it failed to maintain stability in 
Lebanon but preserved its reputation as a non-partisan institution. This allowed it to serve as a 
vehicle to reconcile divisions and, utilising its heritage and reputation, assert an inclusive Lebanese 
identity once a political settlement to the conflict was reached. In BiH, the pre-existing military 
structures had been repurposed to fight the war and were, for the most part, resented by the parts 
of the population they did not represent. Furthermore, while the Lebanese Army’s pre-civil war 
heritage was very much identified with the sanctity of the republic, which was compatible with the 
post-war political climate, the military heritage of BiH was rooted in socialism, which showed little 
chance of re-emerging as a force in Bosnian politics. Any military claiming to represent an over-
arching identity, including a Bosnian one, was likely to be viewed as illegitimate, and even a threat, 
by the nationalist leaders who dominated parliament, and would likely lead to their withdrawal from 
the whole process.  
The regimental system agreed by the DRC, on the other hand, found ‘a solution for maintaining 
military heritage and identity within a single military force’ which was ‘in keeping with the multi-
ethnic constitution and laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’110 Indeed, the merits of such a system in 
the Yugoslav context was highlighted in 1992 by James Gow, who argued that ‘it seems self-evident 
that an empirically homogenous, regimental system could have improved [JNA] effectiveness.’111 In 
the proposed system, the Bosnian Croat component of the VF would contribute three battalions to 
the new military, the Bosnian Muslims another three, and three would come from the VRS. 
Together, they would form the OSBiH. Operationally and administratively, they would be organised 
in three brigades, which was the standard (and thus interoperable) model for NATO militaries. Each 
brigade was to be formed from an infantry battalion from each ethnicity, while command, support, 
and specialist units were to be formed anew and would be multiethnic. The leadership was to be 
provided by a Joint Staff, which would oversee both the Operational Command and Support 
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Command.112 The report also stipulated that the three constituent peoples should be ‘equally 
represented in each senior decision-making level’ and, as a result, the Minister of Defence, Chief of 
the Joint Staff, the Commander of Operational Command, and the Commander of Support 
Command would ‘each have two deputies whose responsibilities are defined in the law. The 
principal and his deputies cannot be from the same Constituent Peoples.’113  
It was, however, recognised that ‘the brigade structure addresses basic structural operational 
requirements but it does not address the need to maintain a military heritage and identity.’114 As a 
result, an additional layer of organisation was placed over the military for ‘ceremonial and military 
heritage purposes,’ in which the units were grouped into three regiments. Each regiment would 
embody ‘the historical military lineage of the component from which it is descended,’ although it 
was reiterated that ‘regiments are purely ceremonial organisations and unlike brigades have no 
operational, training or administrative roles.’115 Furthermore, legally, the complexion of the 
regiments was to be defined as multiethnic, although no meaningful measures were taken to 
encourage mixing of personnel.116 While the identity of the infantry regiments was inspired by 
ethnicity, non-infantry units were to be affiliated to regiments based on speciality, such as artillery. 
In practical terms, the regiments were composed of a handful of staff led by a Regimental Major. 
Their tasks were designated as the: management of the regimental museum; use of the regimental 
fund for ceremonial purposes; preparation, research and maintenance of regimental history; 
preservation of regimental artefacts; guidance on conduct at ceremonial events; direction on 
regimental custom, dress and deportment; and operation of the Officer’s, NCOs and Junior Rank 
Messes.117 This correlates exactly with how regiments in the British Army are often described, 
however it is evident that whomever would command the regiments would enjoy a lot of scope to 
interpret their duties as they pleased.118 The rest of the 2005 DRC report largely focussed on 
reducing overall troop numbers, abolishing conscription entirely (thus making the OSBiH a wholly 
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professional force), and restructuring the reserve system so that only discharged professional 
soldiers were retained.119  
Both entities were largely receptive to the plans, although Rohan Maxwell and John Andreas Olsen 
explain that the proposals were met with calls for even greater ethnic representation. They recall 
proposals to ‘group non-infantry functions into three non-infantry regiments . . .  so that each of the 
three constituent peoples would get one non-infantry regimental command position,’ and others 
that called for the infantry brigades (rather than battalions) to be mono-ethnic, or for all OSBiH 
personnel to belong to one of the infantry regiments, regardless of their position in the military, in 
order to maintain ethnic identification.120 Maxwell and Olsen argue that extending ethnic 
identification beyond the infantry would result in ‘an [OSBiH] divided into three distinct ethnic 
groups,’ whilst having no ethnic identification at all ‘would destroy the regimental compromise that 
allowed for agreement on a single military force.’121 ‘The application of the regimental system to the 
infantry,’ they concede, ‘is the concession to ethnic identity within the [OSBiH].’122     
By the end of December 2005, most of the relevant legislation had been passed at the state and 
entity level, establishing the state as the sole authority over the military, and in January, the 
implementation of the reforms on a practical level began.123 In July 2006, the Bosnian parliament 
approved a decision by the BiH Presidency to reduce military personnel to 10,000 professional 
soldiers, 5,000 reservists, and 1,000 civilian staff, and introduce a system of ethnic quotas based on 
data from the 1991 census, with the intention of ensuring ethnic representation in proportion to the 
pre-war population. As a result, its target composition is 45.9 percent (4,826 people) Bosnian 
Muslim/Bosniak, 33.6 percent (3,533 people) Serb, 19.8 percent (2,084 people) Croat, and 0.7 
percent (74 people) Other.124 This created yet another layer of ethnic identification in the OSBiH, and 
arguably undermined the regiments that had so recently been introduced, as their function of 
preserving heritage and identity became, to an extent, the concern of the military as whole. 
In December 2006, the freshly unified OSBiH was admitted to the PfP programme, marking the 
culmination of four years of dramatic change in the post-Dayton security sector in BiH. Attaining 
access to the programme was a significant feat and illustrated the extent to which the military 
situation was becoming normalised. Indeed, transforming three large formerly warring armies into a 
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unified, professional, and democratically accountable military was the most significant step in 
stabilising BiH since the signing of the DPA. Not only had the presence of multiple armies within a 
single state been removed, but the Bosnian state had secured its monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force, greatly strengthening its position as the sovereign authority in the territory of BiH. Indeed, 
reflecting on the key reforms (creating a state-level judiciary, tax collection system, and military) that 
were made in BiH under his oversight, Ashdown observes: ‘What is it that defines a state? It is a 
region bounded by borders in which a single law operates, and the instruments of lethal force lay in 
the hands of state and no one else.’125 Furthermore, integration into the PfP offered the OSBiH 
access to training, exercises, and assistance from the most modern militaries in the world, improving 
its effectiveness and reinforcing its professionalism. Ashdown argues that ‘we could not have 
created a single army responsible to the state in BiH had there not been NATO as the magnetic pull,’ 
noting that the military leaderships in BiH ‘were professional, and they immediately saw the 
advantage of having a unified army up to NATO standards, and saw a single army in Bosnia as the 
best context to be professional soldiers. . . That was crucial.’126 Thus, in the eyes of many Bosnians 
and the international institutions in the country, military unification and international integration 
represented a significant step in BiH fulfilling the criteria of a ‘successful state’ on the ‘path to a 
sustainable peace as a member of the European institutions,’ and its military being recognised as a 
modern and professional force.127     
Although the OSBiH made rapid and considerable progress in terms of operability and 
administration, the ‘ethnic identification’ concession included in the reforms began veering off track 
almost immediately. Gregorian notes that one of the key aspects of the DRC’s conclusions which he 
was unsatisfied with were the names chosen for the regiments, commenting that he would have 
preferred ‘something innovative like the Una, the Bosna, and the Neretva regiments,’ which alluded 
to the former armies by reference to the location of their headquarters, but did not explicitly state 
ethnic allegiance.128 However, unsurprisingly, the names and symbols eventually selected were, for 
the most part, inspired by ethnicity. The Bosnian Croats chose Pješadijski gardijski puk (The Guards 
Infantry Regiment) and issued the Croatian šahovnica (checkerboard) as their regimental emblem, 
the Bosnian Muslim regiment was called the Pješadijski rendžerski puk (The Rangers Infantry 
Regiment) and received the Zlatni ljiljan (Golden Lily) as its emblem, and the Bosnian Serb regiment 
was called the Pješadijski Republika Srpska puk (Republika Srpska Infantry Regiment) and would 
wear the coat of arms of RS as its emblem. Whilst such variations in appearance are common to the 
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regimental system and are usually encouraged by its proponents to foster a unique regimental 
identity, all of the emblems that were chosen in BiH were prominent wartime symbols. Furthermore, 
the Guards Regiment now appeared, in both name and iconography, almost identical to its 
counterparts in the Croatian Army, and the RS coat of arms which the Republika Srpska Regiment 
had as its emblem was only two small fleurs-de-lis and some crossed sabres away from being that of 
the Serbian Army. While it should be noted that the troops in each regiment are required to wear 
the BiH flag in a superior position to any regimental symbol, and those symbols that are worn are set 
on a blue background (indicating infantry) and fringed with yellow, a pattern which happens to 
reflect the colours of the Bosnian flag, the imagery employed by the AFBiH regiments remains 
unconventional. 
The use of imagery associated with other states raises obvious questions regarding the loyalty of 
such units and highlights the potential for them to serve as a potential fifth column or Trojan Horse 
in the case of a conflict. Furthermore, by subscribing to an existing identity, the individuality and 
uniqueness of the regimental identities themselves are undermined. The Royal Irish Regiment of the 
British Army has perhaps the most in common with the Guards and RS Regiments of the OSBiH, as it 
historically draws its soldiers from a population who may primarily identify with a neighbouring 
state, Ireland. However, rather than drawing on imagery from the Irish State, the Royal Irish wear a 
clover leaf as their insignia, use a motto in the Irish language (Faugh a Ballagh; Modern Irish: Fág an 
Bealach; English: Clear the way), and their regimental colours depict a crown, symbolising loyalty to 
the British monarchy, and a harp, an established cultural symbol of the Irish. As a result, the 
regiment’s Irish identity is clearly displayed, yet it remains clear to what the regiment owes its 
loyalty, and furthermore, the regimental identity is free to develop separately from Irish national 
identity. In a similar manner, the Royal 22E Régiment of the Canadian Army displays its Francophone 
legacy through the use of the French language rather than imagery from France itself, successfully 
preserving its cultural heritage without styling itself as being in service to the French state.  
Conclusion 
Between the conception of the first DRC in April 2003 and the OSBiH’s accession to the PfP 
programme in December 2006, the security environment in BiH was transformed. In 2002, over a 
quarter of a million soldiers and reserves stood ready to go to war with each other, the state had no 
real military authority, and security had to be provided by external forces. By the Autumn of 2005, 
however, the number of soldiers and reserves had been reduced to a total of 15,000, democratically 
accountable civilian oversight of the military was established at the state-level, and the number of 
peacekeepers was dramatically reduced, with responsibility for them transferred from NATO to the 
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EU. Such changes went far beyond what was needed to satisfy the demands and conditionality of 
the international community, and undoubtedly contributed to increasing stability in BiH and the 
wider region. Viewed through the prism of peace and conflict studies, it is possible to illustrate the 
scale of change this represented. The ‘loyalty to the ideas of the state’ displayed by the leaderships 
of BiH’s constituent peoples by disbanding their wartime armed forces and supplying troops to the 
state-level military, compounded by the ‘improvement in attitudes and practices toward each other’ 
this represented, signifies the most significant step in the transition from a ‘negative’ peace to a 
‘legitimate’ one.129 Indeed, it can be argued that military integration alone achieved this progress, as 
although significant political divisions within BiH remain, any conflict between the constituent 
peoples is confined to constitutional state institutions. 
While a military that was inclusive and representative of the multiethnic population of BiH was 
created, the development of institutional identity and cohesion has been hampered by the 
antagonistic political discourse in the state that it serves. Despite the pervasiveness of these issues, 
progress made with defence reform should not be understated. Ashdown notes that ‘I think most 
people who know anything about Bosnia regard the fact that you have a unified army, responsible to 
the Presidency, as a miracle.’130 Considering the potential for the reformed defence sector to serve 
as a model for other Bosnian institutions, he argues that the military is ‘the place where the nation’s 
interests and the interests of those in the organisation have superseded, or mostly superseded, 
nationalistic tendencies.’131 Central to achieving this ‘miracle’ was the Orao Affair. Gregorian argues 
that the it was ‘crucial, vital’ for the success of defence reform in post-Dayton BiH, while Ashdown 
summarises its impact thus: ‘in politics you use what levers you can use which are presented to you. 
If one is presented to you, you use it. And the Orao Affair was certainly a lever to achieve what I 
wanted to achieve.’132 The opportunity presented by the Orao Affair was pivotal in illustrating the 
need for urgent reform, creating the context for it to take place, and building the political and 
diplomatic capital that was needed to achieve it.  
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Conclusion 
 
The years 1991 – 2006 represent a period of considerable upheaval and change in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Bosna i Herzegovina, BiH). After centuries of being ruled from Istanbul, Vienna, and 
Belgrade, a sovereign Bosnian state emerged. However, before the institutional and legal framework 
of the new state was established, the war began. Half of the population were forced from their 
homes, approximately ten percent served in an array of armed forces, political entities designed to 
replace BiH were founded, atrocities and genocide were committed, and divisions among the 
communities of BiH became firmly entrenched. The peace negotiated at Dayton ended the conflict 
and provided the blueprint for the new state, but gave the architects of the war what they wanted: 
the partition of BiH and the separation of its population. Since the agreement was signed, nationalist 
leaders of all ethnicities have perpetuated divisions between their respective constituencies and 
regularly campaigned against integration at every level. In such a climate, the integration of three 
formerly warring armies just a decade after the conflict came to an end represents a remarkable 
achievement of historic significance.   
This dissertation charts the story of how such a symbolically powerful moment came to pass while 
also offering fresh insights into the organisation and development of the five armies that preceded 
the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the first time, the military history of modern BiH, 
from independence to the creation of a unified army, has been presented and assessed as an 
integral whole. In addition, by building on existing research and focusing on the ways in which the 
various armed forces that operated in BiH in this timeframe approached the subjects of national 
identity and civil-military relations, the chapters presented here have provided many fresh 
perspectives on a complex and contentious topic.  
The first chapters outlined some models to better understand how multiethnic militaries have been 
organised historically and assessed how Yugoslav policymakers approached the construction of the 
Yugoslav People’s Army, as well as how they attempted to utilise it. This revealed the extent to 
which the leadership of Yugoslavia believed that the twin pillars of Brotherhood and Unity and 
socialism could forge not only a cohesive and effective army from the nations and nationalities they 
governed, but also a society. The gradual changes in military organisation and the reduction of 
efforts to use the JNA to promote a Yugoslav identity highlights the limited success of such 
integrative policies. However, the collapse of Yugoslavia is evidence enough to prove that the more 
“organic” approach they moved toward was no more effective.  
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Analysing the Bosnian War through the prism of military organisation illustrates the collapse of 
Yugoslavia from the perspective of its most important institution, as well as the emergence of three 
distinct state-building projects. The VRS chapter reveals how a premeditated plan to build an army, 
conquer territory, and establish a state was executed. It shows how the military was employed to 
promote the visions and ideas of Milošević, Karadžić, and Mladić, while also offering insights into the 
rivalry between the three leaders and the problems that emerged due to the ambiguous nature of 
the VRS’s chain of command. Furthermore, the chapter provides an unprecedented analysis of 
relationship between the VRS and the nascent state it nominally served, highlighting the 
unparalleled importance of the military in building Republika Srpska, both as a political entity and an 
idea.  
The chapter on the ARBiH and HVO reveals the painstaking process of building armed forces during a 
conflict and demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between the two militaries. More 
importantly, however, it charts the gradual decline of the ARBiH’s multiethnic outlook and 
composition. The evolution of the ARBiH from a diverse and inclusive institution into the 
predominantly-Muslim force it ended the war as shows the difficulties in maintaining such an 
identity while at war and illustrates the extent to which the military became an arena in which rival 
visions for the future of Bosnian society competed. Furthermore, the failure to preserve the 
multiethnic character of the ARBiH exemplifies the extent to which Bosnian society became 
increasingly divided by ethnicity as the war progressed and highlights the scale of the challenge that 
those aiming to build a multiethnic military in BiH after the war faced. The development of the HVO, 
in many ways, mirrors that of the ARBiH. The decline in multiethnicity and its increasing 
incorporation into the structures of the Croatian military illustrates the extent to which Bosnian 
society became divided during the war, as well as highlighting further the scale of the challenge that 
building a multiethnic army after the war represented. 
By analysing the ways in which the ARBiH, HVO, and VRS adjusted to peace, the chapter on the 
entity armies illustrates the many ways in which Bosnian political leaders continued to employ their 
armies to consolidate their constituencies and, in some ways, continue the war off the battlefield. 
Such leaders drew legitimacy from their command of their respective armed forces, and by extolling 
their sacrifices and triumphs in ceremonies and parades and polemicizing about the threat posed by 
the other armies in BiH, they were able to continue the division of BiH long after the fighting 
stopped. Furthermore, this chapter exposed a complex security environment, in which the ARBiH 
and HVO existed as separate forces within the same military and embarked on a comprehensive 
reform process, while the VRS remained very much linked with Belgrade. The divergent paths of the 
Army of the Federation and the VRS in this period not only made building a multiethnic military in 
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BiH more difficult, but also serves as a telling microcosm of the divisions that pervaded post-Dayton 
Bosnian society. However, by assessing regional political and security developments and the impact 
they had on BiH, the chapter also provides vital context for understanding how the defence reform 
and military integration process began.  
The culmination of this dissertation is the chapter on the Orao Affair and military integration in BiH. 
With the previous chapters illustrating the complexity of building a multiethnic military and 
providing the historical and military context in which unification took place, the final chapter focuses 
on the various diplomatic initiatives, political events, and technical challenges which steered the 
construction of the OSBiH. The insights offered by key figures in the process of military integration 
such as Paddy Ashdown and Raffi Gregorian provide an extraordinary perspective, which reveals 
both the circumstances which allowed reforms to be implemented and the individual efforts and 
processes which led to unification. The chapter also highlights a severely overlooked moment in 
Bosnian history: the Orao Affair. This scandal exposed many of the ambiguities and discrepancies of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement and was the key factor not only in catalysing the military integration 
process, but also in consolidating the power of the Bosnian state and driving the integration of BiH 
into Euro-Atlantic institutions forward. Finally, the rationale behind the selection of the regimental 
system to organise the OSBiH was explained before an analysis of its implementation. This revealed 
the reluctance of those implementing reform to move towards a model that resembled the JNA, 
particularly during its period of “Integral Organisation,” and the necessity for compromise, 
particularly regarding the individual ethnic identities and separate heritages of the three armies that 
were unified. Viewed in this light, it is clear why a model of “Organic Organisation” was selected. 
However, the relatively successful experience of the post-civil war Lebanese Army highlights the 
extent to which there are no clear solutions to the challenge of building a cohesive and effective 
army from a multiethnic society.  
Indeed, this challenge continues to test academics, policymakers, and military leaders to this day, 
and its salience shows little sign of receding. In 2014, the Iraqi Armed Forces disintegrated in the 
face of an aggressive and determined foe. Thousands of Iraqi troops deserted their posts rather than 
fight, abandoning some of the most advanced military equipment in the world, despite outmatching 
their opponent in every quantifiable metric.1 Their collapse was due to a ‘lack of moral cohesion’ and 
esprit de corps, informed in large part by the army’s multiethnic composition, despite over a decade 
                                                          
1 Major Adam Scher. “The Collapse of the Iraqi Army’s Will to Fight: A Lack of Motivation, Training, or Force 
Generation.” Military Review. (2016) p.1 
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of oversight and training by the US military.2 Indeed, after the collapse of Iraqi forces at Ramadi, US 
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated: ‘We can give them training, we can give them equipment. 
We obviously can't give them the will to fight.’3 Furthermore, of 49 conflicts considered active in 
2016, only two were between states.4 The prevalence of intrastate conflict in the world today 
requires the development of better approaches and a deeper understanding of the ways in which 
stable states and effective institutions, including the military, can be constructed. Many of the 47 
intrastate conflicts currently taking place will, presumably, one day be resolved in peace processes 
similar to the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war in BiH. The successful Bosnian 
experience with implementing defence reforms and integrating formerly warring armies into a 
credible and professional military can undoubtedly provide lessons that can contribute to more 
effective and sustainable transitions from conflict.  
In addition to such policy-relevant implications, this dissertation also offers an original contribution 
to numerous academic disciplines. On a political level, military unification signifies the successful 
implementation of comprehensive defence reforms which greatly improved BiH’s prospects of 
integration into institutions such as the EU and NATO, as well as a rare example of consensus in the 
Bosnian parliament. This not only fulfilled a specified objective of the Bosnian state but was seen as 
the key to building a lasting peace by international actors such as High Representative Paddy 
Ashdown. As the largest multiethnic institution in the country, the unified Armed Forces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Oružane snage Bosne i Hercegovine, OSBiH) also served as a symbol of 
reconciliation, and was viewed as a potential model for the reintegration of other aspects of Bosnian 
society.5 Furthermore, while much of BiH remains divided, the integration of the armed forces 
constitutes a small step to achieving the democratic, secular, and inclusive society that President 
Alija Izetbegović had declared as his vision to world leaders in London in 1992.6  
From a civil-military relations perspective, the emergence of the OSBiH represents the completion of 
two complex processes. Its formation was implemented alongside a reorganisation of the civilian 
institutions responsible for the armed forces, resulting in the establishment of state-level 
parliamentary oversight and properly accountable civilian leadership. Coupled with the 
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standardisation of doctrine and training, these changes represented the completion of the transition 
from a socialist to a democratic civil-military dynamic. In addition, through shifting military authority 
from the entities to the state, the unification of the armed forces meant that BiH fulfilled the key 
criterion of a Weberian state: a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. By examining this process 
in such detail, this dissertation provides a fascinating case study of state-formation.  
The strategic impact of military integration in BiH was considerable. The presence of three armies in 
a single state had been recognised as inherently destabilising. Merging these armies into a single 
military, particularly one which was considered a professional peer to NATO forces, signified one of 
the greatest steps in promoting stability in the Balkans since Dayton. This alleviated the burden on 
NATO and EU peacekeeping operations in BiH, and created the conditions necessary for the OSBiH to 
begin contributing troops to UN and NATO international forces. Although BiH has made little 
progress towards NATO membership since 2009 (due to obstructions from the Republika Srpska 
administration regarding the transfer to the state of military property seized in the war), most other 
conditions of its Membership Action Plan have been fulfilled. Bosnian accession to NATO would have 
a profound impact on the strategic environment in the Balkans. It would join Albania, Croatia, 
Montenegro, and, in all likelihood, Macedonia under the banner of NATO in an unprecedented 
alliance, but would leave Serbia surrounded tous azimuts by its historic adversary.7  
The military integration of former belligerents after civil wars is a topic of considerable interest to 
the peacebuilding community. The scale of the international community’s involvement in post-war 
BiH make it a prime example of the ‘New York Consensus’ (building free-market democracies) 
approach to building peace.8 Indeed, Kalevi Holsti argues that international intervention in BiH 
represented a ‘prototype’ for future interventions and state-building projects.9 In addition, the 
unification of the entity armies was the culmination of the demobilisation, disarmament, and 
reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) aspects of BiH’s post-conflict transition. As a 
result, the period 1995 – 2006 illustrates a prime example of the successful implementation of these 
processes. Furthermore, the decision of Bosnian political leaders to entrust the security of their 
                                                          
7 French President Charles de Gaulle spoke of the need for défense dans tous azimuts (defence in all directions) 
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Statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations. (London, 2009) p.287 
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constituents to the state symbolises a significant step in building ‘legitimate peace’ after conflict and 
reducing the chance of a return to violence.10 
Although every effort has been made to ensure the work presented in this dissertation is as 
comprehensive and expansive as possible, it can of course be enhanced in a number of ways. 
Developments in BiH did not occur in isolation. While the entire region underwent a period of rapid 
military change, some of which was addressed in the dissertation, a particular point of interest that 
would complement the research presented here was the construction of a multiethnic military in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (now North Macedonia). This process took place in parallel 
to the implementation of defence reforms in BiH, and involved building the framework of a new 
state, consolidating its authority, and forming a military from a diverse population. While this 
process was similar to that which took place in BiH, offering a good opportunity for comparative 
analysis, the most significant aspect of the Macedonia case is that it took place without a war. This 
offers the chance to analyse the impact of conflict on state and military formation by assessing both 
processes alongside each other.   
A more pertinent addition, however, would be an analysis of the development of the OSBiH since 
unification and an assessment of the ways it has impacted both the Bosnian state and population. In 
light of the increasing political polarisation in BiH in recent years, understanding the condition of the 
OSBiH and identifying its position in Bosnian society demands further research.  
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